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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
Energy markets are characterized by large uncertainties and risks. The an-
nual volatility of the Brent oil price is 28%, meaning that there is a 1-in-3
chance that next year’s oil price will be more than 28% higher or lower than
this year’s price.1 Similarly, the annual volatility of gas prices for domestic
consumers in Belgium/Brussels is 14%. The uncertainty is much larger than
in many other goods and services, such as cars, housing, or travel, to name
but a few household spending categories. This phenomenon is all the more
important since energy is an essential input to many production processes and
consumption patterns.
The risk in energy markets has several underlying causes: technical, such
as the recent application of new techniques that allow for the extraction of
‘shale gas’, which has depressed gas prices in the US; macroeconomic, such as
the drop in oil demand following the 2008/2009 global economic crisis, which
roughly halved oil prices; and political, such as the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis
in 2006 and 2009, or the first oil shock in the 1970s.
Part I of this thesis deals with political risk, and analyzes decisions of
resource-rich countries that affect the allocation of energy-related rents. Chap-
ter 2 studies the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis and how it impacts European
import strategies. Chapter 3 investigates the taxation of resource extraction in
petroleum-producing countries. Chapter 4 also studies taxation, but focuses
on a resource that is mostly exploited in Western countries, namely nuclear
power. Chapter 5 also deals with Western countries and explores the possible
outcome of potential international negotiations on the distribution of rents
1The oil price volatility is based on the annual time series 1976-2010 of Brent oil prices in
US dollar per barrel, according to BP (2011). The gas price volatility is based on Eurostat
(2011) semi-annual prices for households in Belgium/Brussels – before taxes – in the period
1985-2011, excluding seasonal effects.
15
16 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
arising from a trans-European CO2 pipeline network for Carbon Capture and
Storage (CCS).
Part II of this thesis investigates how firms can protect themselves against
the risks in energy supply, by hedging their exposure. The main challenge
in hedging is that energy markets are typically very incomplete, in that not
enough different contracts (such as options) exist to enable firms to hedge their
exposure completely. Chapter 6 analyzes the effect of market incompleteness
on welfare and investment incentives in the specific case of an electricity market
with demand uncertainty. Chapter 7 provides a generalization of the theory
for a generic market structure with non-specified uncertainty.
Table 1.1 compares the chapters of this dissertation in terms of the energy
commodities they deal with and the methodological emphasis. The chapters
in Part I each deal with a different commodity: gas, oil, electricity and CO2,
respectively. In Part II, Chapter 6 is applied to the case of electricity, while
Chapter 7 has generic validity. The methodological emphasis in Chapters 2,
4 and 7 is on theoretical modeling. Chapters 5 and 6 have a less theoretical
focus and mainly feature a numerical simulation. Chapter 3 has a substantial
empirical section.
Table 1.1: Comparison of chapters in terms of commodity and methodology
(“+” means moderate emphasis. “++” means strong emphasis.)
Chapter Commodity Model Simulation Econometrics
2 Gas ++ +
3 Oil + ++
4 Electricity ++ +
5 CO2 ++
6 Electricity + ++
7 (Generic) ++
1.2 Summary of chapters
Chapter 2. Europe’s dependence on Russian gas imports has been the sub-
ject of increasing political concern after gas conflicts between Russia and
Ukraine in 2006 and 2009. This paper assesses the potential impact of
Russian unreliability on the European gas market, and how it affects
European gas import strategy. We also study to what extent Europe
should invest in strategic gas storage capacity to mitigate the effects
of possible Russian unreliability. The European gas import market is
described by differentiated competition between Russia and a – more
reliable – competitive fringe of other exporters. The results show that
1.2. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 17
Russian contract volumes and prices decline significantly as a function
of unreliability, so that not only Europe but also Russia suffers if Rus-
sia’s unreliability increases. For Europe, buying gas from more reliable
suppliers at a price premium turns out to be generally more attractive
than building strategic gas storage capacity.
This chapter is joint work with Stef Proost, and has been published in
The Energy Journal, 2010, Volume 31, Issue 4.
Chapter 3. Tax rates on resource extraction vary widely between different
countries. This paper develops a political economy model of resource
taxation, in order to explain the differences in government take, i.e. the
share of resource extraction profits appropriated by the governments of
resource-rich countries. The theoretical model features taxes on resource
extraction, endogenous exploration and a formalized classification of gov-
ernment types. The model predicts that, all else equal, the government
take of resource extraction profits would increase with government autoc-
racy (as opposed to democracy) and government benevolence, and with
higher existing reserves base, while the government take would decrease
with higher undiscovered reserves or higher import dependence. Nearly
all of these effects are confirmed empirically for the case of oil, using OLS
on a cross-section of 77 countries. The statistically significant positive
effect of government autocracy (i.e. dictatorship) on government take is
shown to be robust in an IV analysis, and, to a lesser extent, a panel
data regression.
This chapter has been presented at ETE day in Leuven on March 3rd
2008, BEED 2009 at UCL-CORE on February 2nd 2009, the workshop
on Political Economy and Institutions in Transport, Energy and Envi-
ronment at KULeuven-CES on February 26th 2009, the Spring Meeting
of Young Economists 2009 in Istanbul on April 23rd-25th 2009, the In-
ternational Energy Workshop 2009 in Venice on June 17th-19th, EAERE
2009 in Amsterdam on June 24th-27th 2009, and a workshop on Politi-
cal Economy and the Environment at UCL-CORE on October 22nd-23rd
2009.
Chapter 4. The taxation of nuclear energy is studied using a stylized model
of the electricity sector, with one dominant nuclear producer and a com-
petitive fringe of fossil-fuel plants. We show that an unanticipated tax
on nuclear production can generate significant government revenue in
the short run without disturbing the market, but will harm investment
incentives in the long run, especially if the government cannot credibly
commit to a future tax rate. Even if the government is capable of cred-
ibly committing to an optimal long-run tax, government revenues from
the long-run tax will be very low due to the market power of the incum-
bent. Lifetime extension agreements negotiated with multiple potential
18 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
players, and competitive auctioning of new nuclear licenses are shown
to be the most attractive policies. The analytical results are illustrated
with a numerical simulation for the case of Belgium.
This chapter is joint work with Pieter Himpens and Stef Proost and has
been presented at the conference on The Economics of Energy Markets
at the Toulouse School of Economics in January 2010, an ETE seminar
in Leuven in March 2010, and the conference in honor of Yves Smeers
at CORE-UCL in June 2010. The text has been submitted to Energy
Economics.
Chapter 5. If CO2 Capture and Storage (CCS) is to become a viable op-
tion for low-carbon power generation, its deployment will require the
construction of dedicated CO2 transport infrastructure. In a scenario
of large-scale deployment of CCS in Europe by 2050, the optimal (cost-
minimising) CO2 transport network would consist of large international
bulk pipelines from the main CO2 source regions to the CO2 sinks in
hydrocarbon fields and aquifers, which are mostly located in the North
Sea. In this paper, we use a Shapley value approach to analyse the
multilateral negotiation process that would be required to develop such
jointly optimised CO2 infrastructure. Using the InfraCCS CO2 pipeline
network optimisation tool, we perform numerical simulations on the cost
burden allocation of a 28.0 billion euro CO2 pipeline network, which
would be required to reach the EU’s 2050 climate goals in the PRIMES-
based Power Choices scenario. We analyse two cases: one with national
pipeline monopolies and one with liberalised pipeline construction. We
find that countries with excess storage capacity capture 38% to 45% of
the benefits of multilateral coordination, with the higher number corre-
sponding to the case with liberalised pipeline construction. Countries
with a strategic transit location capture significant rent in the case of
national pipeline monopolies. Finally, the liberalisation of CO2 pipeline
construction reduces by two-thirds the differences between countries in
terms of cost per tonne of CO2 exported. As a side result of the analy-
sis, we find that the resource rent of a depleted hydrocarbon field (when
used for CO2 storage) is roughly $1 per barrel of original recoverable oil
reserves, or 1 euro per MWh of original recoverable gas reserves.
This chapter has been presented at the International Energy Workshop
2011 in Stanford, US, in July 2011.
Chapter 6. The high volatility of electricity markets gives producers and re-
tailers an incentive to hedge their exposure to electricity prices by buying
and selling derivatives. This paper studies how welfare and investment
incentives are affected when an increasing number of derivatives are in-
troduced. It develops an equilibrium model of the electricity market with
risk averse firms and a set of traded financial products, more specifically:
1.2. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 19
a forward contract and an increasing number of options. We first show
that aggregate welfare (the sum of individual firms’ utility) increases
with the number of derivatives offered, although most of the benefits are
captured with one to three options. Secondly, power plant investments
typically increase because additional derivatives enable better hedging of
investments. However, the availability of derivatives sometimes leads to
‘crowding-out’ of physical investments because firms’ limited risk-taking
capabilities are being used to speculate on financial markets. Finally,
we illustrate that players basing their investment decisions on risk-free
probabilities inferred from market prices, may significantly overinvest
when markets are not sufficiently complete.
This chapter is joint work with Bert Willems and has been published in
Energy Economics, 2010, Volume 32, pp. 786-795.
Chapter 7. In this paper we show that free entry decisions may be socially
inefficient, even in a perfectly competitive homogeneous goods market
with non-lumpy investments. In our model, inefficient entry decisions
are the result of risk-aversion of incumbent producers and consumers,
combined with incomplete financial markets which limit risk-sharing be-
tween market actors. Investments in productive assets affect the distri-
bution of equilibrium prices and quantities, and create risk spillovers.
From a societal perspective, entrants underinvest in technologies that
would reduce systemic sector risk, and may overinvest in risk-increasing
technologies. The inefficiency is shown to disappear when a complete fi-
nancial market of tradable risk-sharing instruments is available, although
the introduction of any individual tradable instrument may actually de-
crease efficiency.
This chapter is joint work with Bert Willems. It is No. 11.17 in the
Center for Economic Studies Discussions Paper Series (DPS), CentER
Discussion Paper No. 2011-057, and TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2011-
029.
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Chapter 2
Russian Gas Imports in
Europe: How Does
Gazprom Reliability
Change the Game?
This chapter has been published in The Energy Journal.
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, security of gas supply has been high on the political agenda
in Europe. Gas import dependence of the European OECD bloc will increase
from 45% in 2006 to 69% in 2030, according to the IEA (2008) Reference Sce-
nario. Russia plays a crucial role, given that it already supplies more than
half of Europe’s gas imports and that it has the largest proven natural gas
reserves in the world (BP, 2006-2008).1 This has been a source of increasing
political concern, especially since 2006, when Russian gas export monopolist
Gazprom launched an effort to increase the gas prices paid by Russia’s neigh-
boring states, as shown in Table 2.1. The price conflict in Ukraine sparked
strong political reactions in Europe, because it led to interruptions of gas sup-
plies to Europe in the beginning of 2006 and 2009. Energy supply security
and in particular the potential unreliability of Russian gas imports became an
important topic at EU summits and G8 meetings, and in bilateral discussions
with Russia. After the second conflict in January 2009, Czech Prime Minister
Topolanek – then President of the European Council – even stated explicitly
1In this paper, the terms Europe and European refer to the EU-27 plus Norway, Switzer-
land and Iceland, unless indicated otherwise.
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Table 2.1: Gas prices for Russia’s neighboring states, in USD per tcm
Country Price on
Dec 31,
2005
Increased price
demanded by
Gazprom
Price on
Jan 1,
2007
Ukraine 50 230 130
Belarus 46 200 100
Georgia 100 235 235
Moldova 80 (unknown) 170
Note: tcm = thousand cubic meters. Source: Press sources (2006)
that “the EU must weaken its dependence on Russian gas imports” (IHT, Jan
28, 2009).2
This paper provides an economic perspective on Russia’s strategic position
in the European gas market by answering the following two research questions:
1. What is the potential impact of Russian unreliability on the European
gas market, and how does this affect European gas import decisions?
2. To what extent should Europe invest in strategic gas storage capacity to
mitigate the effects of potential Russian unreliability?3
We study long-term gas contracting in a non-cooperative setting, using
a partial equilibrium model of the European gas market, with differentiated
competition between one potentially unreliable ‘dominant firm’ (Russia) and a
reliable ‘competitive fringe’ of other non-European import suppliers. Russia’s
potential unreliability is modeled by assuming that there is a probability δ
that Russia does not comply with the long-term contracts it has signed: with
probability δ, Russia ‘defaults’ and withholds supply to increase its price to
monopolistic levels for a duration of 4 months.
2It should be noted that the relation between Russia and Europe is very different from
the relation between Russia and its neighboring states, which, before the price increase,
were receiving gas from Russia at prices below netback parity. In addition, it is suspected
that Russia’s price increases in neighboring states are a prelude to deregulation of Russia’s
domestic gas market, which currently also has below-market prices. Both considerations
imply Russia had understandable reasons for raising prices to its neighbors. On the other
hand, Russian gas prices for Europe in 2006 were already in line with the prices in the
middle column of Table 2.1, which made Europe a profitable and important customer for
Russia. Given that, in addition, Gazprom was trying to enter the downstream European
gas market, Russia was unlikely to act in the same way towards Europe as it did towards
Ukraine. Nevertheless, as a result of the Ukrainian gas crises, European politicians and gas
consumers clearly started questioning the reliability of Russia as a gas supplier.
3Hence, the focus of the paper is on strategic storage. This storage is in addition to
any storage that is necessary for technical reasons such as seasonal and daily fluctuations.
Storage for technical reasons is not considered in this paper and is assumed to be sized
independently of the supply security considerations raised in this paper.
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The numerical analysis in this paper shows that it is not optimal for Russia
to cut gas supplies to Europe completely during a crisis: rather, one can
expect Russia to reduce its gas supplies by roughly 40% during the 4 months,
thereby temporarily increasing gas prices by roughly 40%. More importantly,
the analysis shows that not only Europe but also Russia suffers when Russia’s
probability of default δ increases. Indeed, as Russia becomes – or is perceived
as becoming – more unreliable, Europe procures a larger volume of long-term
gas import contracts from the competitive fringe. This way, Europe makes
itself less dependent on Russia and therefore less vulnerable in the event of
Russian withholding. With increasing Russian unreliability, the volume of
long-term gas import contracts with Russia decreases while Russia has to
grant an ever higher discount in its contracts. The resulting negative impact
on Russia’s profits is not sufficiently counterbalanced by the gains it makes in
case it does not comply with its contracts. As a result, Russia’s expected profits
are found to decrease as Russia’s unreliability increases. As mentioned before,
investments in strategic gas storage capacity can reduce Europe’s vulnerability.
However, the numerical simulations show that strategic storage capacity is only
attractive for Europe if Russian unreliability is high (δ of more than 30%) and
storage capacity costs are reduced by a factor 3 to 4 compared to typical
current cost levels.
Earlier papers have studied Russian gas imports into Europe from differ-
ent perspectives. Hirschhausen et al. (2005) focus on the strategic interaction
between Russia and transit countries such as Ukraine and Belarus. Grais and
Zheng (1996) analyze the quantity, price and transit fee of gas contracts be-
tween Russia and Europe, in a hierarchical three-stage Stackelberg game in
which Russia is the leader, followed by the transit country, which in turn is
followed by the response of European demand (factoring in a potential alter-
native gas supplier). They study the impact of exogenous shocks, e.g. an
exogenous change in the preference for Russian gas over other gas, and they
mention reliability as a potential cause of such a shock. Our model has a non-
cooperative multi-stage structure similar to Grais and Zheng (1996), but goes
a step further by explicitly examining how reliability affects the demand for
Russian gas compared to gas from other suppliers: a demand shift resulting
from a change in (un-)reliability is an endogenous effect in our model. In ad-
dition, our paper investigates investment in strategic gas storage capacity. On
the flip side, to keep the paper focused, we do not model the strategic behavior
of transit countries.
The effect of a Russian supply interruption has recently been examined
by Hartley and Medlock (2009): as part of their analysis of potential futures
for Russian gas exports, they use a comprehensive numerical dynamic spatial
equilibrium model to study the global supply chain repercussions of a scenario
in which Russia withholds roughly one third of its gas supplies to Europe dur-
ing a 4-month period. Hartley and Medlock (2009) model the interruption
as a deterministic shock with exogenous size. In contrast, in our model, the
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size of the shock is endogenous, and more importantly, there is uncertainty as
to whether the shock will occur. Our model provides an analytical study of
how the anticipation of a possible shock – in other words, the perception of
unreliability – alters strategic decisions. Our methodology for modeling unre-
liability is taken from the pioneering paper by Nordhaus (1974), who analyzes
oil supply interruptions using a model with two regimes: a normal regime and
a supply interruption regime, each with its probability. Like Nordhaus (1974),
we investigate the option of investing in storage capacity.4 However, in ad-
dition, our model analyzes the contrast between an unreliable supplier and
a reliable competitive fringe. In this setting, gas import contracts with the
reliable competitive fringe and investments in storage capacity are (imperfect)
substitutes.
Since our paper studies long-term gas import contracts, there are similari-
ties with the literature that deals with these contracts (such as Boucher et al.,
1987, and Neuhoff and Hirschhausen, 2005) and with the ‘hold-up’ literature,
such as Hubert and Ikonnikova (2004). However, an important difference be-
tween the approach in this paper and the approach of Hubert and Ikonnikova
(2004) or Ikonnikova and Zwart (2009) is that the latter two papers use coop-
erative game theory and explicitly model the negotiation/bargaining between
the various parties. Our paper, in contrast, describes the gas market in a non-
cooperative setting with quantity competition, following the seminal work of
Mathiesen et al. (1987), several well-known analyses such as Golombek et al.
(1995, 1998), Boots et al. (2004) and more recent work such as Holz et al.
(2008) and Lise et al. (2008).5 Most of this literature considers European con-
sumers as price-takers with linear demand, which is also the approach taken
in this paper.6
On a broader microeconomic level, the analysis of this paper fits into the
literature on differentiated competition. Indeed, as will be shown in Section
2.3, the contrast of a potentially unreliable gas import supplier (in this case:
Russia) and a set of reliable import suppliers (in this case: the competitive
fringe of other non-European import suppliers), results in a market structure
similar to differentiated competition. Singh and Vives (1984) for example,
compare Cournot and Bertrand competition in differentiated duopoly, while
4Nordhaus (1974) also investigates import taxes, but it turns out that storage is the most
specific response to supply security concerns. In this paper, storage shall therefore be used
as the exemplification of a broader range of policy measures (e.g. import taxes, rationing,
subsidies for renewable energy, etc.).
5Note in particular that an analysis of long-term contracts is not considered inconsis-
tent with non-cooperative modeling. On the contrary, Boots et al. (2004) also use (non-
cooperative) Cournot-Nash modeling, which they justify by writing “competition can be
expected to take place through quantities, since long-term take-or-pay contracts still prevail
in the natural gas market” (Boots et al., 2004, p.74).
6However, unlike this paper, the models of Boots et al. (2004) and Golombek et al.
(1995, 1998) analyze a segmentation of the European market, based on country and/or type
of consumer and/or season. Our paper has only one aggregate demand curve. Note that
Holz et al. (2008), as an exception, use non-linear demand curves.
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Gaudet and Moreaux (1990) do the same for the particular case of nonrenew-
able natural resources. The main contribution of our paper is that it introduces
the notion of unreliability directly into the market structure of the European
gas market.
2.2 Model of the European gas market
2.2.1 European demand, domestic supply, and objective
function
Europe is modeled as a large number of uncoordinated gas consumers and
domestic gas producers, with an overarching government that can decide to
invest public funds in gas storage capacity. We assume Europe is a price-taker
with a linear long-run inverse demand curve for gas:
p(q) = α+ βq (2.1)
European domestic producers supply an exogenous and fixed7 quantity qD, and
the remaining excess demand q − qD needs to be satisfied by non-European
imports. Short-run demand is also linear, but with a steeper slope βSR:
pSR(q) = p
∗ + βSR · (q − q∗) (2.2)
with (p∗, q∗) representing the long-run equilibrium.
We assume that decisions on long-term gas import contracts and publicly
financed strategic storage capacity investments are based on a combination of
the interests of importers, end-consumers, domestic producers and taxpayers.
We therefore assume that Europe maximizes the expected total ‘European
surplus’ E[S]:
maxE[S] with S = CS + ΠD −G (2.3)
where CS is the consumer surplus,8 ΠD represents the profits of domestic pro-
ducers, and G is the public expenditure on gas storage capacity investments.
−G represents the interests of the recipients of marginal expenditures out of
general government revenue. Note that equation (2.3) assumes risk-neutrality.
Annex 2.D deals with the case of European risk aversion.
7A case of elastic domestic supply is discussed in Annex 2.E.
8For the sake of simplicity, our model does not go to the level of individual end-consumers
such as households, industrial users and power generators. Therefore, the term CS, as we
will compute it based on demand curve (2.1), is in fact the importer surplus. In practice,
this surplus is somehow divided into importers’ profits on the one hand and end-consumer
surplus on the other hand. We will not make that distinction, since it depends on market
power and regulation in individual countries. We will simply refer to CS as ‘consumer
surplus’.
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2.2.2 Non-European gas import suppliers
Excess demand needs to be satisfied by signing long-term import contracts with
non-European import suppliers. We assume that the non-European import
suppliers have a dominant firm – competitive fringe structure.9 Russia is the
‘dominant firm’ and the other non-European gas import suppliers are grouped
together as the ‘competitive fringe’.
Russia is modeled as a monolithic entity, i.e. the Russian state is not
distinguished from the gas exporter Gazprom. Russia is assumed to be a
risk-neutral profit maximizer. Russia is modeled to be unreliable: once the
long-term contracts have been signed, there is a probability δ that Russia
temporarily does not comply with its previous supply commitments, i.e. Russia
‘defaults’. Conversely, there is a probability (1− δ) that Russia complies with
its long-term contracts during the entire period. All participants know the
parameter δ upfront.10 Russia’s long-run marginal costs of production are
assumed constant at cR.
The competitive fringe is a diversified set of current or potential future
non-European gas import suppliers, including both pipeline and LNG supplies.
Therefore, we assume that – as a group – the competitive fringe is reliable:
even if Russia defaults, the competitive fringe delivers the originally promised
contract quantity q0 at the originally promised contract price p0. This requires
two assumptions. First, we assume that the long-term gas import contracts
between Europe and the competitive fringe are not indexed on any gas spot
market price, which would rise sharply in the event of Russian default. In
practice, this condition is fulfilled since most current long-term gas import
contracts contain little or no indexation on gas spot market prices. Second, we
assume that the competitive fringe players do not deviate from their contracts.
This is a major assumption, which can be justified by the difference in scale
between Russia and each of the other non-European import suppliers. Each
of the other non-European import suppliers has much less incentive to be
unreliable because the market impact of each of them is much smaller. In
addition, a supplier who is perceived as unreliable could face the threat of
being replaced by another supplier in the long term. Russia, on the other hand,
is hard to replace completely in the long term, even if it behaves unreliably.
9This fairly standard model of industrial organization is described in multiple textbooks,
e.g. Carlton and Perloff (2000, Chapter 4).
10Hence, δ is exogenous, and there is perfect and complete information about it. The
rationale for exogeneity of δ is that Russia’s decision-makers are also aware of the potential
unreliability of the Russian state, and that they do not have full control over Russia’s
image of unreliability, nor over Russia’s actual behavior over the entire period for which
gas contracts are signed. For instance, although Russia never cut gas supplies to Europe
during the Ukrainian gas conflicts, the conflict nevertheless led to an increased perception of
unreliability in Europe. As we will see later, our model shows that if Russia had full control
over its unreliability, it would be optimal for Russia to be perfectly reliable (δ = 0). Since
we want to study the effects of increased unreliability (whether it is pursued deliberately or
not), we make δ exogenous. In Section 2.5, we mention a different approach which could
lead to an endogenous δ.
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As we will see below in Section 2.2.3, the reliability of the competitive fringe
does not mean that – in the event of Russian default – there would be price
discrimination between end-consumers of Russian gas and end-consumers of
gas from the competitive fringe. There will be only one single end-consumer
price.11 However, the rents that result from the compliance of the competitive
fringe in the event of Russian default accrue to European importers. Therefore,
the most important implication of our assumption is that these rents are part
of the European surplus function S in equation (2.3), and are not part of
the profits of the competitive fringe. As for costs, we assume that the long-
run marginal cost curve of the competitive fringe is linearly increasing: c0 +
d0q0 (with q0 the volume of long-term gas import contracts supplied by the
competitive fringe, and c0, d0 positive constants).
The above-mentioned long-run marginal cost functions (i.e. cR for Russia,
and c0 + d0q0 for the competitive fringe) include not only production costs,
but also transportation costs. The calibration for the numerical simulations of
Section 2.4 will take this into account.12 Finally, since this paper analyzes the
gas market on an aggregated European level and does not model gas delivery
to end-consumers, distribution costs are irrelevant.
2.2.3 Structure of the game
The interaction between Europe, Russia and the competitive fringe, is modeled
as a game in three stages. Figure 2.1 explains the different stages of the game.
In a nutshell: in Stage 1 Europe decides how much to invest in strategic gas
storage capacity; Stage 2 is the stage in which Europe signs long-term gas
import contracts with Russia and the competitive fringe; Stage 3 consists in
the execution of the long-term gas import contracts, in which Russia may or
may not comply with the long-term contracts it has signed. We represent the
imported gas quantities by qR,1 (Russia complies with long-term contracts),
qR,2 (Russia defaults) and q0 (competitive fringe). The corresponding prices
are denoted pR,1, pR,2 and p0.
Before describing each of the stages in detail, it is important to note that
the stochastic outcome of Stage 3 influences the strategic interaction in Stage
2, because Europe and Russia factor the expected value of Stage 3 pay-offs
into their decisions in Stage 2. In Stage 3, European surplus is either S = S1
or S = S2 depending on whether Russia complies with its long-term contracts
11One could imagine offering interruptible contracts to industrial consumers at a discount.
We will not consider that option in this paper.
12Note that, while certain parts of the transportation cost can be estimated reasonably
well (e.g. LNG shipping from overseas suppliers to Europe), transportation sometimes
relies on transit countries (e.g. Ukraine), which leads to additional complexity. For exam-
ple, Hirschhausen et al. (2005) explicitly study the strategic considerations involved in gas
transport from Russia to Europe via transit countries Ukraine and Belarus. While these
considerations are important, our paper focuses on the strategic interaction between Europe
and its import suppliers. We use OME (2002) estimates of the transit fees.
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or not. In Stage 2, Europe therefore tries to maximize the expected surplus
E[S]. This maximization problem can be translated into demand functions
for Russian and other long-term gas import contracts by finding – for given
long-term gas contract prices – the optimal long-term gas contract quantities
that maximize Europe’s expected surplus E[S] in Stage 3. As for Russia, its
expected profits in Stage 3 are either ΠR = ΠR,1 or ΠR = ΠR,2, depending on
whether Russia complies with its long-term contracts or not. Therefore, in the
‘dominant firm – competitive fringe’ game in Stage 2, dominant firm Russia
sets the optimal gas contract quantity to maximize its expected profits E[ΠR]
in Stage 3, taking into account the long-term gas import contract supply curve
of the competitive fringe and Europe’s above-mentioned demand functions for
Russian and other long-term gas import contracts. European demand for long-
term gas import contracts will turn out to be differentiated between gas import
contracts from Russia and gas import contracts from the competitive fringe,
because their effect in Stage 3 is different. The rest of this section describes
the three stages in more detail.
In Stage 1, Europe decides to foresee a quantity qS (in bcm, i.e. billion
cubic meters) of strategic gas storage capacity, to be used as a buffer in case
of withholding of gas supply by Russia. Given the long lead times involved in
the development of storage sites, this decision cannot be postponed until it is
known whether Russia will comply with its contracts or not (i.e. it cannot wait
until Stage 3). Furthermore, in our model, the storage capacity investment
decision takes place before decisions are made regarding the amounts of long-
term gas imports that are contracted from Russia and the competitive fringe
(i.e. before Stage 2). The reason is that investment in storage capacity is a
decision that Europe can make unilaterally. By making the storage capacity
investment decision in a separate stage upfront (Stage 1), Europe gives its
storage capacity investment decision an advantageous Stackelberg leadership
position in the strategic game with its gas import suppliers. In making the
decision about storage capacity investment, Europe takes into account the
strategic behavior of Stage 2, and it has perfect and complete information to
do so.
In Stage 2 Europe signs long-term gas import contracts with Russia and
with the competitive fringe. Our approach is non-cooperative, with Europe as
a price-taker in a ‘dominant firm – competitive fringe’ model of the long-term
gas import contract market. Russia, as the dominant firm, puts a quantity qR,1
(in bcm per year) on the European market, for which it receives a price pR,1 (in
EUR per tcm, i.e. EUR per thousand cubic meters).13 In making its decision,
Russia already takes into account the subsequent decision of the competitive
fringe, who put a quantity q0 (in bcm per year) on the market, for which they
receive a price p0 (in EUR per tcm). The prices pR,1 and p0 are the response
13Note that bcm per year is consistently used for quantities, while EUR / tcm is consis-
tently used for price. The alternative use of bcm and tcm makes the resulting quantity and
price numbers conveniently end up in the 0-200 range.
32 CHAPTER 2. RUSSIAN GAS IMPORTS
of the European inverse demand functions to the quantities qR,1 and q0. The
quantity-price pairs (qR,1, pR,1) and (q0, p0) represent the long-term gas import
contracts signed between Europe and Russia, and between Europe and the
competitive fringe, respectively. Because of Russian unreliability, the prices
pR,1 and p0 do not need to be the same. Although there are separate inverse
demand functions for Russian and other gas – resulting from the behavior of
importers – the end-consumers face a single price for gas and cannot choose
their own mix of reliable and non-reliable gas. There is a single end-consumer
price in each of the two states of the world in Stage 3.
Stage 3, the final stage of the game, is the execution of the long-term gas
import contracts signed in Stage 2. Stage 3 is the stage that results in actual
pay-offs for the participants to the game. We study one representative year:
although the import contracts and storage capacity investment decisions are
long-term decisions that will hold for multiple years, all volumes and monetary
pay-offs in Stage 3 are shown as annual amounts. In a representative year,
there is a probability 1−δ that Russia honors its commitments, and effectively
delivers qR,1 at a price pR,1. This is ‘Case 1’ (Russia complies with long-term
contracts). Figure 2.2 illustrates Case 1 graphically. qD is the gas supply
from European domestic producers, which is assumed to be exogenous and
fixed (inelastic). The shaded area, S1, is the European surplus according
to equation (2.3), but without taking any storage capacity investments into
account.14 End-consumers pay a single price corresponding to p∗ ∈ [pR,1, p0],
such that demand at price p∗ is exactly equal to qD + q0 + qR,1.
In a representative year, there is also a probability δ of default, in which
case Russia withholds supply to maximize short-run profits. This is ‘Case 2’
(Russia defaults), which is depicted in Figure 2.3. Assuming that neither qD
nor q0 can increase in the short run, Russia can set qR,2 < qR,1, for which it
can command a price pR,2  pR,1. Note that this price is derived from the
short-run demand curve (2.2). Europe responds by cutting consumption and
using the maximum amount of stored gas, which is constrained by the storage
capacity qS chosen in Stage 1. The storage capacity investment only covers
the cost of the storage facility and the capital cost of the unused gas, but
not the purchase price of the stored gas itself. The gas withdrawn from the
storage will therefore need to be replaced for future crises, and we assume that
this can be done at some point at a price equal to p0. Effectively, the price
of using gas from the storage is therefore p0 (in addition to storage capacity
costs, which are sunk). The competitive fringe always delivers q0 at price p0,
whatever happens in Stage 3. As before, this does not mean that identical end-
consumers would pay different prices in the event of Russian default. Since the
marginal unit of gas import supply in the short run in case of Russian default
14For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the domestic suppliers have zero cost, hence
the shaded area for q ∈ [0, qD] in Figure 2.2 extends all the way down to the horizontal axis.
A non-zero cost would merely constitute a uniform shift of the European surplus function,
which would not affect results.
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Figure 2.2: Demand and supply in Case 1 – Russia complies with long-term
contracts
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Figure 2.3: Demand and supply in Case 2 – Russia ‘defaults’
qR,2qD
p
q
qS
Loss in 
European 
surplus due to
Russian default 
(DS)
p0
p*
q0
pR,2
pR,1
qR,1
34 CHAPTER 2. RUSSIAN GAS IMPORTS
has a cost pR,2 (because only Russia could increase supply), the ‘marginal’
price for end-consumers should correspond to pR,2. While this does create a
rent from the fringe supply contracts equal to (pR,2 − p0)q0, the rent is part
of the European surplus.15 In total, the European surplus in case of Russian
default is lower than S1 from Figure 2.2. Figure 2.3 shows ∆S, the loss in
European surplus due to Russian default. This loss is discussed in more detail
in equation (2.8) in the next section.
The three stages of the game represent three distinct decisions. We assume
that this 3-stage game is played once. In practice, the game is obviously re-
peated after a number of years, but because the lead times for gas projects are
very long, we do not consider the repeated game. Finally, if Russia ‘defaults’
(probability δ), the assumption is that this happens only during a fraction τ
of the year. For the remaining fraction (1−τ) of the year, Russia respects qR,1
and pR,1. This is comparable with the approach taken by Hartley and Med-
lock (2009): in their scenario of a Russian supply interruption, they consider a
supply reduction which lasts for 4 months in the year 2010. In our model, this
corresponds to setting τ = 4/12. If Russia defaults, Figure 2.3 represents the
supply situation during a fraction τ of the year, while Figure 2.2 represents
the supply situation during the remaining fraction (1− τ) of the year.16 The
volumes qD, q0, qS , qR,2 shown in Figure 2.3 should be interpreted as annual-
ized volumes.17 This means, in particular, that in order to have access to an
annualized storage withdrawal volume of qS during a Russian default (which
15Both in Case 1 and in Case 2, there may be a rent (or loss) for importers, because
the price paid by end-consumers (p∗ in Case 1, and pR,2 in Case 2) does not correspond
to the average price paid by the importers (a weighted average of p0 and pR,1 in Case 1,
and a weighted average of p0 and pR,2 in Case 2). This positive or negative rent is treated
as an integral part of European surplus. In the simplest situation, the rent takes the form
of windfall profits (or losses) for gas importers. However, more realistically, we can expect
that European governments would intervene and take measures that would redistribute
the rents (or losses) to end-consumers, e.g. through non-linear tariffs. One example of
non-linear tariffs during a Russian default (Case 2), would be a measure that allows all
households a rationed share of q0+qS at a price corresponding to p0, while the remaining gas
imports are priced according to pR,2. This measure would distribute the rent (pR,2 − p0)q0
to end-consumers whilst ensuring that demand is reduced to the available gas quantity
qD + q0 + qS + qR,2 because the ‘marginal’ price perceived by households is still pR,2.
16The effects of τ and δ on the end result are quite similar. For example, the expression
that we will develop for the discount in Russia’s contract price (equation (2.11)) will turn out
to be a function of the product δτ . This would mean that e.g. a 30% chance of a 4-month
supply interruption would be to some extent equivalent to a 40% chance of a 3-month supply
interruption. In the remainder of the paper, τ is chosen to be 4/12. A different value of τ
would roughly result in a horizontal scaling of the results in Figures 2.4 and 2.5.
17The notion ‘annualized’ in this paper means that the quantity is extrapolated to an
entire year. For example, suppose Europe has a contract with Russia for qR,1 = 120 bcm
per year, i.e. 10 bcm per month. During a 4-month crisis (τ = 4/12), Russia reduces supply
from 10 bcm per month to 6 bcm per month. In that case, we will have qR,2 = 12× 6 = 72
bcm per year. Note however, that the crisis lasts for only 4 months, so the volume supplied
by Russia during the crisis is only 4 × 6 = 24 bcm. However, to make the magnitude of
qR,1 and qR,2 comparable, we choose to represent annualized amounts in the figures and
formulas: everything is expressed per year.
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lasts for a fraction τ of the year), a storage capacity of only τqS is needed.
Furthermore, the total European surplus S2 during a representative year in
the event of Russian default is given by:
S2 = (1− τ)S1 + τ(S1 −∆S) = S1 − τ∆S (2.4)
In summary, our model describes Russia’s unreliability as a potential ‘de-
fault’ event, with a probability δ of default.18 The model takes into account two
ways for Europe to escape from the unreliability of Russian gas supplies: on
the one hand, diversification by signing long-term contracts with the competi-
tive fringe, and on the other hand, investments in strategic storage capacity.19
The next section solves the model analytically.
2.3 Analytical solution
We will now analyze the game described in Section 2.2 using backward induc-
tion. The three stages of the game will therefore be discussed in reverse order.
This section discusses each of the steps in detail.
2.3.1 Stage 3: Execution of contracts
Stage 3 determines the pay-offs for Europe, Russia and the competitive fringe.
There are two possible cases: either Russia complies with the long-term con-
tracts it has signed (Case 1) or Russia ‘defaults’ (Case 2). We will compute
the pay-offs of Europe and Russia in each of these two cases.
Case 1: Russia complies with long-term contracts. In this case, the
European surplus in a representative year corresponds to the shaded area S1
in Figure 2.2:
S1 = α ·(qD+q0 +qR,1)+ 1
2
β ·(qD+q0 +qR,1)2−p0q0−pR,1qR,1−cSτqS (2.5)
This result is obtained by applying equation (2.3), or directly graphically from
Figure 2.2. The first two terms are simply the integration of the inverse de-
mand curve (2.1) on the interval [0; qD + q0 + qR,1]. The next two terms rep-
resent the expenditure on imported gas, taking into account that both Russia
and the competitive fringe comply with their contracts. The last term is the
yearly storage capacity cost G = cSτqS . In this expression, cS is the yearly
18The model thus accounts for uncertainty in Russia’s behavior (i.e. deliberate supply
withholding and price increases), as opposed to technical uncertainty. Technical uncertainty
is the risk of a sudden supply interruption because of technical failure of e.g. gas pipeline
systems. Technical uncertainty is not considered in this paper.
19Similarly, the section on supply security in the energy policy communication of European
Commission (2007) emphasizes strategic storage and diversification.
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constant marginal cost of gas storage capacity, expressed in EUR per tcm per
year. One could interpret G as the yearly rent to be paid for the storage site.
Note that G has to be paid whether or not the gas is actually withdrawn.
Russia’s profits in a representative year in Case 1 are:
ΠR,1 = (pR,1 − cR)qR,1 (2.6)
Case 2: Russia defaults. In this case, Russia does not supply qR,1 at pR,1,
but delivers a lower quantity qR,2 at a higher price pR,2, for a fraction τ of the
representative year. Since Russia’s unilateral action comes as a surprise, the
relation between qR,2 and pR,2 is determined by Europe’s short-run demand
curve (2.2), taking into account the mitigating effect of storage. Annex 2.A
derives Russia’s optimal quantity and price:
qR,2 = − 1
2βSR
[p∗ − βSR(qR,1 − qS)− cR]
pR,2 =
1
2
[p∗ − βSR(qR,1 − qS) + cR] (2.7)
Remember that βSR < 0 and so the second term in the expression for pR,2
is a positive mark-up. Higher qR,1 or lower qS lead to higher vulnerability
of Europe and therefore increase the potential monopoly price pR,2. In other
words, the impact of Russian unreliability is larger when Russia has a larger
market share to begin with (larger qR,1), or when Europe has less strategic gas
storage capacity (lower qS). The price pR,2 also increases with p
∗, because p∗
is the starting point of the European price before Russian withholding.
The loss in European surplus during the Russian default can be derived
from Figure 2.3:
∆S = (p0 − pR,1)qS + (pR,2 − pR,1)qR,2 +
+ [(p∗ − pR,1) + 1
2
(pR,2 − p∗)](qR,1 − qS − qR,2) (2.8)
∆S applies only during the crisis, which lasts for a fraction τ of the year.
Note that the value of ∆S is an annualized amount, like qR,2. The first term
in equation (2.8) is the consumer surplus lost because gas from the storage is
more expensive than the original contract with Russia. The second term is
the consumer surplus lost because of the Russian price increase from pR,1 to
pR,2. The last line in equation (2.8) is the loss of consumer surplus due to the
unserved demand qR,1−qS−qR,2. In Figure 2.3, this corresponds to the part of
the striped area above the interval q ∈ [qD+q0 +qS+qR,2; qD+q0 +qR,1]. The
total European surplus S2 in a representative year in which Russia defaults
can be obtained by substituting equation (2.8) into equation (2.4).
Russia’s annualized profits during the 4-month crisis are (pR,2 − cR)qR,2.
Russia’s profits ΠR,2 during an entire representative year in which Russia
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defaults are simply a weighted average of this amount and ΠR,1, with weights
τ and 1− τ , respectively.
Since p∗ = α + β · (qD + q0 + qR,1), equations (2.5) through (2.8) can be
easily expressed as a function of qS , qR,1, q0, pR,1 and p0, i.e. the parameters
of Stages 1 and 2. The results of these equations are taken into account by
Europe and Russia when they make strategic decisions in Stage 2.
2.3.2 Stage 2: Signing long-term gas import contracts
In Stage 2, Europe signs long-term gas import contracts with Russia and
with the competitive fringe, i.e. the quantities qR,1 and q0 and the prices
pR,1 and p0 are determined. In our non-cooperative setting, Russia and the
competitive fringe set quantities to maximize profits while taking into account
Europe’s inverse demand functions. In our solution procedure, we will first
determine the European inverse demand functions for long-term gas import
contracts, then determine the non-strategic decisions of the competitive fringe,
and finally analyze the actions of ‘dominant firm’ Russia.
European inverse demand functions for long-term gas import con-
tracts. For given long-term gas import contract prices pR,1 and p0, European
demand for long-term gas import is derived by finding the optimal quantities
qR,1 and q0 that maximize the expected value of European surplus E[S]:
E[S] = (1− δ)S1 + δS2 = S1 − δτ∆S (2.9)
with S1 and ∆S as computed above. The resulting quantities qR,1(pR,1, p0, qS)
and q0(pR,1, p0, qS) will also be a function of stage-1 decision variable qS . By
inverting the resulting expressions, we obtain the inverse demand functions.
For the special case in which τ = 1, qS = qD = 0 and cR = 0, the inverse
demand functions are:20
pR,1 = α
φ
1−δ + β
φ+ 3δ4 (k−1)
1−δ qR,1 + β
φ
1−δ q0
p0 = α
(
φ+ 3δ4
)
+ βφ qR,1 + β
(
φ+ 3δ4
)
q0
(2.10)
with k = βSR/β  1 and φ = 1 − δ(3 + k−1)/4 > 0. These are the inverse
demand functions for differentiated competition: because of Russian unrelia-
bility in Stage 3, the long-term gas import contract negotiations involve two
differentiated goods, namely long-term gas import contracts with Russia on
the one hand, and long-term gas import contracts with the competitive fringe
on the other hand. The prices of these two goods can be different. The price
20This is a special case that leads to insightful analytical expressions. The general case,
which is used in the numerical simulations in Section 2.4, can also be expressed analytically,
but the resulting expressions are long and not very insightful. The formulas of the general
case are available in Maple format from the corresponding author upon request.
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obtained by Russia depends not only on the quantity set by Russia, but also
on the quantity set by the competitive fringe (and vice versa). Note that the
differentiation applies only at the contracting stage (Stage 2). Once the gas
flows (Stage 3), the gas molecules are identical and there is by assumption no
more differentiation in the final consumer market. Since β < 0, the partial
derivatives ∂p0/∂q0, ∂p0/∂qR,1, ∂pR,1/∂q0 and ∂pR,1/∂qR,1 in equation (2.10)
are all negative, as is expected for substitute goods.
A quick check is that for δ = 0 and hence φ = 1, the two suppliers are iden-
tical, and equations (2.10) reduce to equation (2.1). When δ > 0, we observe
that ∂pR,1/∂qR,1 < ∂p0/∂q0 < 0, meaning that Russia faces a more elastic
demand curve than the competitive fringe, due to its unreliability. Likewise,
∂pR,1/∂q0 < ∂p0/∂qR,1: Russia’s price drops more steeply in response to a
quantity increase by the competitive fringe than vice versa. The effect of the
asymmetry in Europe’s preferences is that Russia’s contract price pR,1 will be
lower than p0. In other words: when δ > 0, Russia needs to offer Europe a
discount ∆p = p0 − pR,1 > 0 due to its unreliability. Annex 2.B shows that in
general, for small values of δ, the percentage discount is approximately given
by:
∆p
p∗
≈ 3
4
δτ
|eSR|
(
qR,1
q∗
)
(2.11)
with eSR the short-run price elasticity of European demand for gas. Russia’s
discount increases with the probability δ and duration τ of possible interrup-
tions, and with Europe’s dependence on Russian long-term gas import con-
tracts as a share of the total gas supply (qR,1/q
∗). Russia’s discount decreases
as Europe’s short-run price elasticity of demand |eSR| increases (in absolute
terms).
Non-strategic quantity decision by the competitive fringe. By defi-
nition, the competitive fringe behaves non-strategically and supplies long-term
gas import contracts to Europe up to the point where the contract price equals
the marginal cost of additional long-term gas imports. For the special case in
which τ = 1, qS = qD = 0 and cR = 0, we find q0 by setting p0 from equation
(2.10) equal to the marginal cost c0 + d0q0. We find:
q0 =
α(φ+ 34δ)− c0
d0 − β(φ+ 34δ)
+
βφ
d0 − β(φ+ 34δ)
qR,1 (2.12)
which provides us with the reaction of the competitive fringe as a function of
the decision qR,1 by ‘dominant firm’ Russia. The procedure for the general
case is completely analogous.
Quantity decision by ‘dominant firm’ Russia. The ‘dominant firm’
Russia faces a residual (inverse) demand function pR,1 = pR,1(qR,1), which
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is found by substituting equation (2.12) in the expression for pR,1 in equa-
tion (2.10). Using the residual demand function, Russia’s expected profits
E[ΠR] = (1 − δ)ΠR,1 + δΠR,2 can be expressed as a function of qR,1 (and
qS). Russia chooses a long-term contract quantity qR,1 to maximize E[ΠR] as
a monopolist on the residual demand function.21 For the special case δ = 0
(and hence also qS = 0) we find the traditional solution of the ‘dominant firm
– competitive fringe’ model:22
qR,1 = − 1
2βd0
[(α+ βqD)d0 − βc0 − cR(d0 − β)] (2.13)
Using equation (2.13), we can also assess the impact of the recent ‘gas glut’
on the European gas market. The gas glut is caused by large-scale extraction
of shale gas in the US. The use of shale gas in the US makes more LNG supplies
available to Europe, which makes the slope of the cost curve of the competitive
fringe less steep, i.e. it lowers d0. According to equation (2.13) we find:
∂qR,1
∂d0
=
cR − c0
2d20
> 0 (2.14)
hence a decrease in d0 leads to a reduction of import contracts with Russia. A
similar effect applies to discovery and extraction of shale gas in Europe. This
would lead to an increase in qD. Since we have:
∂qR,1
∂qD
= −1
2
(2.15)
we find that in the model in this paper, every 1 bcm/y produced from European
shale gas leads to a reduction of Russian gas imports by 0.5 bcm/y. When
considering the effect of unreliability, it should be noted that the decrease in
qR,1, whether due to a decrease of d0 or an increase of qD, will also lower the
discount offered by Russia. Indeed, Russia’s market share drops, which leads
to a smaller discount in equation (2.11).
21This is the standard textbook solution to the ‘dominant firm – competitive fringe’ model
(see e.g. Carlton and Perloff, 2000). First of all, note that there is an implicit assumption
that Russia is a Stackelberg price leader vis-a`-vis the competitive fringe. An alternative
approach would be to have a Nash-Cournot equilibrium between Russia and the competitive
fringe. Ulph and Folie (1980) compare the two approaches for the case of oil, and find that
the Nash-Cournot approach has the undesirable property that it can lead to an unstable
equilibrium in which the dominant firm’s profits are lower than under perfect competition.
In a slightly different (non-energy) setting, Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) show that in
duopolistic price leadership games in which firms have capacity constraints, the smaller firm
strictly prefers – under a relatively wide range of conditions – to be a follower, as opposed to
being the leader or making decisions simultaneously. These results support our assumption
that Russia behaves as a Stackelberg leader vis-a`-vis the competitive fringe. Secondly, the
standard textbook approach mentions an alternative solution, in which a dominant firm
with low costs can completely push the competitive fringe out of the market, by setting a
price below the ‘kink’ in the residual demand curve. However, the calibration later in our
paper shows that c0 < cR, so we do not have to consider this alternative solution.
22The same comment as in Footnote 20 applies here.
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2.3.3 Stage 1: Storage investment decision
Equations (2.10), (2.12) and (2.13) describe special cases in which, among
others, qS = 0. In the complete derivation of the model, all these equations are
a function of qS , the storage capacity investment decision that Europe makes
in Stage 1. Therefore, also E[S] can be expressed as a function of a single
decision variable qS . In Stage 1, Europe chooses the amount of storage capacity
investment qS that maximizes E[S], obviously subject to the constraint qS ≥
0.23 Once qS is determined, qR,1 can be computed, followed by q0, pR,1, p0,
qR,2 and pR,2, according to the generalized versions of the equations above.
The existence of a unique pure-strategy equilibrium is guaranteed because
our model consists of a set of sequential decisions, each of which is based on a
quadratic (concave) pay-off function.
2.4 Numerical results
The parameters of the model are calibrated on cost data and elasticities from
the literature, the 2007 baseline for volume, and the average price 2003-2007.
Annex 2.C contains details on the choice of the parameters, while Annex 2.E
performs a sensitivity analysis on the elasticities.
2.4.1 Effect of default probability δ on long-term gas im-
port contracts and pay-offs
The top half of Figure 2.4 shows how quantities and prices vary as δ, the
probability of Russian ‘default’, goes from 0 to 1. The graph also shows the
discount ∆p = p0 − pR,1 of long-term gas import contracts offered by Russia
compared to contracts offered by the competitive fringe.
For δ = 0, there is no risk and there is obviously no price difference between
the contract with Russia and the contracts with the competitive fringe. The
simulation shows that in this case, Europe buys qR,1 = 135 bcm per year
from Russia and q0 = 94 bcm per year from the other suppliers. This is
not too far from the actual data in 2007 as cited by BP (2006-2008), which
mentions 120 bcm per year from Russia and 95 bcm per year from other non-
European import suppliers. Indeed, until recently, Russia was considered a
reliable supplier, and so it is not surprising that the currently observed market
quantities correspond to the case δ = 0.
23The unconstrained optimal value of qS tends to −∞ as δ → 0+. Hence, for sufficiently
small δ the constraint is always binding: qS = 0. Under certain conditions, the constraint
is binding across the entire interval δ ∈ [0, 1]. Under other conditions, there is a threshold
δ = δS above which the constraint is not binding. In the latter case the optimal qS can be
expressed analytically. However, the threshold δS itself cannot be calculated analytically,
since it is the solution of a polynomial of order 7 in δ. Section 2.4 numerically computes the
threshold levels δS under various conditions.
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Figure 2.4: Base scenario: Relation between δ (horizontal axis) and quantities,
prices, consumer surplus and supplier profits (vertical axis)∗
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∗Note that qR,2 is an ‘annualized’ amount in the sense of Footnote 17, which means that
qR,2 is extrapolated as if the crisis lasts the entire year instead of 4 months. On the other
hand, S2 and ΠR,2 do take into account that the crisis is limited to 4 months: they contain
4 months of crisis plus 8 months of non-crisis.
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For δ > 0 Russia becomes unreliable. When Russia ‘defaults’, it delivers
only an annualized amount qR,2 instead of qR,1, at a higher price pR,2 instead
of the originally agreed long-term gas import contract price pR,1. Panel (a)
of Figure 2.4 shows that the quantity withheld would be around 40% and
panel (b) shows that the resulting price increase would be around 40% as
well. Although substantial, such a price increase is only a 2-sigma event over 3
trading days at gas hubs such as NBP (National Balancing Point, in the UK)
when considering a typical daily volatility of 10%.24
As δ increases, Europe increases its volume q0 of long-term gas import
contracts with the competitive fringe, at a slowly increasing contract price p0.
Meanwhile, Europe procures a smaller volume qR,1 with long-term contracts
from Russia, even though Russia is obliged to give an increasing discount ∆p
to ‘compensate’ the risk for Europe. It is obvious why Russia would want
to give the discount: as δ increases, there is a higher chance that Russia can
charge the monopoly price pR,2 in Stage 3 (by supplying only a quantity qR,2
of gas). By giving a discount ∆p, Russia can induce Europe to sign the long-
term gas import contracts qR,1 (despite the unreliability), which puts Europe
in a vulnerable situation. For example, for δ = 20%, the Russian contractual
discount is 6.3 EUR/tcm or roughly 4.5% of the price, which is consistent with
the approximative equation (2.11) which predicts a discount of 4.4%. Despite
the discount, Russia loses market share as δ increases and for δ > 57% supply
from the competitive fringe outstrips Russian supply. Clearly, Europe tries to
make itself less dependent on Russia and therefore less vulnerable in the event
of Russian withholding.
Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 2.4 show the effect on European surplus and
on suppliers’ profits, respectively. Recall that S1 is the European surplus in
Case 1 (Russia complies with long-term contracts) while S2 is the European
surplus in Case 2 (Russia defaults). E[S] is the expected value of the European
surplus. For δ = 0 and δ = 1, we obviously find E[S] = S1 and E[S] = S2,
respectively. As δ increases, E[S] decreases: despite the Russian discount and
shifting supply mix, Russian unreliability causes a loss of expected European
surplus. Panel (d) shows Russia’s profits in Case 1 (ΠR,1), Case 2 (ΠR,2) and
the expected value E[ΠR], as well as the profits Π0 obtained by the compet-
itive fringe. Clearly, Russia’s expected profits decrease monotonically with
increasing δ: the negative impact of the Russian contract discount and loss of
Russian market share is not sufficiently counterbalanced by Russia’s increased
likelihood of benefiting from a crisis. The only party gaining from increased
unreliability is the competitive fringe. The competitive fringe profits Π0 in-
crease with increasing δ, because increased Russian unreliability allows them
to sell a larger volume at a higher price.
24In fact over the period 2003-2007 there have been 13 instances of (day-ahead) spot
price increases of 40% or more between the closing prices of two consecutive trading days.
However, we need to mention that only a very small share of gas volumes is traded on the
gas hub spot markets, and liquidity is particularly low on the days with large swings.
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The most important observation is that both Russia and Europe suffer
when δ increases. Although δ is exogenous in our model, the results show that
it would be attractive for both Europe and Russia to invest in a more reliable
relationship, i.e. lower δ.
2.4.2 Conditions for strategic gas storage capacity invest-
ment qS > 0
In the simulations of Figure 2.4, the value of qS is always 0, meaning that
it is never interesting for Europe to build any strategic gas storage capacity
whatever the value of δ. The annual cost of storage capacity, cS = 50 EUR per
tcm per year, is too high compared to the potential gains. Figure 2.5 repeats
the simulations with cS = 15 EUR per tcm per year.
25 The result is identical
to Figure 2.4 for δ < 30%. For δ ≥ 30%, Russian unreliability is high enough
to make investments in strategic gas storage capacity qS competitive. As of
that point, pR,2 (Russia’s potential ‘monopoly price’) drops significantly. As
a result, Russia’s market share loss compared to the competitive fringe slows
down slightly, while its discount ∆p flattens out.
Figure 2.5: Scenario with reduced storage costs: Relation between δ (horizon-
tal axis) and quantities and prices (vertical axis)
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25In particular, if the storage site could be set up so that it can be used for seasonal
arbitrage while the cushion gas serves as strategic storage, the cost of strategic storage
would be significantly reduced. Typical ratios of total gas (working gas plus cushion gas) to
working gas are 3-4 for aquifers and depleted reservoirs, hence our choice cS = 15 instead
of 50 EUR per tcm per year.
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Besides lower storage capacity costs cS , another factor that can encour-
age investments in strategic gas storage capacity, is risk aversion. Annex 2.D
explains how our model can take into account European risk aversion, as mea-
sured by θ, the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Typical values of θ are 2 to
4 for financial assets and 10 to 15 when real assets are also included (Palsson,
1996). θ = 0 corresponds to the risk-neutral case which we have been studying
in this paper so far. Figure 2.6 covers different values of θ. For each value of θ,
the graph contains a curve (as a function of δ) that shows the maximum value
of cS for which qS > 0. There is storage investment qS > 0 in the region of the
(δ, cS) space below each curve. One can see that for θ = 0 and cS = 15 EUR
per tcm per year, the storage option becomes interesting for δ ≥ 30% (point
A), which is obviously identical to what has been observed in Figure 2.5. If
θ goes up to 20, then the threshold level comes down to δ = 17% (point B).
However, for cS = 50 EUR per tcm per year, storage remains unattractive,
unless θ  50, which is highly unrealistic.
Figure 2.6: Relation between δ (horizontal axis) and maximum value of cS (in
EUR per tcm per year) for which qS > 0 (vertical axis), for different levels of
risk aversion θ
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2.5 Conclusions
The first research question of this paper is how Russian unreliability may
impact the European gas market and how this affects European gas import
decisions. Our numerical simulations show that it is not optimal for Russia to
cut gas supplies to Europe completely during a crisis: rather, one can expect
Russia to reduce its gas supplies by roughly 40%, thereby temporarily increas-
ing gas prices by roughly 40%. More importantly, the analysis shows that
2.6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 45
not only Europe but also Russia suffers when Russia’s probability of default
δ increases, due to erosion of its price and market share. These results add
weight to the conclusion that the Ukraine incidents probably were not aimed
at exploiting monopoly profits from Europe. As observed in Footnote 2, more
plausible explanations are a desire to obtain netback parity from neighboring
countries, perhaps a prelude to raising prices closer to market levels in Russia
itself. Quite possibly, the European perception of these crises as expressions
of Russian market power have been harmful to the interests of both Europe
and Russia.
The second research question of this paper is to what extent Europe should
invest in strategic gas storage capacity to mitigate the effects of possible supply
withholding by Russia. We find that strategic storage capacity is attractive for
Europe only if Russian unreliability is high (δ of more than 30%) and storage
capacity costs are reduced by a factor 3 to 4 compared to typical current cost
levels. The threshold of 30% default probability is lowered when Europe is
assumed to be risk averse.
The results of this paper are obtained using a partial equilibrium model of
the market for long-term gas import contracts, with differentiated competition
between one potentially unreliable ‘dominant firm’ (Russia) and a reliable
‘competitive fringe’ of other non-European import suppliers. Future research
could examine the impact of the other suppliers becoming unreliable as well.
Another possible extension is to turn our model into a repeated game. In
such a game, δ could become endogenous as part of a mixed Russian strategy.
Finally, the topic of this paper could be placed in a broader comparison of
policy measures (import taxes, rationing, interruptible consumer contracts,
etc.) that can be used to address gas import challenges.
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2.A Annex: Optimal quantity and price for
Russia in case of default
This annex explains equation (2.7). Russia’s annualized profits during the
crisis are:
ΠR,crisis = (pR,2 − cR)qR,2 (2.16)
where pR,2 and qR,2 follow the short-run demand curve (2.2) around the point
(qD + q0 + qR,1; p
∗):
pR,2 = pSR(qD+q0 +qS+qR,2) with pSR(q) = p
∗+βSR ·(q−qR,1−q0−qD)
(2.17)
To determine the optimal qR,2 (and consequently, the optimal pR,2) the deriva-
tive of (2.16) is used:
dΠR,crisis
dqR,2
=
∂ΠR,crisis
∂qR,2
+
∂ΠR,crisis
∂pR,2
· dpR,2
dqR,2
=
[
pSR(qD + q0 + qS + qR,2)− cR
]
+
[
qR,2 · p′SR(qD + q0 + qS + qR,2)
]
(2.18)
Setting (2.18)= 0 and solving together with (2.17), yields the monopoly quan-
tity and price shown in equations (2.7). Strictly speaking, the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions for constrained optimization with constraint qR,2 ≥ 0 should be
used. This constraint is ignored in the analytical presentation of Section 2.3,
but in the numerical simulations of Section 2.4 it is taken into account, not
only for qR,2, but also for q0, qR,1 and qS . Except for qS , the constraint is never
binding. Note that (2.7) is the well-known textbook expression for monopoly
pricing with linear demand and constant marginal cost.
2.B Annex: Russian discount ∆p = p0 − pR,1
This annex explains equation (2.11). We develop a first-order approximation
for ∆p around δ = 0. In first order, the inverse demand functions (2.10) reduce
to: pR,1 ≈ α(φ+ δ) + β
(
φ+ 3δ4 (k − 1) + δ
)
qR,1 + β(φ+ δ) q0
p0 ≈ α
(
φ+ 3δ4
)
+ βφ qR,1 + β
(
φ+ 3δ4
)
q0
(2.19)
using the fact that φ/(1 − δ) ≈ φ + δ in first order. Subtracting the first
equation from the second, we obtain:
∆p ≈ δ
4
[−3βkqR,1 − α− βqR,1 − βq0] (2.20)
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The inverse demand functions (2.10) describe the special case in which τ = 1,
qS = qD = 0 and cR = 0. When we redo the exercise with those parameters
included, equation (2.20) modifies only slightly:26
∆p ≈ δτ
4
[−3βkqR,1 − α− βqR,1 − βq0 − βqD + cR] (2.21)
which can be further simplified, using p∗ = α + β · (qD + q0 + qR,1) and the
short-run equivalent of equation (2.26) – assuming q∗ ≈ qcal and p∗ ≈ pcal.
We obtain:
∆p ≈ δτ
4
[−3βSRqR,1 − p∗ + cR] (2.22)
≈ δτ
4
[
3
(
1
|eSR|
p∗
q∗
)
qR,1 − (p∗ − cR)
]
(2.23)
After dividing by p∗ we obtain:27
∆p
p∗
≈ δτ
4
[
3
|eSR|
(
qR,1
q∗
)
−
(
1− cR
p∗
)]
(2.24)
Since we typically have:
3
|eSR|
(
qR,1
q∗
)
 1− cR
p∗
(2.25)
equation (2.24) can be further approximated by equation (2.11).28
2.C Annex: Calibration of the model parame-
ters for the numerical simulations
This section describes the numerical assumptions for the parameters used in
our model, which are based on estimates from the literature.
Demand. The parameters α, β and βSR are determined using elasticities
from the literature, the 2007 baseline for volume, and the average price 2003-
2007. β can be easily derived from a calibration point (pcal, qcal) and an
elasticity value e:
β =
1
e
pcal
qcal
(2.26)
26Since Section 2.3.3 shows that qS = 0 for small enough values of δ, we keep qS = 0 in
the derivation of equation (2.21).
27Note that Russia’s discount decreases when its rent margin (1− cR/p∗) increases.
Naively, one might think that Russia’s discount should increase in case of a higher rent
margin, since a higher rent margin offers more financial room for discounting. However,
a higher rent margin provides Russia with an incentive to withhold less in the event of a
default, thus leading to a lower discount on the long-term contract price.
28With the calibration parameters used in the rest of the paper, the left-hand side of
equation (2.25) is roughly 10 times larger than the right-hand side.
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Long-run price elasticity of demand is taken equal to -0.93, following Golombek
et al. (1998). Short-run price elasticity of demand is determined based on the
very comprehensive literature survey of Dahl (1993). In Dahl (1993), the av-
erage short-run elasticity over the 15 studies that compute both short-run
and long-run elasticities is -0.27.29 In case this value seems large (in absolute
terms), one should consider that we are ignoring any elasticity of European do-
mestic supply: qD is exogenous and fixed. The number -0.27 should therefore
also include the effect of a non-zero elasticity of domestic supply. In addition,
our model allows Russia to withhold supplies for 4 months at a time. This
means that our short-run price elasticity of demand relates to a time frame of
a few months, which makes the value of -0.27 seem reasonable. For the sake
of safety, Annex 2.E performs a sensitivity analysis on the elasticities.
According to BP (2006-2008), total European gas consumption in 2007
was qcal = 494 bcm per year. The average German border price as regis-
tered by the German government (BAFA, 2009) was pcal = 144 EUR per tcm
over the period 2003-2007. Based on these numbers and the above-mentioned
elasticities, the resulting β, βSR and, finally, α can be determined.
Costs. Total per-unit production and transportation costs are based on
OME (2002), which shows costs curves for additional volumes of gas sup-
ply to the EU in 2010.30 For Russia, marginal costs are assumed constant (cR,
see Section 2.2.2).31 According to OME (2002), the long-run marginal cost for
production in the Nadym-Pur-Taz region with transport through Ukraine (a
combination which represents a very large share of current Russian exports)
is $2.8/MMBtu. The long-run marginal cost for production on the Yamal
peninsula with transport through Belarus (a combination which represents
large future potential for Russian exports) is also $2.8/MMBtu. We there-
29Note that the average long-run elasticity of the same 15 studies was -0.99, which is in
line with the -0.93 from Golombek et al. (1998).
30Supply to the EU-15 is used because this is the most realistic estimate of the cost of
supply to an ‘average’ country in Europe. Using data for EU-27 would understate the costs
for Russia.
31Our assumptions about marginal production costs are a slightly simplified version of
Boots et al. (2004) and Golombek et al. (1995, 1998), who model marginal production costs
as:
MCproduction = a+ bq + c ln(1− q/Q) (2.27)
where q is production and Q is capacity (the third term makes production costs go up to
infinity as soon as capacity is reached). The constants a, b, c and Q are determined for each
supplier country separately. The exact values of a, b, c and Q are listed in Golombek et al.
(1995), and are the same in the three studies Boots et al. (2004) and Golombek et al. (1995,
1998). For Russia however, b is 0, which is in line with the assumption of constant marginal
cost used in this paper. Compared to Boots et al. (2004) and Golombek et al. (1995, 1998),
our main assumptions are that (i) we leave out the non-linear capacity term c ln(1 − q/Q)
for both Russia and the other suppliers (to keep our model analytically solvable), and (ii)
we aggregate the production of the other suppliers and assume a linear marginal cost curve
for the total.
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fore choose cR =$2.8/MMBtu, or 107 EUR/tcm.
32 For the other suppliers,
we assume that marginal costs are linearly increasing (c0 + d0q0, see Section
2.2.2). For c0, we choose the cheapest source of gas imports to the EU-15
according to OME (2002): Algerian gas imported via the MedGaz pipeline at
$1.1/MMBtu. So c0 = 42 EUR/tcm. The slope d0 of the marginal cost curve
is determined based on the slope of the cost curve for additional gas imports
into the EU-15 on p. 14 of the OME (2002) report, excluding domestic Euro-
pean and Russian supplies. The cost curve for additional gas supplies starts
at $1.1/MMBtu with Algerian gas, and climbs up to $3.0/MMBtu (Qatar
LNG) to reach an additional volume of 70 bcm per year. We therefore choose
d0 = ($1.9/MMBtu)/70 bcm = 1.04 EUR/tcm/bcm. The annual gas storage
capacity costs cS are taken at the lower end of the range 50-70 EUR per tcm
per year, mentioned by Mulder and Zwart (2006).
2.D Annex: Modeling European risk aversion
Equation (2.3) assumes risk-neutrality: Europe maximizes the expected value
of European surplus S. The most straightforward way to introduce risk aver-
sion is to assume instead that Europe maximizes the expected value of a
concave transformation of European surplus. A theoretical justification for
this transformation is to model European decision-making using the Stigler-
Peltzman model33 and assume that Europe maximizes a political support func-
tion M :
M = M(CS,ΠD,−G) (2.28)
instead of maximizing just S as in equation (2.3). Assuming that different
constituencies are treated identically, we can simplify the expression for M :
M = f(S) with S = CS + ΠD −G (2.29)
Following Peltzman (1976), we have f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0. If Europe’s objective
is to maximize the expected value of M , then the concavity of f leads to risk
averse behavior.34 To make the degree of risk aversion explicit, we choose
a particular functional form for f(·), namely a function that yields constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA):
f(x) = uθ(x) =
x1−θ
1− θ (2.30)
32USD/EUR conversions are done at the average exchange rate for the year 2002 in which
the OME estimates were made (1 USD = 1.06 EUR).
33See Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976).
34In the true sense of the political support function, this would only model the risk aversion
of the politicians. However, we shall assume that risk aversion of consumers and domestic
producers is also included in f .
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θ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.35
To determine the European inverse demand functions for long-term gas
import contracts (Section 2.3.2), we need to maximize E[M ] = E[f(S)] in-
stead of E[S]. Since f ′ > 0, the maximization of E[f(S)] is equivalent to the
maximization of C = f−1(E[f(S)]). Let us now define  = S1 − S2 = τ∆S,
i.e. the potential ‘downside’ of the deal with Russia. We need to maximize:
C = u−1θ ((1− δ)uθ(S1) + δuθ(S2))
= u−1θ ((1− δ)uθ(S1) + δuθ(S1 − ))
≈ S1 − δ− 1
2
δ(1− δ)θ 
2
S1
+ higher-order terms in θ and 
(2.31)
in which the last step results from a Taylor expansion around θ = 0 and  = 0.
By defining σ:
σ = δ +
1
2
δ(1− δ)θA with A = S1 − S2
S1
(2.32)
we can rewrite equation (2.31) as:
C ≈ S1 − σ = S1 − στ∆S = (1− σ)S1 + σS2 (2.33)
Equation (2.33) is completely equivalent to equation (2.9) but with δ replaced
by σ. The analytical results of Section 2.3 therefore remain valid for a risk
averse Europe, provided we replace δ by σ in equations modeling Europe’s
decisions. This approach has the advantage of having a very intuitive inter-
pretation: in equation (2.33), Europe ‘perceives’ a Russian default probability
σ, which is different from the ‘real’ default probability δ. Europe’s risk aver-
sion is thus modeled as a higher perceived default probability.36 For the cases
δ = 0 and δ = 1, there is no uncertainty, so σ = δ. The more uncertainty (i.e.
the closer to δ = 0.5), the larger the difference between σ and δ.
2.E Annex: Sensitivity analysis on elasticities
The analyses in Section 2.4 assume that long-run price elasticity of European
demand for imported gas is -0.93, and that the short-run elasticity is -0.27.
35The precise level of risk aversion θ is a parameter to the simulations. Section 2.4.2
contains simulations for different values of θ.
36The caveat is that σ is actually not a constant, but depends on A, which is the propor-
tional ‘deviation’ between S1 and S2. However, in addition to the approximations already
made in the derivation of equation (2.33), σ is treated as a constant in subsequent analyses.
σ therefore changes with δ as defined in equation (2.32), but does not depend on S1 and S2,
because a fixed A is taken. The value of A is chosen to be 0.05 in the numerical simulations.
This is about twice the value observed in Figure 2.4 (Panel (c)) in order to take into account
the fact that the absolute value of European surplus is probably lower due to the costs of
domestic production, which are ignored in the computation of E[S].
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In other words, the ratio k between long-run and short-run elasticities is 3.4
(k = e/eSR = βSR/β). The empirical evidence on this ratio k, however,
is scattered. Neuhoff and Hirschhausen (2005) report k values of 4 to 5 for
industrial demand, and 5 up to 10 for residential and commercial demand.
In this section we shall briefly review how the results of Section 2.4.1 change
when we double k from 3.4 to 6.8.
First, let us double k by reducing the short-run elasticity to half its original
value, i.e. we set eSR = −0.14 instead of −0.27. The slope of the short-run
demand curve βSR becomes twice as steep. We keep the long-run elasticity e of
gas demand constant, meaning that β is held constant. The simulation results
are shown in Figure 2.7 and are graphically similar to those in Figure 2.4, but
the effects are more pronounced: Russia’s monopolistic price pR,2 is obviously
higher, its market share declines faster as a function of δ, while its discount
increases more steeply, as is expected based on equation (2.11). However, still
no storage is built when cS = 50 EUR per tcm per year.
Secondly, let us double k by increasing the long-run elasticity to twice its
original value, while keeping eSR = −0.27.37 The results are shown in Figure
2.8. Because of the very high long-run elasticity, the volume of long-term gas
import contracts with Russia for δ = 0 exceeds quite significantly the actual
2007 volume: 197 bcm per year versus the actual 120 bcm per year. However,
the large value of k brings the volumes down quite rapidly as δ increases. As
of δ ≈ 0.5 the results become graphically very similar to the base scenario in
Figure 2.4.
All in all, the conclusions are fairly robust vis-a`-vis changes in k.
37While this seems quite an extreme stress-test, one can argue that it is justified because
long-run elasticity of domestic supply qD is ignored in this paper. Furthermore, note that a
change in β requires also a change in α to make sure that the new demand curve still passes
through the same calibration point.
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Figure 2.7: Scenario with halved short-run elasticity: Relation between δ (hor-
izontal axis) and quantities and prices (vertical axis)
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Figure 2.8: Scenario with double long-run elasticity: Relation between δ (hor-
izontal axis) and quantities and prices (vertical axis)
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Chapter 3
Political Economy of
Resource Taxation:
Why Do Dictators
Charge More?
3.1 Introduction
There is a wide variation between the fiscal systems for resource extraction in
different countries. This becomes clear when looking for example at the gov-
ernment take of petroleum extraction profits. Government take is the total
share of resource extraction profits that the producing firm needs to transfer –
in the form of royalties, production-sharing agreements, corporate taxes, etc.
– to the government of the country in which it operates. For example, oil com-
panies that produce oil in the US or the UK typically face a government take
of around 40%. Oil companies in Indonesia or Myanmar, by contrast, face a
government take of more than 70%. This paper aims to examine the underly-
ing causes of these large differences. We construct a model of a resource-rich
country, which incorporates elements from both resource economics and polit-
ical economy theory. The results of the model are tested empirically on a data
set of 77 countries. Although the theoretical model is applicable to a wide
range of resources (petroleum, metals, precious minerals, etc.), the empirical
work is focused on oil.
There is a large body of literature on resource taxation within the Hotelling
(1931) tradition of dynamic partial equilibrium models of the resource sector.
Well-known studies such as Burness (1976), Dasgupta and Heal (1979), Das-
gupta et al. (1980) and Heaps (1985) analyze the impact of different forms
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of taxation on intertemporal allocation of a given amount of an exhaustible
resource. Other models not dealing with taxation, such as Peterson (1978) and
Pindyck (1978) endogenize the amount of reserves by studying the exploration
decision of firms. Conrad and Hool (1981), Campbell and Lindner (1985) and
others integrate both taxes and exploration in the same model. The model
developed in our paper also includes both taxation and exploration, but on a
more stylized level. In particular, we do not use a continuous-time model, but
rather a two-period model, which is less common in the resource economics
literature, although it has been used by e.g. Stiglitz (1976) and Solow and
Wan (1976). Furthermore, our model does not distinguish between different
types of taxation. Instead we represent the entire fiscal system using a single
profit tax, which, according to Dasgupta and Heal (1979), is by far the most
widespread type of tax.
The above-mentioned literature on resource extraction and taxation gener-
ally takes the perspective of the producing firm, and is less concerned with the
economics of resource-rich countries. This is the topic of a separate strand of
literature, which mainly took off after the oil price rises of the 1970s and sub-
sequent drops in the oil price during the 1980s. Most of the literature focuses
on the development aspect and relates to what Auty (1993) calls the resource
curse: although natural resources seem desirable at first sight, abundance of
natural resources can distort a country’s economy and make the country on
balance worse off. A recent study by van der Ploeg (2011) provides a sur-
vey of research results. In many analyses, it turns out that economies with
abundant natural resources have tended to grow less rapidly than natural-
resource-scarce economies (see e.g. Sachs and Warner, 1995). One of the most
frequently cited underlying mechanisms is the well-known Dutch disease, as
described for example by van Wijnbergen (1984) and Krugman (1987) and
many other authors. The Dutch disease refers to the effect that abundance
of natural resources may shift production factors away from other sectors (in
particular: non-resource-based traded goods), thereby reducing “learning-by-
doing” in those sectors, which ultimately leads to lower overall productivity
growth and reduced long-term welfare. Our paper does not consider these
macroeconomic effects but instead is focused on the microeconomic aspects of
a resource-rich country.
Indeed, besides the Dutch disease, other factors contribute to the resource
curse (Davis, 1995): misguided protection of industry, overly optimistic re-
source price and export revenue forecasts from governments (leading to sticky
overspending, and recession when prices drop), and rent-seeking. Logically,
several authors therefore studied the political economy of the resource-abundant
states, which will also be our approach. Karl (1997) argues that “dependence
on petroleum revenues produces a distinctive type of institutional setting, the
petro-state, which encourages the political distribution of rents. Such a state
is characterized by fiscal reliance on petrodollars, which expands state jurisdic-
tion and weakens authority as other extractive capabilities wither. As a result,
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when faced with competing pressures, state officials become habituated to re-
lying on the progressive substitution of public spending for statecraft, thereby
further weakening state capacity”. In a similar vein, Auty and Gelb (2001) use
an extension of Lal’s (1995) typology of governments and argue that resource-
abundant countries are more likely to have factional or predatory governments,
which tend to distort the economy in the pursuit of rents. As a result, the
economy does not follow a competitive industrialization model, but falls into
a “staple trap”.
The political economy models of Karl (1997) and Auty and Gelb (2001) re-
main qualitative (unformalized), unlike models about rent seeking, such as the
model of Torvik (2002). The latter develops a simple model in which resource-
abundance increases the number of entrepreneurs engaged in rent seeking and
reduces the number of entrepreneurs running productive firms. Torvik (2002)
assumes a ‘demand externality’: in his model, the reduction in the number of
productive firms leads to less income and demand and, thus, lower profits for
the remaining productive firms. The resulting drop in income is higher than
the increase in income from the natural resource. Robinson et al. (2006) build
the first explicitly political, formal model to explain the resource curse. In a
two-period probabilistic voting model, they explain public sector clientelism,
paid from natural resource rents, as a way to influence election outcomes. The
model integrates an endogenous choice of natural resource extraction rate, and
studies the effects of resource booms on resource extraction, and on factor mis-
allocation. Deviation from the optimal extraction path as a result of political
economy effects is also studied by van der Ploeg (2008), who argues that the
fact that resource-rich countries often save less than the marginal resource
rents can be due to either anticipation of more favorable conditions (lower
extraction costs, higher resource prices, higher interest income) or political
distortions in fractionalized societies with imperfect property rights.
Although our model is less concerned with the resource curse, we use a
similar formal approach like Robinson et al. (2006). Our model is slightly
more sophisticated on the resource economics side, given that it includes re-
source taxation and endogenizes firms’ exploration and production decisions,
but less explicit on the political economy side, as will be explained in the
next section. The reason for this is that the inclusion of non-democracies in
our model is essential (since many resource-rich states are non-democratic)
but, as pointed out by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, p.89), the literature
on decision-making in non-democracies is much smaller than the vast litera-
ture on democracies. For instance, standard political economy literature such
as Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Besley (2006) is focused exclusively on
democratic decision-making. Our model is inspired by the stylized models
developed by Niskanen (1997), who compares fiscal decisions of autocratic,
democratic, and optimal governments. To model the government characteris-
tics of resource-abundant countries, we use and formalize the above-mentioned
government typology developed by Lal (1995).
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One of the main contributions of our paper is that it complements the
theoretical model with an empirical analysis of government take in 77 oil-
producing countries. The empirical methodology draws from Persson and
Tabellini (2003), who compare fiscal and other policies across democracies,
and Mulligan et al. (2004), who compare policies of democracies and non-
democracies. Unlike Mulligan et al. (2004), our empirical investigation checks
the robustness of OLS estimates through IV and panel data estimation.
This paper is structured as follows. First, Section 3.2 develops a stylized
theoretical model of the political economy of taxation of resource extraction.
Next, Section 3.3 describes our data set, defines our regression analysis, and
presents the regression results. Finally, Section 3.4 summarizes the main con-
clusions from the analysis, and suggests potential directions for further re-
search.
3.2 A political economy model of resource tax-
ation
3.2.1 Structure of the game
We study a model with two periods, t = 1, 2. As we will see below, this allows
for smooth integration with median-voter or probabilistic voting equilibria
from political economy theory. The length of each period can be thought of
as 5 to 10 years.
In each period t, the government first sets the tax rate τt (0 ≤ τt ≤ 1),
after which a competitive firm decides on the level of exploration activity and
production of the resource. The tax τt is assumed to be implemented as a
simple proportional profit tax on resource extraction profits. Initial reserves
of the resource are denoted with R0. Exploration activity in each period t adds
∆Rt to the reserves base due to new discoveries. Production from reserves in
each period t is denoted with qt. Production is sold under a price-taking
assumption on the world market, at price pt per unit, with p2 > p1. Hence,
the price increases between period 1 and period 2, which is consistent with the
Hotelling (1931) concept.
Between period 1 and period 2, there is a stochastic event that may result
in a change of government. In the case of a democratic government, this event
can simply be thought of as an election. Assuming that the election leads to
a typical median-voter or probabilistic voting equilibrium as in Downs (1957)
or Hotelling (1929), where one votes in only one dimension (here the tax rate)
and voter preferences are single-peaked, the policies proposed by competing
politicians before the election will converge and chances of getting elected will
become identical for all candidates. E.g. in a typical median-voter equilib-
rium, the two competing candidates will propose identical policies and each
have a 50% chance of getting elected. Rather than explicitly modelling the
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election game, we will simply assume that there is an exogenous probability
Pe that the government in office at t = 1 gets reelected to period t = 2.
1
In the case of a non-democratic government, there is no election, but we as-
sume that there is a chance that a revolution takes place between period 1
and period 2. The probability that the non-democratic government in office
at t = 1 is still in office at t = 2 is exogenously given by Pnr, the probability
that no revolution takes place. In this way, democracy and non-democracy
can be treated within the same conceptual framework. This is similar to some
of the results of Robinson et al. (2006). In their formal model of political
economy of resource-abundant states, they derive explicit analytical expres-
sions for reelection and non-revolution probabilities and find that there are
striking similarities between the two. Interestingly, as a corollary, Robinson
et al. (2006) make an extrapolation to the case of endogenous democratic
institutions. They conclude that politicians will prefer democracy if, in our
notation, Pe > Pnr, i.e. if the reelection probability in case the country is
democratic, is larger than the non-revolution probability in case the country
is non-democratic. This may be the case for instance if society is structured
in such a way that a very large winning coalition would be needed in order
to sustain a dictatorship. The point about endogenous democratic institu-
tions is explored in detail by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). For instance, in
their static model of democratization (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, Section
5.6) the non-democratic elites choose whether or not to establish democracy by
weighing the possibility of a revolution against the likely income redistribution
in case of democratization. To keep our argument focused, we do not explicitly
model the democratization game in this paper. However, based on the argu-
ment by Robinson et al. (2006) we assume that in any given non-democratic
country, Pnr is larger than the reelection probability Pe that would apply if
the same country was a democracy. Indeed, in a dictatorship, if the reelection
probability Pe after democratization were larger than the non-revolution prob-
ability Pnr during the dictatorship, then the country’s dictator would already
have chosen for a transition to democracy, hence Pnr would not be applicable
anymore. So, whenever Pnr is applicable, we have Pnr > Pe. One could argue
that a symmetric reasoning would hold for a democracy, which would there-
fore only exist if Pe > Pnr. However, it seems more difficult for a democratic
government to decide to make the transition to a dictatorship, than it is for
a dictator to facilitate democratization. In this paper, we therefore use the
assumption that, all else equal, we have Pnr > Pe.
1Note that this also holds for median-voter models. Indeed, in typical median-voter
models, it is assumed that if the policies of the two competing politicians are identical, then
they each have a 50% probability of winning. See e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2000).
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3.2.2 Firm behavior
In each period t, firms respond to the tax rate τt by choosing their activity
level of exploration and production. Let us first study the production decision
regarding existing reserves R0, i.e. reserves for which no further exploration
is needed. We assume these reserves are in the hands of a competitive firm,
which acts as a price-taker on the world market. Marginal production costs
are assumed to be constant at a level of c per unit. In a Hotelling (1931) world,
and assuming no taxation, prices p1 and p2 would be such that the firm would
be indifferent between producing its reserves at t = 1 or leaving them in the
ground for production at t = 2. The condition for this is p1 − c = δf (p2 − c),
with δf the appropriate discount factor for the firm. In such a world, first the
countries with the cheapest production costs (lowest c) would produce their
reserves, and more expensive countries would only produce after the cheapest
resources have been depleted. Looking for example at the large disparities in oil
production costs of currently producing countries2, this is clearly not a realistic
view: many inframarginal low-cost countries are producing simultaneously
with marginal high-cost countries. For the purpose of our analysis, we shall
assume that the country under consideration is an inframarginal producer,
such that:
p1 − c > δ(p2 − c) (3.1)
In the absence of taxes, the competitive firm would extract all of R0 in period
1. With profit taxes τt, the firm’s profits per unit of production change from
(pt − c) to (1 − τt)(pt − c). If taxes were constant over time (τ1 = τ2), this
would not affect the production path, a result also obtained in a more general
context by Dasgupta and Heal (1979). We shall assume that p1, p2 and δ are
such that production of R0 will remain unaffected even if τ1 6= τ2. This could
be the case e.g. if p1 is not very different from p2, if the country is a highly
inframarginal producer, or if the uncertainty caused by the potential change
of government between periods 1 and 2 leads to a very high corporate discount
rate (i.e. very low discount factor δf ). Hence, the existing reserves R0 will be
fully extracted in period 1 and sold on the world market at p1.
3
Let us now turn to the exploration decision. As in Pindyck (1978), we as-
sume that additions to reserves, for given effort level, decrease with cumulative
2See e.g. Aguilera et al. (2009).
3Obviously, complete extraction of R0 within one period may actually be unrealistic from
a technical point of view, at least for the case of oil. From a technical point of view, if fast
extraction is desired, one would rather expect extraction rates to increase quickly (within the
first few years of operation of the field) up to a peak production level, which is maintained
for a relatively short period and after which a more or less exponential decline follows. Clear
evidence of this can be found by looking at historic production profiles of already depleted
fields, such as the production profiles provided by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
(2011). Such a highly non-linear production profile obviously cannot be modelled in a two-
period model. The most important feature of this non-linear production profile, however,
is that it is strongly weighted towards the first few years. In our two-period model, this
essential feature is best captured by assuming that all of R0 is produced in period 1.
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discoveries. Put otherwise, the marginal exploration effort required for a given
amount of additional discovery increases with cumulative discoveries. For the
sake of analytical convenience, we assume that marginal exploration effort is
a linearly increasing function of cumulative discoveries. If we identify explo-
ration effort with exploration cost, then we have the following expression for
marginal exploration cost w (i.e. exploration cost required for an additional
unit of discovered reserves) as a function of cumulative discovered reserves:
w = w0 + φ
∑
∆Rt (3.2)
with φ > 0 the slope of the curve, and
∑
∆Rt the sum of discoveries ∆Rt
up to and including the period under consideration. We assume w0 < p2 − c,
i.e. there is a net societal benefit in doing some exploration, maybe not in the
near future (period 1) but at least in the more distant future (period 2). It is
convenient to express φ as a function of undiscovered reserves R¯. Undiscovered
reserves, for instance in the case of petroleum, are “quantities of undiscovered
conventional oil, gas, and natural-gas liquids that have the potential to be added
to reserves (proved and inferred) in some specified future time span” (Schmoker
and Klett, 2000). In our case therefore, undiscovered reserves R¯ correspond
to those reserves that can be profitably discovered and produced by the end
of period 2, hence R¯ is such that:4
w0 + φR¯ = p2 − c (3.3)
Equation (3.2) can then be rewritten as a function of R¯ instead of φ:
w = w0 +
p2 − c− w0
R¯
∑
∆Rt (3.4)
How much of the undiscovered reservers R¯ will be explored for and dis-
covered in periods 1 and 2? We denote these discoveries by ∆Rt, t = 1, 2.
Let us first consider period 1. The government sets a tax rate τ1 and a com-
petitive firm responds by exploring for and discovering ∆R1. Following the
above-mentioned argument for R0, all of the newly discovered reserves ∆R1 in
period 1 will be extracted in period 1, leading to a taxable production profit
of (p1− c)∆R1.5 The competitive firm would set its exploration decision so as
4Note that the assessments of undiscovered reserves made by e.g. USGS (2000) are based
on geology and do not consider full economics of exploration and production, see Schmoker
and Klett (2000). Inclusion of petroleum volumes in the undiscovered reserves is based on
a minimum ‘cut-off’ field size, which is chosen by taking into account the ‘forecast span’ of
30 years. In particular, this means that undiscovered reserves R¯ can be safely assumed to
be independent of tax rates, a point that will become important in the empirical analysis in
Section 3.3. This also explains why we do not include a tax rate in equation (3.3).
5Note that we do not deduct exploration costs from the taxable profit. This is in line with
typical exploration and production contracts. More precisely, only the successful exploration
efforts can typically be deducted from profits, as in a case examined by Campbell and
Lindner (1985). In our model, this could be implemented as a fixed tax deduction per unit
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to equate marginal exploration cost and benefit:
(1− τ1)(p1 − c) = w0 + p2 − c− w0
R¯
∆R1 (3.5)
hence:
∆R1 =
(1− τ1)(p1 − c)− w0
p2 − c− w0 R¯ (3.6)
The decision in period 2 is analogous, but we need to take into account that an
amount ∆R1 has already been discovered and produced. Equating marginal
exploration cost and benefit, we get
(1− τ2)(p2 − c) = w0 + p2 − c− w0
R¯
(∆R1 + ∆R2) (3.7)
hence
∆R2 =
(
1− τ2 p2 − c
p2 − c− w0
)
R¯−∆R1 (3.8)
All of ∆R2 will obviously be extracted in period 2. The total quantities pro-
duced in periods 1 and 2 are given by:
q1 = R0 + ∆R1 (3.9)
q2 = ∆R2 (3.10)
3.2.3 Government objective
Government revenues per period are given by (pt − c)τtqt. Besides direct
revenues, we assume that the government derives a strategic benefit of σ per
unit of resource production, resulting from such factors as reduced import
dependence or diplomatic leverage. Total government benefits per period are
thus given by:
Gt = [(pt − c)τt + σ]qt (3.11)
with σ ≥ 0. We will refer to Gt simply as ‘government revenues’.
As mentioned in the introduction, we use the government typology de-
veloped by Lal (1995) and applied to resource-abundant states by Auty and
Gelb (2001). Governments are classified along two dimensions: autonomy and
benevolence. Autonomy refers to whether a government decides on its own
(i.e. a dictatorship) as opposed to having to take into account other parties.
For the sake of clarity, we will call this dimension autocracy instead of au-
tonomy. In our formal model, we describe this dimension using the variable
α, with α = 1 implying dictatorship and α = 0 a multiparty (or democratic)
of production. Indeed, while marginal exploration costs increase with cumulative discoveries,
the amount of successful – i.e. tax-deductible – exploration per unit of production is likely
to stay more or less the same. Since the inclusion of such a fixed tax deduction per unit of
production would make the model mathematically more complicated without changing any
insights, we do not include it.
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government. Benevolence refers to whether a government maximizes social
welfare, as opposed to maximizing its own private objective function. In our
formal model, we describe this dimension using the variable β, with β = 1
referring to a benevolent government and β = 0 referring to a predatory gov-
ernment, which maximizes its own private objective function. In particular,
the typology of Lal (1995) implies that there are multiparty (seemingly demo-
cratic) governments that are maximizing the welfare of a small fraction of the
population (α = 0, β = 0), while there exist autocratic or oligarchic govern-
ments that may be relatively benevolent. An example of the former is India,
an example of the latter is Singapore.6
Assuming that the resource firm is foreign and that resource taxes τt do not
introduce any distortions elsewhere in the economy, a benevolent government
(β = 1) – i.e. a government that seeks to maximize social welfare – would
maximize in period 1 the discounted sum of government revenues:
Wbenevolent = G1 + δgG2 (3.12)
with δg the appropriate discount factor of the government. A predatory govern-
ment (β = 0), i.e. a government in which officials seek to maximize their own
profit, would have a different objective function. Assuming that government
officials are able to (mis)appropriate a fixed share of government revenues,
they would however still try to maximize government revenues, just like the
benevolent government.7 However, the officials will take into account that
they only get access to the tax revenues of period 2 if they are still in office
at that time. Assuming risk-neutral officials, the predatory government would
therefore maximize Wpredatory:
Wpredatory = G1 + PδgG2 (3.13)
with P the probability that the period-1 government is still in office in period
2. Combining (3.12) and (3.13), a generic government maximizes:
W = βWbenevolent + (1− β)Wpredatory (3.14)
= G1 + [β + (1− β)P ]δgG2 (3.15)
As discussed in the Section 3.2.1, a dictatorship (α = 1) would have P = Pnr,
while a democracy would have P = Pe. Combining both, we find:
P = αPnr + (1− α)Pe (3.16)
and hence
W = G1 + [β + (1− β)(αPnr + (1− α)Pe)]δgG2 (3.17)
≡ G1 + ΨG2 (3.18)
6Our typology is thus different from Niskanen (1997), who distinguishes only three types
of government: autocratic, democratic, and optimal. In our model, optimality (a proxy for
benevolence) is orthogonal to the democracy dimension.
7Maximization of tax revenues is also assumed by Niskanen (1997), for the case of auto-
cratic governments.
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with Ψ defined as
Ψ = [β + (1− β)(αPnr + (1− α)Pe)]δg (3.19)
In reality, the government of the country may not be fully benevolent or fully
predatory, but somewhere in between the two extremes, and likewise for the
level of autocracy. In the remainder of the paper we assume that government
decisions in period 1 are determined by equation (3.17), even in the case of
continuously measured α and β.
As a final note on government incentives, it should be pointed out that
in an ideal case the government would attempt to distinguish its tax rate for
existing versus newly discovered reserves. However, such distinction may be
difficult due to government credibility issues, so we do not consider it here.
3.2.4 Theoretical determinants of government take
We now derive the optimal government tax decisions τt using backward induc-
tion. In period 2, government maximizes G2, given by equation (3.11). Using
(3.10) and (3.8), G2 can be expressed as a concave quadratic function of τ2:
G2 = [(p2 − c)τ2 + σ]
[(
1− τ2 p2 − c
p2 − c− w0
)
R¯−∆R1
]
(3.20)
Let τˆ2 be the value of τ2 that corresponds to the peak in G2. Assuming
0 ≤ τˆ2 ≤ 1,8 the optimal period-2 tax rate τ2 is given by:
τˆ2 =
1
2
(p2 − c− w0)(R¯−∆R1)− σR¯
(p2 − c)R¯ (3.21)
and the corresponding government revenues:
Gˆ2 =
1
4
[(p2 − c− w0)(R¯−∆R1) + σR¯]2
(p2 − c− w0)R¯ (3.22)
with ∆R1 from equation (3.6). Substituting (3.22) and (3.11) into (3.18), we
can find W as a concave quadratic function of τ1.
9 Let τˆ1 be the value of τ1
8This will be the case for typical values of the input parameters. However, there may be
realistic parameter configurations which would cause the peak value of the quadratic function
G2 to be outside of the natural interval for tax rates [0, 1]. Depending on assumptions, this
would most likely result in τ2 being bounded at 0 or 1. A detailed analysis of the different
cases would complicate our explanation, and is not really needed for the purpose of this
paper. Indeed, we are mainly interested in understanding the general direction of the impact
of various parameters on the tax rates in order to have a theoretical intuition on which to
build the empirical testing in Section 3.3. In this context it therefore seems acceptable to
simply analyze the peak value of G2, without applying the constraints on τ2. The same
principle will be applied to τ1.
9We do not show W here, because the expression is long and not very insightful.
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that corresponds to the peak in W . Again assuming 0 ≤ τˆ1 ≤ 1, the optimal
period-1 tax rate τ1 is given by:
τˆ1 =
2(p1 − c− w0 − σ) + (p2 − p1 + σ)Ψ + 2(p2 − c− w0)R0R¯
(p1 − c)(4−Ψ) (3.23)
Within this model, τˆ1 from equation (3.23) is the most appropriate measure
of current taxation on resource extraction. In the remainder of this section we
will analyze the determinants of τˆ1 in more detail. Taking into account that
p2 > p1 > c; p2 > c+ w0; σ ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ Ψ ≤ 1, we can easily see that:
∂τˆ1
∂R0
=
2(p2 − c− w0)
(p1 − c)(4−Ψ)R¯ > 0
∂τˆ1
∂R¯
= − 2(p2 − c− w0)R0
(p1 − c)(4−Ψ)R¯2 < 0
∂τˆ1
∂σ
= − 2−Ψ
(p1 − c)(4−Ψ) < 0
∂τˆ1
∂w0
= − 2
(
1 + R0
R¯
)
(p1 − c)(4−Ψ) < 0
(3.24)
So, all else equal, government take of resource extraction profits could be
expected to increase with (existing) reserves R0, but decrease with higher
undiscovered reserves R¯, with higher strategic value of resource production σ
– e.g. because of higher import dependence – or with higher exploration costs
w0. The impact of production cost is slightly more complicated. The partial
derivative of τˆ1 with respect to c is:
∂τˆ1
∂c
=
2(−w0 − σ) + (p2 − p1 + σ)Ψ + 2(p2 − p1 − w0)R0R¯
(p1 − c)2(4−Ψ) (3.25)
which could be either positive or negative, depending on the parameter con-
figuration. The impact of production cost on government take is therefore
ambiguous in this model. Finally, we study the impact of government typol-
ogy, as measured by autocracy α and benevolence β. Since the numerator of
expression (3.23) is increasing in Ψ while the denominator is decreasing in Ψ,
it is clear that ∂τˆ1/∂Ψ > 0. Hence,
∂τˆ1
∂α
=
∂τˆ1
∂Ψ
∂Ψ
∂α
=
∂τˆ1
∂Ψ
δg(1− β)(Pnr − Pe) ≥ 0 (3.26)
where we have used the fact that Pnr > Pe, as discussed in Section 3.2.1.
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Likewise for ∂τˆ1/∂β:
∂τˆ1
∂β
=
∂τˆ1
∂Ψ
∂Ψ
∂β
=
∂τˆ1
∂Ψ
δg(1− αPnr − (1− α)Pe)
≥ ∂τˆ1
∂Ψ
δg(Pnr − αPnr − (1− α)Pe)
=
∂τˆ1
∂Ψ
δg(1− α)(Pnr − Pe) ≥ 0
(3.27)
All else equal, according to this model the government take of resource ex-
traction profits would increase with higher autocracy or higher benevolence.
Simply put: under comparable circumstances, a dictator would impose a higher
tax than a non-dictatorial government, and a benevolent government would
impose a higher tax than a predatory or corrupt government.
To provide some intuition for these results, we need to distinguish three
revenue streams for the government:
(i) Revenues from production of existing reserves in period 1
(ii) Revenues from exploration and subsequent production of undiscovered
reserves in period 1
(iii) Revenues from exploration and subsequent production of undiscovered
reserves in period 2
A higher tax rate in period 1 will increase revenue stream (i), but decrease
revenue stream (ii) due to reduced exploration. Since the latter effect leaves
more undiscovered reserves for period 2, a higher period-1 tax rate will also
increase revenue stream (iii). The period-1 tax rate in equilibrium depends on
the trade-off between these three revenue streams. At the equilibrium point,
the total revenues in period 1, i.e. the sum of revenue streams (i) and (ii),
would decrease with higher period-1 tax rate. Indeed, if the total period-1
revenue were to increase with higher period-1 tax rate, then the government
would increase the period-1 tax rate, since also the period-2 revenues (revenue
stream (iii)) would increase with higher period-1 tax rate. Given that we
consider an equilibrium, we can therefore say that total period-1 revenues
decrease with higher period-1 tax rate, while total period-2 revenues increase
with higher period-1 tax rate.
As a result of these effects, the government faces a trade-off when deciding
on its government take: a higher current tax rate increases long-term revenues,
but decreases short-term revenues. The resulting choice of current tax rate will
depend on the attitude of the government towards the future. Assuming that
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autocratic governments have a higher probability of staying in power than
democratic governments, they will assign a higher weight to future revenues,
hence choose a higher current tax rate. Benevolent governments consider so-
cietal benefits rather than their own benefits while in power, so they would
also put a higher weight on future revenues, hence also choose a higher cur-
rent tax rate. A non-benevolent government, on the other hand, especially a
non-autocratic non-benevolent government, has an incentive to lower tax rates
in the short term, thereby encouraging earlier exploration so that it can get
access to the resource revenues within its time in office. This is analogous to
the dynamic common-pool problem in public debt theory,10 with debt being
equivalent to a negative resource.
3.3 Empirical testing
3.3.1 Cross-sectional estimates using OLS
In this section, we test the theoretical conclusions from Section 3.2 on a cross-
section of 77 oil-producing countries, using OLS. Our objective is to perform
an empirical analysis of the main determinants of government take in the
oil sector, and to verify our theoretical conclusions about the impact of gov-
ernment autocracy, government benevolence and geological characteristics, on
government take.
Our dependent variable is GovTake: government take expressed in percent.
Data on government take is scarce. For the cross-sectional analysis in this
paper, we compile data points from six different sources: Johnston (1994, 1999,
2003), Van Meurs and Seck (1997), Himona (2005) and Tordo (2006). In cases
when multiple sources provide an estimate of the government take of the same
country, we give preference to the most recent source. When multiple values
are given for the same country in a single source (e.g. varying by region within
the country), we use the average of all values. In total, the data set contains 77
countries. This is comparable to the sample size of the cross-sectional analyses
of Mulligan et al. (2004, Table 2) and Persson and Tabellini (2003, Table 3.1)
on corporate tax rates and central government revenues, respectively. Figure
3.1 shows the data.
Based on the model of Section 3.2 the main independent variables of inter-
est are the degree of autocracy, the government’s benevolence, discovered and
undiscovered reserves, whether a country is an importer or exporter, and its
oil exploration and production costs. The degree of autocracy, denoted with
variable name Aut Polity2, is measured using the polity2 variable from the
Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010), inverted and scaled to the 0-1
range with 0 denoting full democracies and 1 denoting absolute autocracies.
We take the average value of the period to which the GovTake estimates apply
10See e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 13).
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(1994-2006). For Belize and Brunei, which are not assessed in the Polity IV
project, we impute values based on data from Freedom House (2011). The
degree of benevolence, denoted with variable name Ben WGI, is measured us-
ing the 2006 value of the Control of Corruption variable from the Worldwide
Governance Indicators (Kaufman et al., 2010), also scaled to the 0-1 range.
Countries’ already discovered reserves, denoted with variable name Reserves,
are based on the 2006 estimate of oil reserves made by BP (2011). Reserves
are assumed to be 0 for those countries that are not mentioned by BP (2011).
Undiscovered reserves, variable name Undiscovered, are based on the coun-
try estimates made by USGS (2000)11. OilImporter is a dummy indicating
whether a country was an oil importer in 2006, as can be inferred from the
production and consumption data of BP (2011). Data on production costs,
variable name ProdCost, is drawn from Aguilera et al. (2009), who provide
production costs for all major oil and gas producing basins. Production costs
for a country are computed as the average of all basins that are wholly or
partly in that country, weighted by future oil reserves in that basin.12 No
suitable data set on exploration costs (w0) was found, so exploration costs are
not part of the analysis.
Besides the above-mentioned independent variables of interest, we include a
number of covariates, in order to control for generic country characteristics. We
include all covariates used by Mulligan et al. (2004, Table 2) in their regression
of corporate tax rates across democratic and non-democratic countries. We
also include the covariates used by Persson and Tabellini (2003, Table 3.1)
in their cross-country regression of central government revenue.13 Combining
all of these, we have three groups of exogenous covariates. The first group
consists of economic characteristics: LYP, the log of PPP converted GDP per
capita (chain series) according to the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2011);
OECD, a variable defined by Persson and Tabellini (2003) indicating whether a
country was an OECD member in the early 90s; Trade, the sum of exports and
imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product
according to the World Development Indicators – WDI (World Bank, 2011);
and TransEcon, a dummy for former communist countries, taken from the
Global Development Network Growth Database (Easterly, 2001). The second
11Data on cooperative jurisdictions (e.g. Australia/Indonesia Zone of Cooperation) is
distributed 50/50 between the two cooperating countries.
12For countries that do not contain any part of any of the specified basins, we use the
estimates for ‘Remaining provinces’ which are provided per subcontinent, unless the country
contains no undiscovered reserves according to USGS, in which case we use the estimates
for ‘Areas not assessed in USGS’, which are also provided per subcontinent.
13A few of the covariates used by Persson and Tabellini (2003) are not included in our
regression: FEDERAL (which measures whether a country has a federal government struc-
ture or not) because this is mostly relevant for the specific case of Persson and Tabellini
(2003) since they look only at central government revenue, whereas our data on government
take includes all taxes imposed; GASTIL because it measures the same thing as our vari-
able Aut Polity2 ; and the dummies indicating colonial origin, because most of this effect is
already captured by the variable Leg British used by Mulligan et al. (2004).
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group of exogenous covariates consists of population characteristics: LPop,
the log of population according to the Penn World Tables; Prop1564, the
proportion of people aged 15-64 in the population according to the WDI; and
Prop65, the proportion of people aged 65+ in the population, again from
the WDI. Such population characteristics may be important for oil taxation
because they influence the government’s budget constraints: Prop1564 because
it is linked to government revenue potential, and Prop65 because it may be
related to expenditures. The third group of exogenous covariates. consists of
regional/colonial dummies: AFRICA, ASIAE and LAAM, indicating whether
a country is in Africa, eastern and southern Asia (except Japan, which is
included in OECD), or southern and central America including the Caribbean,
respectively; and Leg British, indicating whether the origins of a country’s legal
system are British, as defined by Easterly (2001).
Table 3.1 shows the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of
GovTake on the political and geological characteristics, first without any con-
trols, then progressively including the three groups of controls: economic char-
acteristics, population characteristics, and regional/colonial dummies.14 The
results are broadly in line with the theoretical predictions of Section 3.2. First
of all, it is indeed shown that dictatorship, i.e. a higher value of Aut Polity2,
has a positive effect on government take. The effect remains significant also
when additional controls are added. The results suggest that, all else equal,
a dictator would have a 15% higher tax rate on oil extraction than a com-
parable democracy. Secondly, government benevolence, i.e. a higher value of
Ben WGI, also has a significant positive effect on government take, except in
the most parsimonious specification without any controls. All else equal, a
benevolent government’s oil extraction tax rate may be 24% (or more) higher
than a comparable predatory government’s tax rate. The effect of Reserves
is also positive and significant in two specifications, although less pronounced
than the other effects. Undiscovered reserves do not seem to have any signif-
icant effect. This may be due to the omittance of exploration costs from the
regression. Indeed, the size of the undiscovered reserves may be negatively
correlated with exploration costs. Hence, the negative direct impact of undis-
covered reserves on government take – as predicted by the theoretical model
– may be masked by the negative impact of exploration costs on government
take. Since exploration data is unavailable however, this cannot be confirmed
based on this analysis. ProdCost does not have a significant coefficient either,
but this was to be expected since the model does not predict an unambiguous
direction of the impact. OilImporter, an indicator of strategic value of oil pro-
duction, has a significant negative effect as expected, except in the simplest
14Note that we do not use robust standard errors, because in several cases these turn out
to be slightly smaller than the conventional standard errors, which may hint at finite sample
bias. Unfortunately, increasing the sample is not an option since there are only a limited
number of oil-producing countries in the world. As mentioned before, sample size is already
nearly as large as for Persson and Tabellini (2003, Table 3.1) and Mulligan et al. (2004,
Table 2).
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Table 3.1: OLS regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GovTake GovTake GovTake GovTake
Aut Polity2 21.57∗∗∗ 20.50∗∗∗ 16.75∗∗∗ 14.73∗∗
(5.276) (5.087) (5.667) (7.290)
Ben WGI -8.299 23.76∗ 24.40∗ 33.00∗∗
(7.670) (12.88) (13.37) (14.70)
Reserves 0.158 0.167∗ 0.136 0.188∗
(0.0954) (0.0900) (0.0963) (0.0984)
Undiscovered 0.0404 0.0683 0.0852 0.125
(0.134) (0.134) (0.143) (0.142)
OilImporter -3.555 -7.778∗∗ -7.734∗∗ -8.764∗∗
(3.482) (3.510) (3.596) (3.666)
ProdCost 0.0757 -0.0357 -0.106 -0.253
(0.249) (0.250) (0.262) (0.264)
LYP -3.409∗ -3.032 -4.105
(1.838) (2.598) (2.775)
OECD -10.34∗ -3.415 -9.506
(5.316) (7.165) (7.765)
Trade -0.0521 -0.0649 -0.107∗∗
(0.0372) (0.0419) (0.0456)
TransEcon -3.079 2.081 -0.535
(4.351) (6.210) (7.358)
LPop 0.0850 -1.412
(1.170) (1.303)
Prop1564 0.0752 -0.264
(0.359) (0.388)
Prop65 -0.992 -0.728
(0.684) (0.724)
AFRICA -6.065
(5.803)
ASIAE 5.396
(5.307)
LAAM -6.922
(6.692)
Leg British -2.166
(3.326)
N 77 74 74 74
adj. R2 0.405 0.484 0.479 0.497
Standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions include a constant term (not shown).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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specification without any controls. Among the controls, it seems that most
of the explanatory power is in the economic characteristics. The inclusion
of population characteristics and regional/colonial dummies does not surface
any significant coefficients. In fact, the inclusion of population characteristics
actually lowers the adjusted R2 slightly.
3.3.2 IV estimates
The causal effects of interest in the regression of the previous section may be
obscured by endogeneity bias. In this section we therefore use an instrumental
variables (IV) approach to verify our findings from OLS.
Our first concern about the OLS specifications of Table 3.1 is possible omit-
ted variable bias with respect to the political characteristics Aut Polity2 and
Ben WGI, meaning that there would be unobserved country characteristics
influencing GovTake, which, through their correlation with Aut Polity2 and
Ben WGI would bias the coefficient estimates of these two variables in Table
3.1. This may be an important issue, although e.g. Mulligan et al. (2004) do
not address this in their OLS regression of tax rates across democracies and
non-democracies. Omitted variable bias in our paper has already been partly
addressed by including a large set of covariates in the OLS regression. To ad-
dress the problem in a more structural way, we use exogenous instruments for
Aut Polity2 and Ben WGI. We take three instruments from the well-known
paper by Hall and Jones (1999): EurFrac, the fraction of the population speak-
ing one of the five primary European languages (including English) as their
mother tongue; EngFrac, the fraction of the population speaking English as
their mother tongue; and Lat01, the distance from the equator, measured as
the absolute value of latitude and scaled to lie between 0 and 1.15 An ex-
planation of the mechanism through which these instruments have an effect
on political institutions is given by e.g. Acemoglu et al. (2001). Simply put,
these instruments are related to whether European colonists used a particular
country as a place to settle, or primarily for exploitation of resources. The
variable Lat01, in particular, is related to tropical diseases, which create an
inhospitable environment that encourages exploitation rather than settlement.
Persson and Tabellini (2003) use the same three instruments in their analy-
sis of the size of government. In addition, Persson and Tabellini (2003) use
three discretely measured indicators of the date of origin of each country’s con-
stitution. This is meaningful for Persson and Tabellini (2003) because they
consider only democracies, but not in our case, so we limit ourselves to the
three instruments EurFrac, EngFrac and Lat01. Anyhow, the three indicators
15Unlike Hall and Jones (1999), we do not use the ‘Frankel-Romer predicted trade share’
as an instrument because this is specific to Hall and Jones’s analysis of country productivity.
Likewise, Persson and Tabellini (2003) use this instrument only in their analysis of produc-
tivity, and not in their analysis of the size of government (which is closest to our analysis of
government take).
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of constitutional origin used by Persson and Tabellini are very weak instru-
ments, as also highlighted by Acemoglu (2005) in his critique of their work, so
including them would increase the risk of weak instrument bias.16
Using EurFrac, EngFrac and Lat01 as instruments for Aut Polity2 and
Ben WGI, we run a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression, including as
always the geological variables and all controls related to economic and pop-
ulation characteristics. The regional/colonial dummies are not used, like in
Persson and Tabellini (2003). Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3.2 show the
first-stage results, i.e. the regression of Aut Polity2 and Ben WGI on the in-
struments and the controls. Column (1a) in Table 3.3 shows the second-stage
results using 2SLS. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.2 indicate that there is
a weak instrument problem in this first specification. Persson and Tabellini
(2003) face the same issue and solve this by not including any controls (except
one) in the first stage. This non-standard approach may lead to biased results,
and is also one of the main points of critique in the review by Acemoglu (2005).
If in our case we removed all controls from the first stage, the first-stage re-
sults would look like columns (1′) and (2′) of Table 3.2. This would solve the
weak instrument problem: in both columns the F statistic is larger than the
recommended value of 10, suggested by Stock et al. (2002).17 Nevertheless, we
do not use (1′) and (2′), and instead follow a different approach to address the
weak instrument problem. Our approach is two-fold. First, in column (1b)
of Table 3.3, we show the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML)
estimation results, which are less sensitive to the weak instrument problem.
Note that the estimates are very similar to those of column (1a), which does
give a bit more confidence in the results. Second, as an alternative, we study
the effects of Aut Polity2 and Ben WGI separately and use the single best in-
strument for each. In the case of Aut Polity2 the best instrument is EurFrac,
while in the case of Ben WGI it is Lat01. All above-mentioned controls are
included in the first stage. The first-stage results when focusing on one en-
dogenous variable at a time and using single instruments are shown in columns
(3) and (4) of Table 3.2. For Aut Polity2 the first-stage F -statistic of the ex-
cluded instrument increases to 13.72, which suggests the instrument EurFrac
is strong enough. For Ben WGI, the F -statistic improves but remains below
10. However, just-identified IV is median-unbiased, hence the weak instrument
problem is anyhow likely to be less of an issue in this case. Columns (3) and
16It should be noted that said critique also questions the validity of the Hall and Jones
(1999) instruments EurFrac, EngFrac and Lat01 in the analysis of Persson and Tabellini
(2003). The main part of that critique, however, is on the use of these instruments for
the explanation of specific institutional features (e.g. whether a country has a majoritarian
or proportional electoral system) as opposed to institutional quality in general. Since our
instrumented variables Aut Polity2 and Ben WGI are more similar to the latter, the use of
the Hall and Jones (1999) instruments seems at least more justified in our case than in the
case of Persson and Tabellini (2003).
17It should be noted that the recommendation made by Stock et al. (2002) was for the
case of a single endogenous variable, while our case has two.
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Table 3.3: Second-stage IV regression results for autocracy (Aut Polity2 ) and
benevolence (Ben WGI )
(1a) (1b) (3) (4)
GovTake GovTake GovTake GovTake
Aut Polity2 41.72∗∗ 41.80∗∗ 40.26∗∗∗
(16.42) (16.47) (12.88)
Ben WGI -67.24 -67.65 31.31
(57.73) (57.97) (56.20)
Estimator 2SLS LIML 2SLS 2SLS
Number of instruments 3 3 1 1
Variables instrumented 2 2 1 1
N 68 68 68 68
adj. R2 0.014 0.010 0.390 0.447
Standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions include Reserves, Undiscovered, OilImporter, ProdCost,
LYP, OECD, Trade, TransEcon, LPop, Prop1564, Prop65 and
a constant term (not shown).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(4) of Table 3.3 show the second-stage results corresponding to the first stage
results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.2, respectively.
Looking at the results, the most striking feature is that the coefficient for
Aut Polity2 is remarkably consistent across the different specifications in Table
3.3. The coefficient is actually larger than the OLS estimates shown in Table
3.1. It seems therefore that the positive effect of autocracy on government
take is confirmed in this IV analysis. The results for Ben WGI are less clear.
In none of the IV specifications its effect on government take proves to be
statistically significant. In specification (4) – the specification least subject to
weak instrument bias – the coefficient turns positive and is similar in size to
the OLS estimate. The error margin remains large however.
Besides the endogeneity of Aut Polity2 and Ben WGI, a second concern
about the results of the OLS analysis in Table 3.1 is possible reverse causation
with respect to Reserves. Indeed, one could imagine that a high tax rate may
already have led to prior underinvestment in exploration, and hence lower
current reserves. The direct causal effect of reserves on government take may
therefore be underestimated by the opposite reverse causal effect of government
take on reserves. We again use an IV approach. The ideal instrument in this
case would be a measure of resource-richness that would be independent of
past exploration efforts, and hence unaffected by government take. We choose
two instruments and use each of these in turn. The first instrument is Res80,
the reserves per country as they were in 1980, according to BP (2011). These
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Table 3.4: Second-stage IV regression results for reserves
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GovTake GovTake GovTake GovTake
Aut Polity2 17.45∗∗∗ 18.85∗∗∗
(5.202) (5.937)
Ben WGI 20.29 13.65
(12.41) (13.40)
Reserves 0.0136 -0.155 0.0577 -0.290
(0.121) (0.396) (0.133) (0.479)
Estimator 2SLS LIML 2SLS LIML
Instrument Res80 Prod65 Res80 Prod65
N 66 62 66 62
adj. R2 0.516 0.454 0.451 0.274
First-stage
F (excluded
instrument) 56.21 2.80 55.72 2.75
Standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions include Undiscovered, OilImporter, ProdCost, LYP,
OECD, Trade, TransEcon, LPop, Prop1564, Prop65 and a
constant term (not shown).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
are probably much less affected by the current government take since they
were discovered before 1980 under a fiscal regime that was probably different.
1980 is the earliest year available in the reserves time series of BP (2011). The
second instrument is Prod65, oil production per country in 1965. While this
is a less adequate measure for reserves, BP (2011) provides data back to 1965,
which makes a reverse causal relation with current government take even less
likely.
Table 3.4 shows the second-stage IV regression results under four different
specifications, and also mentions first-stage F statistics in each case. Since
Prod65 proves to be a weak instrument (as expected), we use it only in com-
bination with LIML estimation. Columns (1) and (2) include Aut Polity2 and
Ben WGI as covariates. Since these variables are also endogenous – as men-
tioned above – it may be safer to leave them out of this regression, as is done in
columns (3) and (4). Overall, the effect of reserves on government take, which
was already relatively weak in the OLS result, disappears in this IV analysis.
The next section may cast some light on a possible underlying mechanism for
this.
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Table 3.5: Explanatory power of Fraser Institute indices
(1) (2) (3)
GovTake GovTake GovTake
FiscTerms 0711 0.228∗∗ 0.304
(0.0911) (0.207)
TaxReg 0711 0.191∗∗ -0.0859
(0.0939) (0.210)
Constant 58.85∗∗∗ 60.06∗∗∗ 59.26∗∗∗
(3.594) (3.739) (3.747)
N 69 69 69
adj. R2 0.072 0.044 0.060
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3.3.3 Panel data estimates
An alternative approach to address the omitted variable bias mentioned in the
previous section, is panel data analysis with country fixed effects. Since time
series data on government take is not available, we use a proxy. From 2007 to
2011, the Fraser Institute has conducted an annual Global Petroleum Survey,
which identifies barriers to investment in the upstream petroleum industry
across countries/jurisdictions, based on questionnaire responses from firms in
the industry (Angevine et al., 2007-2011). In particular, two questions in the
survey ask to what extent petroleum investment in a given jurisdiction is de-
terred by ‘fiscal terms’ and by ‘taxation regime’, respectively. The responses to
these questions result in a score per jurisdiction on the dimensions ‘fiscal terms’
and ‘taxation regime’. These scores, or a combination thereof, could be viewed
as a proxy for government take. Despite the short time span of the time series,
we will use these data for our panel data estimation. Table 3.5 shows the re-
sults of a regression of GovTake, as defined earlier, on FiscTerms07 11 and/or
TaxReg 0711. The latter two variables represent the average of the scores on
the dimensions ‘fiscal terms’ and ‘taxation regime’, respectively, across all edi-
tions of the Global Petroleum Survey from 2007 to 2011. The table shows
that both FiscTerms07 11 and TaxReg 0711 each individually constitute a
statistically significant explanatory variable for GovTake. When combined,
the significance disappears, and the coefficient of TaxReg 0711 becomes neg-
ative.18 Based on these results, we choose to use the annual scores on ‘fiscal
terms’ from the survey as a proxy for government take. We scale the scores by
0.23 to make the resulting estimates comparable with previous sections. The
18Clearly, the regression suffers from collinearity, given the correlation of 0.84 between
FiscTerms07 11 and TaxReg 0711.
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resulting annual variable is called FiscTerms. Since the composition of the
survey has changed over the years, we have an unbalanced panel.
Data for Aut Polity2, Ben WGI and Reserves is also available as a time
series, from the same sources as the static data used in previous sections. A
potential issue, however, is that there is only limited variation in Aut Polity2
for any given country over the short time frame under consideration. As an
alternative to Aut Polity2, we therefore use the Voice & Accountability vari-
able from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufman et al., 2010). We
invert and scale the latter variable to the 0-1 range, as before, and denote it
with Aut WGI. Unlike Aut Polity2, which is measured using a discrete set of
possible values, the variable Aut WGI is continuous, and hence may be able
to record smaller variations in democratic characteristics. The correlation
between Aut Polity2 and Aut WGI is 0.84. The data on ProdCost and Undis-
covered is static, hence we cannot use it in the panel data analysis. Data on
OilImporter, i.e. the dummy indicating whether a country’s oil consumption is
larger than its production, hardly shows any variation during the period under
observation, so we do not use it. Among the controls for economic, popula-
tion and regional/colonial characteristics, only LYP, Trade, LPop, Prop1564
and Prop65 have variation over time, and are included in the regression. We
include country fixed effects, to account for country-specific features not ac-
counted for by the controls, and time effects, to account for global changes
affecting all countries, such as oil market dynamics.19
The results are shown in Table 3.6. Column (1) is the most straight-
forward specification. Column (2) includes lags for all variables of interest.
Columns (3) and (4) are the same as columns (1) and (2), respectively, but with
Aut Polity2 replaced by Aut WGI. The coefficients of autocracy (Aut Polity2
or Aut WGI ) and its lag are positive everywhere, which is in line with our
OLS and IV estimates. Although nearly all these coefficients are larger than
the standard error, only the coefficient of the lag of Aut Polity2 is significant.
The latter may however be an artefact caused by the infrequent occurrence of
variation in Aut Polity2. The coefficients of Ben WGI and its lag are nega-
tive everywhere, and but since nearly all of them are quite a bit smaller than
the standard error in absolute terms, this does not necessarily need to be in-
consistent with previous results. The results for Reserves, although again only
marginally significant, provide some insight regarding our earlier contradictory
findings. Based on Table 3.6, it seems that the link between current reserves
and fiscal regime is negative, which may be an indication of the reverse cau-
sation mechanism described earlier. By contrast, the coefficient of the lag of
Reserves is positive, which may be an indication of the direct effect of reserves
19Moreover, the reporting of the Fraser Institute’s Global Petroleum Survey was changed
between the 2008 and 2009 editions. Until 2008, jurisdictions were ranked based on the
percentage of respondents answering that fiscal terms were a ‘Strong deterrent to investment’
or that they ’Would not invest’. Starting in 2009, the score also includes respondents
answering that they consider fiscal terms a ‘Mild deterrent to investment’. This effect
should be captured by the year dummies.
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Table 3.6: Fixed effects panel regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FiscTerms FiscTerms FiscTerms FiscTerms
Aut Polity2 5.112 4.100
(3.478) (3.544)
Lagged Aut Polity2 9.099∗∗∗
(3.394)
Aut WGI 31.17 34.04
(24.75) (26.09)
Lagged Aut WGI 14.30
(16.90)
Ben WGI -9.390 -16.80 -5.520 -3.891
(13.74) (14.09) (13.85) (14.36)
Lagged Ben WGI -2.198 -5.184
(13.26) (14.32)
Reserves -0.0572∗ -0.0698 -0.0515 -0.0653
(0.0328) (0.0591) (0.0321) (0.0605)
Lagged Reserves 0.0162 0.0220
(0.0833) (0.0841)
N 235 235 236 236
adj. R2 0.702 0.711 0.702 0.698
Standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions include LYP, Trade, LPop, Prop1564, Prop65, country and
year dummies, and a constant (not shown).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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on government take as described in our model. Overall however, it seems the
panel data analysis is suffering from the short time span of the data, which
impedes the derivation of statistically significant conclusions.
3.4 Conclusions
This paper develops a theoretical model of the political economy of resource-
rich countries, featuring taxes on resource extraction, endogenous exploration
and a formalized classification of government types. The model predicts that,
all else equal, the government take of resource extraction profits would in-
crease with government autocracy and/or benevolence and with higher ex-
isting reserves base, while the government take would decrease with higher
undiscovered reserves or higher import dependence. Nearly all of these effects
are confirmed empirically for the case of oil, using OLS on a cross-section of 77
countries. The statistically significant positive effect of government autocracy
(i.e. dictatorship) on government take is shown to be robust in an IV analysis,
and, to a lesser extent, a panel data regression.
The model of this paper can be further improved by modelling the behavior
of citizens in a more detailed way, thereby endogenizing the election probability
or non-revolution probability. Furthermore, an extension to more than two
periods or to continuous time would enable a more refined modelling of the
complex trade-off between current and future earnings. Finally, the use of
longer time series of resource taxation data would allow for more conclusive
panel data estimates.
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Chapter 4
Taxation of Nuclear Rents:
Benefits, Drawbacks, and
Alternatives
This chapter has been submitted to Energy Economics.
4.1 Introduction
Towards the end of 2008, the government of Belgium attempted to reduce
its budget deficit by imposing a tax of 250 million euro on nuclear power
producers. Despite appeals to Belgium’s Constitutional Court, the tax was
upheld and repeated as an annual tax in 2009 and 2010. The tax burden is
allocated to nuclear producers in proportion to their capacities, and amounts
to around 5 euros per MWh produced. Meanwhile in Germany, in the second
half of 2010, the center-right government and the nuclear power producers
agreed to extend the planned lifetime of Germany’s nuclear power plants in
return for a new fuel-rod tax and a compulsory contribution to a renewable
energy fund, later to be replaced by a renewables levy per MWh produced.
The total resulting charge to the nuclear producers in Germany amounted to
slightly over 15 euros per MWh.1
This paper analyzes the short-run and long-run economic implications of
the introduction of such taxes on nuclear production, and compares taxation
with alternative policy measures.2 The economic model is applicable to various
1The information in this paragraph is obtained from articles in De Tijd (March 3 2010 and
December 8 2010), Financial Times (Sep 7 2010) and The Economist (June 2 2011). Note
that as a result of the Fukushima accident, however, the German government eventually
annulled the lifetime extension and maintained the plans for a phase-out by 2022.
2Note that our paper is focused on taxation of economic rents. The Fukushima accident
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countries. Table 4.1 provides an overview of European countries that have
nuclear energy in their generation mix. The table also shows that nuclear
Table 4.1: Overview of nuclear electricity generation capacity in Europe
Country Nuclear
capacity
(Dec 31,
2010)
Share of
nuclear in
total gross
electricity
generation
(2008)
Share of
nuclear
capacity
owned by
largest 2
players
(Dec 31, 2010)
Policy outlook
(Dec 31, 2010)
MW % %
France 62950 76% 99.7% Expansion ongoing
Germany 19895 23% 50.1% Decommissioning by
2022
Sweden 9248 43% 75.0% Stable
United
Kingdom
9218 13% 100.0% Stable
Spain 7409 19% 61.2% Stable
Belgium 5839 54% 97.3% Decommissioning
2015-2030
Czech Re-
public
3775 32% 100.0% Expansion proposals
Switzerland 3220 40% 66.3% Expansion proposals
Finland 2721 30% 100.0% Expansion ongoing
Hungary 1946 37% 100.0% Expansion proposals
Slovakia 1940 58% 100.0% Expansion proposals
Bulgaria 1906 35% 100.0% Expansion proposals
Romania 1310 17% 100.0% Expansion proposals
Slovenia 664 38% 100.0% Expansion proposals
Netherlands 479 4% 100.0% Expansion proposals
Source: Platts (2010), Eurostat (2011).
firms often have large, concentrated market shares and may therefore be able
to exercise market power on national or regional electricity markets. This is
an important feature of the nuclear sector, which we will explicitly include
in this paper using a ‘dominant firm – competitive fringe’ model. The model
allows us to analyze the different types of nuclear rents, the potential for
short-run taxation (as in the above example of Belgium), the possible long-run
effects of such taxes, and alternative policy measures such as comprehensive
lifetime extension deals (as in the German example), auctioning of licenses,
and renewables investment quota.
The issue of nuclear rents has been studied from a policy perspective by e.g.
CREG (2010a) and Matthes (2010). CREG (2010b) also study the German
taxation solution. Such studies focus on detailed quantified analysis of specific
has illustrated the external cost of nuclear power, which could be addressed separately
through a Pigouvian tax. The latter is not the subject of this paper.
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cases. Our paper aims to complement this literature by developing a formal
model that allows for graphical and analytical demonstration of the underlying
economic principles.
The oligopolistic nature of our proposed model embodies a number of is-
sues studied in the vast literature on electricity market deregulation, such as
Newberry’s (2002) analysis of the effectiveness of the deregulation process and
the accompanying problems. Indeed, the ongoing policy challenges regarding
taxation of nuclear rents are a consequence of the liberalization of formerly
regulated electricity monopolies. A large number of papers analyze the elec-
tricity market as an oligopoly and many studies like Borenstein et al. (1999),
Bushnell et al. (2004), Cardell et al. (1997) and Wolfram (1999) analyze mar-
ket power of incumbent firms, which may transform their previous regulated
monopoly rights into substantial unregulated market power.
Our paper fits into the broader literature on optimal regulation of oligopolies
and the electricity sector in particular. Well-known literature such as Demsetz
(1968) and Stigler (1971) questions the benefits of such regulation for society
as a whole, as opposed to the special interest group of the electricity compa-
nies. Models that do advocate regulation of monopolies, typically have as a
result that the first-best solution in the case of a technology with low marginal
costs – such as nuclear power – is to subsidize the monopolist in order to al-
low him to set prices at marginal cost without going out of business (see e.g.
Train, 1991). The same principle is valid in the ‘dominant firm – competitive
fringe’ model used in this paper: we will find that the optimal tax rate of nu-
clear power in the long run may be negative. The key difference is that in our
model there is a severe capacity constraint on nuclear production, which is es-
pecially relevant in the short run. The first-best solution is then to charge the
price that reduces demand to the level of available capacity. Riordan (1984)
proposes a subsidy scheme to create incentives for correct pricing. However,
in the current case, this would result in a negative subsidy, i.e. a lump sum
tax on the nuclear firm, which may be difficult to realize for legal reasons. The
question still arises why there should be any taxation at all in this case: it may
seem that nuclear firms earn a justifiable rent on a scarce resource that they
acquired. The resource was however acquired in a regulated setting, in which
costs were usually passed on directly to consumers through cost-of-service reg-
ulation. For that reason, governments may find it appropriate to tax nuclear
rents. Our paper will therefore evaluate the short-run and long-run effects of a
nuclear production tax, and study a number of alternative policy instruments.
Among the alternative policy instruments, we find that lifetime extension
agreements negotiated with multiple potential players, and competitive auc-
tioning of new nuclear licenses are the most attractive policies. The bargaining
and auctioning aspect is stylized, in order to permit transparent comparison
with the outcomes of taxation. A more elaborate treatment of nuclear capacity
auctions is provided by Fridolfsson and Tanger˚as (2011).
Our monopolistic ‘dominant firm – competitive fringe’ equilibrium concept
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and its oligopolistic extensions are more similar to the typical Cournot models
than to the more sophisticated Supply Function Equilibria (SFE). The ad-
vantage of the former is clearly computational convenience, as acknowledged
by e.g. Ventosa et al. (2005), Borenstein et al. (1999), Hobbs & Pang (2007)
and Wei and Smeers (1999). Willems et al. (2009) confront Cournot models
and SFE with data of the German electricity market. The authors conclude
that SFE models do not significantly outperform the Cournot approach when
studying the German electricity market but that they rely on fewer calibration
parameters and may therefore be more robust. Willems et al. (2009) suggest
that Cournot models are “...aptly suited for the study of market rules...”, while
SFE are suited to study e.g. long-term effects of mergers. In our setting, the
Cournot-style approach seems therefore justified.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 develops our analytical
model of an electricity market with a significant share of nuclear production,
and identifies the different types of nuclear rents. Section 4.3 investigates
the potential magnitude and impact of a nuclear tax in the short run. Next,
Section 4.4 demonstrates the long-run commitment disadvantages of a nuclear
tax. Section 4.5 studies alternative policy measures. Section 4.6 illustrates the
results numerically for the case of Belgium. Section 4.7 concludes the paper.
4.2 Model set-up
4.2.1 Demand and supply
We study a stationary electricity market with linear demand:
q(p) = q0 − βp (4.1)
with constant parameters q0 and β ≥ 0. To focus our thoughts, we assume
that this is the electricity market of one single country. The demand q(p)
represents an ‘average’ demand in the course of a year, and we do not consider
any demand variations within the year, or even within the days of the year.3
Two supply technologies are available: (i) nuclear generation with short-
run marginal production cost cn, and (ii) fossil-fuel-based generation with
linearly increasing short-run marginal production costs c0 + αq. Because of
the low short-run marginal production costs of nuclear power, we assume cn 
c0. Nuclear generation qn is limited by the installed nuclear capacity qn,inst.
Furthermore, we assume that there is a limit qn,max to the amount of nuclear
capacity that can be installed: qn,inst ≤ qn,max. The constraint may be due
to various reasons: technical (e.g. limited access to cooling, insufficient ability
of nuclear power to cope with demand variability), political, ethical, etc. For
3As we will see below, supply and demand are assumed to always intersect in the same
linear part of the supply curve, so the ‘average’ demand corresponds to the ‘average’ price.
In this case, the fact that we analyze only the average demand is therefore not a restriction.
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the sake of simplicity, we assume qn,inst = qn,max, i.e. nuclear capacity has
already been installed up to maximum allowable level. The cost curve c0 +
αq aggregates different fossil-fuel power plants and also includes any relevant
foreign production capacity that can be imported. Additional transmission
costs for foreign production are included in c0 + αq.
4.2.2 Equilibrium concept
We consider a ‘dominant firm – competitive fringe’ game, which is fairly stan-
dard in microeconomic analysis.4 We assume that all nuclear production ca-
pacity is controlled by one ‘dominant firm’. Considering the strong concentra-
tion in nuclear power as shown in Table 4.1, this assumption is not unrealistic,
and serves as a ‘worst case’ baseline for the cases with more than one producer.
The fossil-fuel and foreign capacity represented by c0 + αq is assumed to be
operated by a ‘competitive fringe’. In this model, the dominant firm behaves
strategically, while the competitive fringe always behaves fully competitively
and hence always produces up to the point where price equals marginal cost.
Figure 4.1 illustrates our equilibrium concept. The thick black line is the
Figure 4.1: Equilibrium in the ‘dominant firm – competitive fringe’ game
described in this paper
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industry marginal cost curve. Under perfect competition, the market equil-
4See e.g. Carlton and Perloff (2000).
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brium would be at point A, the intersection of the industry marginal cost curve
and the demand curve. Since it is in practice technically impossible to serve an
entire electricity system with nuclear power, we assume that the intersection
of supply and demand is always in the upward sloping part of the supply curve
(i.e. the part provided by the competitive fringe). The equilibrium price and
quantity under perfect competition are p∗0 and q
∗
0 :
p∗0 =
c0 + α(q0 − qn,max)
1 + αβ
(4.2)
q∗0 =
q0 − β(c0 − αqn,max)
1 + αβ
(4.3)
In our ‘dominant firm – competitive fringe’ model, however, the equilibrium
can be determined by considering the residual demand curve (i.e. demand
minus the quantities supplied by the competitive fringe) and analyzing the
dominant firm as a monopolist on this residual demand curve.5 As shown
in Figure 4.1, the residual demand curve translates into a marginal revenue
curve (MRn) of the dominant firm. If nuclear capacity was not constrained
by qn,inst then the ‘dominant firm – competitive fringe’ equilibrium would be
at point B, i.e. the intersection of MRn and the dominant firm’s (constant)
marginal cost curve. However, given the nuclear capacity constraint (qn ≤
qn,inst), the dominant firm’s quantity decision qn becomes equal to qn,inst =
qn,max. As a result, the equilibrium prices and quantities are the same as
under perfect competition, at least in the case shown in Figure 4.1. Only
with high operating costs and large capacity would the dominant nuclear have
an interest in exploiting his market power by not fully using the available
capacity. However, due to the relatively low short-run marginal cost of nuclear
production, the constraint qn ≤ qn,inst is generally binding. As a result, in
this model, even a single dominant nuclear firm typically does not have an
incentive to withhold production. In order to keep our argument focused,
we will assume that – in the absence of taxes on nuclear production – the
constraint qn ≤ qn,inst is indeed binding.
This assumption can be expressed mathematically. From equation (4.1)
and the cost curve of the competitive fringe, we can easily derive the inverse
residual demand curve pR(q), and subsequently MRn:
pR(q) =
c0 + α(q0 − q)
1 + αβ
(4.4)
MRn =
c0 + α(q0 − 2q)
1 + αβ
(4.5)
5Note that our model description implicitly provides the dominant firm with a Stackel-
berg leadership position vis-a`-vis the competitive fringe. Ulph and Folie (1980) analyze an
alternative configuration, in which a Nash equilibrium is reached between the dominant firm
and the competitive fringe, and find that this leads to a number of undesirable properties,
hence we do not consider this option here.
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In the absence of the constraint qn ≤ qn,inst, the nuclear firm’s unconstrained
production quantity qn,uncon can be computed by setting MRn = MCn = cn:
qn,uncon =
1
2
(q0 +
c0 − cn
α
− βcn) (4.6)
The constraint qn ≤ qn,inst will be binding iff qn,inst ≤ qn,uncon. Since we
assume qn,inst = qn,max, the latter condition can be expressed as:
2qn,max ≤ q0 + c0 − cn
α
− βcn (4.7)
The first two terms of the right-hand side together (q0 − βcn) are slightly
larger than total electricity demand, hence it is reasonable to assume qn,max 
q0−βcn. The last term (c0−cn)/α is also large, because the difference in short-
run marginal production cost between nuclear power and the fossil-fuel fired
power plants of the competitive fringe is large. With the calibration parameters
of Section 4.6, condition (4.7) is satisfied for all European countries in Table
4.1.
Until now, we have assumed that the dominant nuclear firm does not own
any of the competitive fringe capacity. In reality, the firm may have diversified
its asset portfolio by investing also in fossil-fuel capacity, which in our model
is part of the competitive fringe. Let us therefore consider a case in which
the nuclear firm owns not only all nuclear capacity, but also an amount qf
of fringe capacity. This set-up may have an effect on its nuclear production
decisions. Note that we do not consider any withholding of qf . The purpose
of this paper is to study taxes on nuclear production; any withholding of qf is
a separate issue that is not directly affected by taxes on nuclear production.
The nuclear firm’s ownership of qf adds a term qfdpR(q)/dq to MRn in
equation (4.5). We find:
MRn =
c0 + α(q0 − 2q − qf )
1 + αβ
(4.8)
Hence, the MRn curve in Figure 4.1 is shifted downward by an amount
qfα/(1 + αβ), which moves the intersection point B with cn to the left. The
same effect would be accomplished by increasing cn by an amount qfα/(1+αβ).
Hence, the key results regarding optimal tax rates in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 of
this paper remain valid, provided that cn is replaced with cn + qfα/(1 +αβ).
6
The intuition behind this is obviously that ownership of fringe capacity by the
nuclear firm creates an additional opportunity cost when activating nuclear
capacity: in addition to the direct nuclear production cost cn and changes in
nuclear revenues, the firm incurs lost revenues on the capacity qf due to lower
electricity prices.
6Note in particular that this requires β  α−1 for Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, and σn = 0
for Proposition 4.2.
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4.2.3 Rents
Figure 4.1 demonstrates that nuclear producers obtain a rent (p∗0 − cn)qn.
Three types of rent can be distinguished.
First, a large part is the perfectly competitive inframarginal rent required
to cover the fixed costs (mostly investment costs) incurred by the nuclear
firm. Indeed, while short-run marginal production costs are relatively low,
the upfront capital investment of nuclear power is comparatively high. The
discounted sum of inframarginal rents needs to cover that investment cost in
order to provide sufficient investment incentives. We assume that the sum of
the annuity of investment costs plus any relevant fixed operating costs is given
by fnqn,inst.
Secondly, there may be a scarcity rent. Indeed, without the constraint
qn,max, the long-run equilibrium installed capacity of nuclear power would
evolve such that the electricity price equals fn + cn. As a result of the con-
straint, the nuclear firm in Figure 4.1 obtains a scarcity rent (p∗0 − cn− fn)qn.
Thirdly, nuclear firms may obtain rents due to market power. In Figure 4.1,
no withholding takes place, hence there is no market power rent. As mentioned
before, the low level of short-run marginal costs makes short-run withholding
of nuclear capacity unlikely in general. However, as we will see below, there
may be circumstances (e.g. in the event of nuclear taxation) that can lead to
the long-run variety of withholding, namely underinvestment.
4.2.4 Government
In this paper, we study the policy options of the national government of the
country under consideration. We assume that the government maximizes na-
tional welfare W :
W = CS + σnpin + λG (4.9)
with CS the consumer surplus, pin the profits of the nuclear firm, σn (0 ≤ σn ≤
1) the fraction of the nuclear firm’s shares owned by nationals of the country,
G the government revenues from the nuclear sector (taxes, licenses, etc.), and
λ the marginal cost of public funds7. We ignore the potential contribution of
the competitive fringe’s profits to national welfare. The choice of λ depends
on the view one takes regarding government revenues. An assumption λ = 0
implies that government revenues are wasted. On the other hand, assuming
λ > 1 implies that nuclear revenues are used productively to reduce other
taxes, thereby eliminating distortions elsewhere in the economy. For the sake
of simplicity, we assume λ = 1 in the remainder of this paper. Note that if, for
ideological or other reasons, the government does not attach any importance
to the income of the nuclear firm’s national shareholders, this is equivalent to
setting σn = 0.
7See e.g. Browning (1976).
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Assuming a reservation price p¯, we can conveniently write CS as:
CS =
∫ p¯
p∗
q(p)dp = (p¯− p∗)q0 − β
2
(p¯2 − p∗2) (4.10)
with p∗ the market price of electricity in the equilibrium under consideration.
4.3 Short-run taxation potential
We now consider the introduction of an unexpected tax on nuclear production,
as it happened in the case of Belgium. ‘Unexpected’ means that the tax was
not anticipated at the time of investment in the nuclear capacity. We consider
a tax of τ per unit of nuclear electricity produced. The effect is illustrated in
Figure 4.2. For the nuclear firm, the tax increases the short-run marginal cost
of production from cn to cn + τ . As a result, the intersection point of MRn
and MCn moves from point B to point C. If τ is high enough, the intersection
point may shift to point D or beyond. When the intersection point is beyond
point D (indicated with a little arrow in Figure 4.2) the constraint qn ≤ qn,inst
is no longer binding and the nuclear firm withholds some of its capacity.
Figure 4.2: Short-run impact of an unexpected tax on nuclear production
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Proposition 4.1. Under the assumptions of Section 4.2 and the additional
conditions that β  α−1 (highly inelastic demand) and that:
2qn,max ≤ q0 + c0 − cn
2α
− β 5cn + 3c0 + 2αq0
8
(4.11)
the government’s optimal choice of the short-run nuclear tax rate is:
τ˜sr =
c0 + α(q0 − 2qn,max)
1 + αβ
− cn (4.12)
Proof. First, observe that τ˜sr is the maximum tax rate the government can
impose without causing the nuclear firm to withhold. This can be easily seen
by replacing cn with cn + τ in equation (4.7) and solving for τ .
Lowering the tax rate below τ˜sr keeps the constraint qn ≤ qn,inst binding,
hence it does not change the equilibrium. The only effect of lowering the tax
rate below τ˜sr is a linear transfer from government revenue to nuclear profits.
Since σn ≤ 1 this cannot increase the government’s objective function W in
equation (4.9). This is shown in Figure 4.3, for τ ≤ τ˜sr.
Figure 4.3: Shape of W as a function of τ
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Raising the tax rate τ above τ˜sr leads to withholding. The constraint
qn ≤ qn,inst is not binding anymore and nuclear production qn,1 is given by
equation (4.6) with cn replaced by cn + τ . The equilibrium price can then be
easily derived:
p∗1 =
1
2
[
cn + τ +
c0 + αq0
1 + αβ
]
(4.13)
which can be substituted into equation (4.10) for CS. Using also G = τqn,1,
one can derive an analytical expression for the government’s objective function
4.3. SHORT-RUN TAXATION POTENTIAL 89
Wwh in case of withholding, which is a concave quadratic function of τ . As
mentioned before, we assume λ = 1. For σn = 0, the maximum value of Wwh
is reached for:
τpeak ≈ c0 − cn
2
+
αβ
4
(
αq0 − c0 − cn
2
)
(4.14)
in which we have approximated τpeak using its first-order Taylor polynomial
around αβ = 0. Due to condition (4.11), this value τpeak is lower than the
first-order polynomial of τ˜sr around αβ = 0, hence τpeak is outside the domain
where withholding takes place. As a result, W declines with τ when τ ≥ τ˜sr,
as is illustrated in Figure 4.3. This result is also valid if σn ≥ 0, because then
τpeak will be even smaller since in this case a larger τ contributes an additional
negative term to W through pi.
Since it is impossible to increase W – neither by lowering τ below τ˜sr nor
by raising it above τ˜sr – the choice τ = τ˜sr must be an optimal value.
Condition (4.11) is similar to condition (4.7), but slightly more restric-
tive. With the calibration parameters of Section 4.6 the condition is satisfied
when the maximum nuclear capacity represents less than 60% of total demand.
Except for France, this is satisfied for all countries in Table 4.1.
Proposition 4.1 demonstrates that it is possible (and optimal in the short
run) for governments to impose a substantial8 unexpected tax on nuclear pro-
duction, without even affecting the equilibrium on the electricity market. An
immediate side-effect of such a tax is that incentives for efficiency improve-
ments at nuclear power plants vanish. Indeed, according to equation (4.12)
any investment that reduces cn would lead to an increase of τ˜sr by the same
amount, leading eventually to the same total costs for the nuclear firm. The
situation of the nuclear firm becomes similar to the situation of a regulated firm
under cost-of-service regulation. Fabrizio et al. (2007) analyze efficiency im-
provements induced by a transition from cost-of-service regulation to market-
oriented environments for a large set of US electric generating plants. Their
estimates suggest that investor-owned utility plants in restructuring regimes
reduced their labor and non-fuel operating expenses by 3 to 5 percent in an-
ticipation of increased competition in electricity generation, relative to plants
in states that did not restructure their markets. The reverse effects might
be expected in the taxation case analyzed in this paper. In addition to this
immediate impact, the tax may have an effect on long-run reinvestment. This
will be studied in the next section.
8An indication of the likely size of such a tax is provided in Section 4.6.
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4.4 Long-run effects of taxation on reinvest-
ment
The government’s ability and incentives to introduce ex-post taxes on nuclear
production in the short run, as in the previous section, may hamper invest-
ments in new nuclear capacity – or any other generating capacity with high
capital costs – because firms may fear expropriation of profits. This is a well-
known problem in the tax competition literature. Janeba (2000) uses a model
in which one firm produces for the world market and its profits are taxed by
the government. When the production has to be local, there is a standard
time inconsistency problem. The government has an interest to raise the tax
after the investment, the firm understands this ex ante and the firm would
never invest. In Janeba’s model this problem can be avoided by the firm at a
high cost by building extra capacity in another country and to shift produc-
tion to the country where the net profit is the highest. According to Janeba,
when capacity costs are sufficiently low, this is the equilibrium. For higher
capacity costs, there is an equilibrium without investment. In our case, even
if there is enough international transmission capacity, high (nuclear) capacity
costs would rule out an equilibrium with excess capacities. A second way to
avoid the time inconsistency problem is to rely on other constraints on the
behavior of governments. One legal option is to have constitutions that rule
out governments changing the tax rules. This type of rule exists in order to
limit government debt but is rather naive as governments have by definition
the power to tax profits more and lower other taxes. A second constraint
could be reputation. In order to assess this constraint we need a behavioral
model of the government as an agent that desires to be reelected by its voters
(Besley, 2006). A government raising taxes ex post can be seen as an unreli-
able government by investors but voters with a shorter-term memory and/or
perceiving the nuclear tax as a justified tax on excess profits or compensating
nuclear risks may consider such a government as defending its interests. The
best evidence is that in countries such as Germany and Belgium, such an ex-
post nuclear tax has been agreed upon in Parliament. In conclusion, credible
commitments not to raise the tax ex post are difficult. The remainder of this
section therefore considers multiple cases, with different levels of commitment.
Subsection 4.4.1 first analyzes the effects of the tax τ˜sr (from equation
(4.12)) on investment incentives, when this tax is made permanent and the
government is able to commit to it. Subsection 4.4.2 investigates a situa-
tion in which the government cannot make any credible commitment at all.
Subsection 4.4.3 investigates the opposite situation, in which the government
is capable of making credible commitments to an optimal long-run tax rate,
which would be lower than τ˜sr.
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4.4.1 Credible commitment to the short-run tax rate
Suppose the government imposes a tax τ˜sr on current nuclear power produc-
tion, according to Proposition 4.1. When the current nuclear capacity expires
and needs to be replaced, nuclear firms will take the tax τ˜sr into account when
making the reinvestment decision. In this subsection we assume that the gov-
ernment can credibly commit to maintaining – i.e. not increasing – τ˜sr after
the replacement capacity has been built.
In their long-run reinvestment decision, firms will not only take into account
the short-run marginal cost cn and the tax τ˜sr but also the fixed (investment)
costs fn per unit of capacity built. Figure 4.4 illustrates the decision of the
nuclear firm. The relevant marginal cost curve is now MCn,lr, which intersects
with MRn at E instead of D. The resulting reinvestment decision can be found
by replacing cn with cn + τ˜sr + fn in equation (4.6):
qn,reinv =
1
2
(
q0 − β(cn + τ˜sr + fn) + c0 − (cn + τ˜sr + fn)
α
)
(4.15)
Using equation (4.12) this can be simplified to:
qn,reinv = qn,max − fn(1 + αβ)
2α
(4.16)
which is obviously lower than the technical maximum qn,max.
9
With the existing fringe capacity marginal cost curve, the reduction of
nuclear capacity from qn,inst = qn,max to qn,reinv increases electricity prices
from p∗0 to p
∗
2. One can easily compute that:
p∗2 − p∗0 =
fn
2
(4.17)
i.e. the underinvestment in nuclear capacity due to the introduction of a tax
according to Proposition 4.1, may lead to an increase in electricity prices equal
to half the per-unit fixed (investment) cost.10
4.4.2 No credible commitment
The caveat with Figure 4.4 is that once the capacity qn,reinv has been installed,
the government would be incentivized to increase the tax rate above τ˜sr. In
Figure 4.4, the government could increase the tax to τ˜sr + fn without causing
9In the case shown in the figure, we have fn ≤ τ˜sr, so that in the absence of taxes
even a single dominant firm would reinvest up to the the full technical maximum qn,max.
If fn > τ˜sr, this need not be the case but the resulting capacity in the case with taxes is
always lower than in the case without taxes.
10For the sake of simplicity, we have implicitly assumed that long-run price elasticity of
electricity demand is the same as in the short run. In reality, in the long run, households
may adapt and industries may decide to relocate to other countries, so long-run demand
would be less inelastic.
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Figure 4.4: Long-run impact of an unexpected tax on nuclear investments,
assuming government can commit to τ˜sr
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any withholding of the capacity qn,reinv. In fact, by analogy with Proposition
4.1, it is easy to see that for any level of qn,reinv the government’s optimal
ex-post short-run tax τ˜ ′sr can be found by following the MRn curve:
τ˜ ′sr = MRn − cn (4.18)
A rational nuclear firm anticipates the government’s ex-post tax increases.
Hence, the MCn,lr curve changes to include the ex-post tax increase:
MCn,lr = cn + fn + τ˜
′
sr = fn +MRn (4.19)
For fn > 0 there is no more intersection between MCn,lr and MRn, hence no
nuclear capacity is built if the government cannot make any credible commit-
ment regarding the future tax rate.
Full loss of commitment power of the government is not required to create
the conditions for underinvestment. Indeed, the possibility of the government
changing tax rates ex-post, may be sufficient to deter investment. Suppose that
there is a probability δ that the government makes an ex-post decision to apply
the tax τ˜ ′sr according to equation (4.18). Conversely, with probability (1− δ),
the government does not apply any tax. A risk-neutral firm will behave as if
government imposed the expected value of the tax, i.e. the weighted average
δτ˜ ′sr. This is illustrated in Figure 4.5. The nuclear firm’s reinvestment decision
is at point F , the intersection of MRn and MCn,lr, with the latter including
the expected value of the tax. As δ increases, the point F moves further up
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the MRn curve – as indicated with a little arrow – and reinvestment is further
reduced. One can show that qn,reinv becomes 0 when:
δ ≥ 1− fnc0+αq0
1+αβ − cn
(4.20)
Hence, reinvestment may be completely deterred even if it is not certain that
the government cannot commit to a tax rate.
Figure 4.5: Long-run impact of an unexpected tax on nuclear investments,
assuming a probability δ that the government cannot credibly commit to a
tax rate
~δ
~(1–δ)
qqn,max
cn
p
q0
MRn
MCn,lr
δτsr
~'
fn
qn,reinv
F
4.4.3 Credible commitment to the optimal long-run tax
rate
Let us assume that the government can choose a tax rate before the nuclear
firm’s reinvestment decision, and that the government can make a credible
commitment to maintain this tax rate after the capacity has been built. By
analogy with Proposition 4.1, essentially by replacing cn with cn + fn, we can
derive the government’s optimal choice of the tax rate. However, since fn may
be large, the analog of condition (4.11) is not necessarily fulfilled, hence two
cases need to be considered.
For the sake of analytical simplicity, we will assume σn = 0 in this section.
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Proposition 4.2. Under the conditions of Section 4.2 and assuming σn = 0
and β  α−1, the optimal choice of the nuclear tax rate for a government
capable of making credible commitments is:
τ˜lr = max
{
τ˜sr − fn , c0 − cn − fn
2
+
αβ
4
(
αq0 − c0 − cn − fn
2
)}
(4.21)
Proof. The proof is analogous to Proposition 4.1. For τ ≤ τ˜sr − fn, the
constraint qn,reinv ≤ qn,max is binding, and lowering τ below τ˜sr − fn cannot
increase W .
For τ > τ˜sr − fn the constraint is not binding anymore. In the absence of
the constraint, the government’s objective function W has a peak at τpeak as
given by equation (4.14) with cn replaced by cn + fn.
If τpeak ≤ τ˜sr− fn then W declines when τ is raised above τ˜sr− fn, similar
to the situation in Figure 4.3. If τpeak > τ˜sr − fn, then the maximum of W
is reached for τ = τpeak. Combining both cases, we find τ˜lr = max{τ˜sr −
fn , τpeak}, hence equation (4.21).
Note that τ˜lr according to equation (4.21) is not necessarily positive. In
general, it is easy to see that large fn will make τ˜lr small or negative. The
government therefore faces a trade-off: on the one hand, short-run welfare
maximization would require taxing current nuclear capacity at a rate τ˜sr, but
this would harm government credibility thereby hampering reinvestment. On
the other hand, the optimal long-run tax rate τ˜lr in this setting is rather low.
If, in order to preserve its credibility, the government decides to apply τ˜lr
also to current capacity, this would leave a very large part of current nuclear
rents untouched. Ideally, the government would be able to make a credible
commitment to distinguish its tax rate on current capacity from its tax rate
on new capacity, but this may be difficult to do.
4.5 Alternative policy instruments
The previous section has highlighted the challenges of imposing an unexpected
short-run tax on a dominant nuclear firm. In this section we explore alternative
policy measures.
4.5.1 Lifetime extension agreements
Belgium’s government first decided to extend the lifetime of the country’s
nuclear power plants. Only later, it imposed a contested tax on nuclear pro-
ducers. An alternative is the German approach, in which a tax was agreed
between government and the nuclear firms in return for a lifetime extension.11
11The lifetime extension was later revoked in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident,
which is, in fact, an illustration of ineffective government commitment.
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The latter option is arguably preferable from the perspective of government
credibility and investment incentives.
We can analyze such a lifetime extension agreement using the reasoning
of Section 4.4.3. Indeed, lifetime extension is very similar to reinvestment,
but the reinvestment cost fn is replaced by a significantly lower refurbishment
cost f ′n. We simplify the bargaining process between the government and the
nuclear industry by assuming a Stackelberg structure in which the government
credibly commits to a tax rate τ in the first stage, and a dominant nuclear firm
responds in a second stage by deciding on how much of the nuclear capacity
will have its lifetime extended. The optimal tax to be set in return for a lifetime
extension can then be derived from Proposition 4.2. For the sake of simplicity,
we assume σn = 0, so that the optimal tax rate is given by Propostion 4.2. If
we assume αβ to be negligible, then the optimal tax rate becomes:
τ = max
{
τ˜sr − f ′n ,
c0 − cn − f ′n
2
}
(4.22)
which can be conveniently analyzed graphically, as in Figure 4.6, where (c0 −
cn − f ′n)/2 < τ˜sr − f ′n, hence τ = τ˜sr − fn. We shall maintain this assumption
in this and the next section.
Figure 4.6: Taxation in return for lifetime extension
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Because f ′n  fn, the agreed tax τ allows the government to capture at
least a sizeable part of the nuclear lifetime extension rent (p∗0− cn−f ′n)qn,inst.
The part captured by the government is indicated in light shading in Figure
4.6. However, a large part of the rent – shown in dark shading in Figure 4.6
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– cannot be captured through a lifetime extension and taxation agreement
with a dominant nuclear firm, because a further increase of the tax rate would
trigger a reduction of the amount of capacity of which the lifetime is extended,
and therefore lead to lower tax revenues.
4.5.2 Auctioning
The main underlying reason why a large part of the nuclear rent cannot be
captured in the setting of Figure 4.6, is the fact that the nuclear firm is assumed
to be a monopolist on the residual demand curve. One way to increase the
share of rent captured by taxes – and thus increase welfare – is to introduce
competition. More specifically, the government could open up the lifetime
extension licensing not only to the incumbent dominant firm but also to other
players, in an auction.
Suppose there are k players, including the incumbent. For the sake of
simplicity, we model the auctioning process as a Cournot game between nuclear
firms. First the government sets a lifetime extension tax τk, as in Section 4.5.1.
Then, in Cournot competition, the k players each decide on an amount of the
capacity to be extended. In the previous sections, the response of the dominant
firm as a function of costs plus taxes, was always given by MRn, which, as
is well-known, has twice the slope of the inverse residual demand curve. In a
Cournot game the resulting total quantity of the k players, as a function of
costs plus taxes, is a similar line, but with a slope of (k+1)/k times the slope of
the inverse residual demand curve. This is shown in Figure 4.7. The reasoning
from Section 4.5.1 can now be applied almost identically. The optimal tax
rate τ1 in the case of one dominant firm is the same as in Section 4.5.1. The
optimal tax rates τk for k > 1 become larger and larger, thereby allowing the
government to capture an ever larger share of the nuclear rent. In the limit
case of perfect competition (k →∞) the tax becomes τ∞ = p∗0 − cn − f ′n, and
the government captures the entire nuclear rent. There may however be some
drawbacks to this approach. In particular, the auctioning process may suffer
from asymmetric information. Indeed, the nuclear firm currently operating
the power plant may have private information that is unavailable to other
potential contenders in the auction. Furthermore, if ownership changes as a
result of the lifetime extension auction, the power plant may continue to be
operated by the original owner, which could lead to principal-agent problems.
In this section, we have applied the auctioning mechanism to the lifetime
extension process. Clearly, the same auctioning mechanism can be applied to
the reinvestment process.
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Figure 4.7: Auctioning of lifetime extension licenses
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4.5.3 Other taxation instruments
In this paper, the optimal nuclear energy tax has been derived for the case of an
excise tax on nuclear production. This is a fixed amount per MWh of nuclear
energy produced. Alternatively, the government could opt for an ad valorem
tax, a profit tax, or a lump sum tax. The former two taxes are in fact similar in
structure to the excise tax we have considered so far. In theory, in the case of a
pure monopoly, an ad valorem tax – proportional to the nuclear firm’s revenues
– yields a larger nuclear output for the same tax revenue than an excise tax.12
In our case however, the difference will be small since cn is small. A special
profit tax – proportional to the nuclear firm’s profits – circumvents the problem
of withholding, since the nuclear firm’s incentives remain unaltered. However,
it leads to the same long-term investment problems as the excise tax discussed
so far. Moreover, the special nuclear profit tax may be difficult to implement:
firms may attempt to evade the nuclear profit tax by inflating costs, shifting
costs between non-nuclear and nuclear plants, or overstating the allocation of
overhead costs to nuclear subsidiaries. From a legal perspective, it may be
challenging to tax the same profit twice, i.e. both through regular corporate
taxation and through the special nuclear profit tax. In any case, the profit
tax bears some resemblance to the excise tax, because also the optimal excise
tax depends on the difference between the price of the fossil fuel alternative
(via c0) and the marginal cost of nuclear power (cn). A pure lump sum tax,
12See e.g. Salanie´ (2003).
98 CHAPTER 4. TAXATION OF NUCLEAR RENTS
set independently of nuclear output, is a superior instrument compared to
the excise tax. However, in many countries lump sum taxes would not be
constitutional as they are not linked to a defined tax base.
4.5.4 Mandatory investments in renewable energy
Instead of pure taxation, governments are also considering the possibility of
requiring nuclear producers to invest a part of the nuclear rent in renewable
energy. For instance, the annulled German lifetime extension agreement in-
cluded a compulsory contribution to a renewable energy fund. In fact, such a
scheme is conceptually equivalent to the combination of a tax plus a commit-
ment to invest the tax revenues in renewable energy. Hence, it is only optimal
if renewable energy investments are indeed the best use of tax money, among
all other possible government investment options. This seems unlikely, unless
one assumes that other government expenditures are generally wasted, i.e. λ
in equation (4.9) very small.
4.6 Numerical simulations for the case of Bel-
gium
4.6.1 Calibration and baseline
In this section we apply the results from previous sections to a numerical
simulation for the case of Belgium. Table 4.2 lists the calibration parameters.
More information on how these values are obtained, can be found in 4.A. We
assume λ = 1 as before. Unless specified otherwise, we assume σn = 0, i.e.
there are no local shareholders of the nuclear firm, or the government does not
include their interests in its objective function.
Table 4.2: Numerical values of parameters for the case of Belgium
Parameter Value Unit
q0 9422 MW
β 0 MW · MWh/EUR
qn,max 5345 MW
cn 20.1 EUR/MWh
fn 34.7 EUR/MWh
f ′n 6.9 EUR/MWh
c0 39.3 EUR/MWh
α 0.0053 EUR/MWh / MW
Since demand is assumed to be completely inelastic (β = 0), the equi-
librium quantity in the absence of any intervention is obviously q∗0 = 9422
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MW. The equilibrium price in the absence of any intervention is p∗0 = 60.9
EUR/MWh, a fairly realistic number.
The total rent obtained by the nuclear firm in this model is given by:
(p∗0 − cn)qn = 1910 million EUR (4.23)
which is in line with the estimate of 1.75 to 2.3 billion EUR made by the
Belgian electricity regulator CREG (2011). It should be emphasized that the
estimation of the nuclear rent is not the objective of our model. Rather, the
similarity with CREG (2011) indicates that the calibration of the model is
likely to be fairly realistic.
4.6.2 Taxation and the effect on new investments
The parameters of Table 4.2 fulfill condition (4.11). The optimal unanticipated
short-run tax according to Proposition 4.1 is:
τ˜sr = 12.5 EUR/MWh (4.24)
and the corresponding government revenues G are 584 million EUR per year.
This tax is quite a bit higher than the 5 EUR/MWh tax introduced by the
Belgian government in 2008, but it still captures only 31% of the total rent.
In the longer run, if the 12.5 EUR/MWh tax is credibly maintained for new
nuclear investment when current capacity has expired, then equation (4.16) in-
dicates that only 39% of nuclear capacity will be replaced. This is obviously
dependent on the assumption that there is only one nuclear firm that can de-
cide to invest in Belgium. The resulting electricity price increase according
to equation (4.17) would be 17.4 EUR/MWh. Note that in this dominant
firm – competitive fringe model, with only one nuclear firm, the nuclear firm
would not replace all nuclear capacity even if no tax is imposed (see foot-
note 9). Indeed, even in the absence of any taxes, the dominant nuclear firm
would only reinvest in 61% of capacity. Still, the 12.5 EUR/MWh tax reduces
reinvestment by more than a third.13
If no taxes are imposed on new nuclear capacity but there is a probability
δ that the government will impose a short-run optimal tax ex-post, new nu-
clear investment may also be severely reduced, as explained in Section 4.4.2.
Figure 4.8 shows how the amount of replacement capacity qn,reinv changes
as a function of δ. According to equation (4.20), as soon as δ ≥ 0.50, there
will be no more nuclear investment. In other words: in this dominant firm –
competitive fringe model, a 1-in-2 chance of an ex-post nuclear tax, of which
the level will be decided by the government after investment, is sufficient to
deter all investment.
13An obvious question is then why the current capacity qn,max has been built in the first
place, given that a monopolist would build less capacity according to our model. One likely
explanation is that the capacity was built during the time of regulated monopoly, in which
the incumbent electricity firm would operate in a cost-plus scheme, and not on a free market
as in our model.
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Figure 4.8: Reinvestment in nuclear capacity as a function of the probability
δ that government will impose an ex-post tax
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Let us now consider the case in which the government can set a long-term
tax rate τ˜lr for new investment according to Proposition 4.2 and commit to
it. Figure 4.9 shows the optimal tax τ˜lr as a function of σn, the share of local
shareholders in the nuclear firm. The optimal tax is the maximum of two
alternatives: τ˜lr − fn and τpeak, as explained in Proposition 4.2. Interestingly,
the optimal tax is negative, even when σn is very low. Since the dominant firm
has an incentive to reinvest less than the technical maximum, it is optimal for
the government to subsidize the construction of nuclear power, in order to pre-
vent underinvestment and too low production. The subsidy is 7.8 EUR/MWh
when σn = 0, and increases with σn up to a maximum of 22.2 EUR/MWh
for σn = 0.51, after which it remains constant because the maximum possible
reinvestment qn,max is reached.
4.6.3 Lifetime extension agreement and auctioning
Let us now analyze the case of a lifetime extension agreement between the
government and the nuclear firm. As mentioned in Section 4.5.1 the problem
is similar to the question of reinvestment treated in the previous section, but
with a lower cost f ′n instead of fn. Applying equation (4.22) we find:
τ˜sr − f ′n = 5.6 EUR/MWh (4.25)
c0 − cn − f ′n
2
= 6.2 EUR/MWh (4.26)
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Figure 4.9: Optimal long-run tax when the government can credibly commit,
as a function of σn
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hence the optimal tax is 6.2 EUR/MWh. The situation is slightly different
from what is depicted in Figure 4.6 in that the government will increase the tax
rate slightly above the point where the nuclear firm starts to withhold capacity
from the lifetime extension. This effect disappears when multiple nuclear firms
are invited to an auction of lifetime extension licenses, as in Section 4.5.2.
With more than one player, in this numerical setting, the government will set
exactly the maximum tax rate that will make sure the lifetime of all capacity
gets extended. Figure 4.10 shows the optimal lifetime extension tax as a
function of the number of players k in the auction. The total potential rent
in this case is 1588 million EUR, which is less than the nuclear rent of 1910
million EUR mentioned earlier because of the lifetime extension cost f ′n. With
one player, the above-mentioned tax of 6.2 EUR/MWh captures only 18% of
this rent. With more than one player, the taxation potential rapidly increases
with k: in an auction with three players, the government would set a tax of
24.5 EUR/MWh, capturing 72% of the maximum potential. In a perfectly
competitive setting, i.e. when k → ∞, the government can capture the full
rent with a tax of 33.9 EUR/MWh.
As mentioned before, the same principle can be applied to the auctioning
of new nuclear power plant licenses, if the government can credibly commit
to an optimal long-run tax rate. The total potential rent is much smaller,
because fn  f ′n. In this numerical simulation, the total rent would be 286
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million EUR per year. However, a large number of players would be required
in order for the government to capture a significant share of this rent, as shown
in Figure 4.11. For k = 1 and k = 2, we obviously find again the subsidy of 7.8
EUR/MWh shown earlier in Figure 4.9. For higher k the subsidy decreases,
and becomes a tax when k ≥ 5. In the fully competitive situation in which
k → ∞, the tax is 6.1 EUR/MWh and the entire rent is captured by the
government.
The main numerical results are summarized in Table 4.3.
4.7 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied nuclear taxation using a stylized model of the
electricity sector with one dominant nuclear producer and a competitive fringe
of fossil-fuel plants. The graphical and analytical results are illustrated using
a numerical simulation for the case of Belgium.
We find that an unanticipated tax on nuclear production can generate
significant government revenues in the short run without disturbing the equi-
librium on the electricity market. In the simulation, the optimal short-run tax
is 12.5 EUR/MWh and captures around 31% of the total nuclear rent. How-
ever, the tax may harm reinvestment incentives in new nuclear capacity in the
long run. Assuming the government commits to maintaining the short-run tax
rate in the long run, reinvestment is reduced by a third in the simulation, com-
pared to a situation without the tax. If the probability that the government
cannot commit to a tax rate is higher than 50%, reinvestment is completely
deterred. If, on the other hand, the government can credibly commit to an
optimal long-run tax rate, government revenues would be very low because the
socially optimal tax would be very small or negative, due to the market power
of the nuclear firm.
An agreement on lifetime extension between the government and a domi-
nant nuclear producer generates less revenues than the unanticipated tax (18%
of the lifetime extension rent in the simulation). However, by inviting multi-
ple competing bidders for the lifetime extension licenses, government revenues
increase rapidly: in the simulation, a lifetime extension negotiation with three
bidders captures 72% of the rent for the government. Likewise, inviting mul-
tiple players to bid for reinvestment in new nuclear capacity can increase the
potential revenues from reinvestment in new capacity because it can make the
socially optimal tax positive.
Government credibility has been proven to be crucial for enabling long-
run optimal nuclear taxation policy. One way to achieve such credibility is to
transfer some authority to a supranational body, so that appeals are possible
when taxation agreements are not honored. The sensitive nature of taxation
may make such a transfer difficult to realize in practice, however.
Our stylized representation of the electricity market of a country with nu-
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Figure 4.10: Lifetime extension tax as a function of the number of participants
in the auction
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Figure 4.11: Long-term tax on new nuclear investments as a function of the
number of participants in the auction
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Table 4.3: Summary of numerical results
Situation Scenario Tax Comment 
    EUR/MWh   
Current nuclear 
power plants 
Optimal 
unanticipated 
short-run tax 
12.5 31% of rent 
captured, but 
risk of 
harming 
reinvestment 
        
    
Reinvestment in 
new nuclear 
power plants 
Commitment to 
same short-run 
tax 
12.5 A third less 
investment 
than without 
tax 
No government 
commitment (or 
more than 50% 
chance of short-
run tax ex-post) 
/ No new 
nuclear 
investments 
Commitment to 
optimal long-run 
tax, with one 
nuclear firm 
-7.8 Negative tax, 
i.e. subsidy, to 
mitigate 
monopoly 
power 
Commitment to 
optimal long-run 
tax, with perfect 
competition for 
nuclear licenses 
6.1 Complete rent 
captured by 
government 
         
    
Lifetime 
extension of old 
nuclear power 
plants 
Negotiation with 
incumbent only 
6.2 18% of total 
rent captured 
Auctioning with 
three players 
24.5 72% of total 
rent captured 
Perfect 
competition for 
licenses 
33.9 Complete rent 
captured by 
government 
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clear power could be further refined. In particular, it would be useful to
enhance the integration of international imports in our model, as these may
be quite important in the event of large underinvestment. Furthermore, since
our analysis shows that multi-party negotiation of lifetime extension agree-
ments and auctioning of new nuclear licenses seem to be the most attractive
policies, further research on the details of such auctioning processes would be
beneficial.
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4.A Annex: Industry marginal cost curve for
the Belgian electricity sector
We estimate coefficients c0 and α based on a cost curve of Belgian electric-
ity supply for the year 2010. The Belgian Transmission System Operator Elia
provides data on available total power per 15-minute time slice. Average avail-
able total power in 2010 was 11927 MW (Elia, 2011). Table 4.4 provides a
breakdown of available capacity by fuel.14 Elia (2011) also provides the avail-
able amounts of international import transmission capacity from neighboring
countries to Belgium, shown in Table 4.5. The latter capacities are relevant,
since the fringe cost curve c0 + αq should also include potential imports, as
mentioned in Section 4.2.1.
Data on efficiencies, emissions and maintenance costs per technology are
taken from the European Commission (2008) and summarized in Table 4.6.
Coal, gas and oil15 prices are based on the average price over the period 2006-
2010 according to BP (2011). Nuclear fuel price is taken from the European
Commission (2008), and includes provisions for waste management. Table 4.7
provides an overview.
In order to construct the industry marginal cost curve, we make a number
of additional assumptions:
14Note that the available nuclear capacity is less than in Table 4.1, because not all capacity
is available at any given time. Overall, average total available capacity is much lower than
total installed capacity, which was 17084 MW in 2010 according to Elia (2011).
15For simplicity we do not distinguish crude oil from the various refined products used in
power generation. Since oil-based generation is anyhow located at the far right-hand side of
the cost curve, this does not significantly affect results.
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Table 4.4: Average available power generation capacity by fuel
Fuel Average available capacity
MW, 2010
Nuclear 5345
Gas 3133
Hydro 1480
Coal 817
Oil (Fuel) 285
Wind 159
Other 753
Total 11972
Source: Elia (2011).
Table 4.5: International import transmission capacity from neighboring coun-
tries to Belgium
Country Net Transfer Capacity – NTC
MW, 2010
France 1700
Netherlands 830
Total 2530
Source: Elia (2011).
• The vast majority of hydropower capacity in Belgium is pumped storage,
which does not make a net contribution to the power supply. The 1480
MW of hydropower in Table 4.4 is therefore excluded from the analysis.
• The available capacities for Wind and Other in Table 4.4 are assumed
to be non-dispatchable capacity, i.e. they do not run as a function of
demand but as a result of another constraint (wind, cogeneration of heat
and power, etc.). We therefore subtract them from demand (using a 50%
load factor) and do not include them in the cost curve.
• Older coal plants typically have lower efficiencies than the Best Avail-
able Technology (BAT) efficiencies listed in Table 4.6. For the purpose
of the coal part of our cost curve, we therefore use the least favorable
characteristics among the two coal technologies listed in Table 4.6.
• Imported generation from the Netherlands is assumed to be gas-based.
• Imported generation from France is assumed to be coal-based. Although
France has very large nuclear capacity, our model does predict that this
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Table 4.6: Techno-economic characteristics of power plant technologies
Technology Typical characteristics
Efficiency CO2 Emissions Maintenance costs
Percent kg/MWh EUR/MWh
Nuclear – Fission 35% 0 12.1
Coal – PCC 47% 725 8.1
Coal – CFBC 40% 850 9.4
Gas – CCGT 58% 350 3.4
Gas – GT 38% 530 5.4
Oil – CC 53% 505 6.7
Source: European Commission (2008).
Table 4.7: Fuel prices
Fuel Reference Price
EUR/MWh(thermal)
Coal Northwest Europe marker 2006-2010 8.3
Gas European Union cif 2006-2010 21.9
Oil Brent (dated) 2006-2010 32.2
Nuclear Price cited by European Commission (2008) 2.8
Source: BP (2011), European Commission (2008).
capacity is already fully utilized, due to its low marginal costs (see Sec-
tion 4.2.2). On average, it would therefore not be able to make an
incremental contribution to serving Belgian load. A similar argument
can be made for France’s large hydropower capacity. The next largest
technology in France’s generation system is coal (Platts, 2010).
• To take into account the additional transmission costs incurred by im-
porting power from neighboring countries, a flat fee of 12.0 EUR per
MWh is added to the cost of imported power. This value corresponds to
the average revenue of Elia (2011) per MWh of load in Belgium.
• The maintenance costs cited in Table 4.6 comprise both fixed (FOM)
and variable (VOM) costs. For the industry marginal cost curve, only
the variable part should be included. We assume this variable part is
50% of the maintenance cost.
• The carbon emissions allowance price is assumed to be 15 EUR per tonne.
The resulting industry marginal cost curve is shown in Figure 4.12. Based
on this cost curve, one can estimate c0 = 39.3 EUR/MWh and α = 0.0053
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EUR/MWh/MW. The figure also shows the net demand, which, after subtrac-
tion of the Wind and Other capacities, is q0 = 9422 MW. Demand is assumed
to be completely inelastic: β = 0.
Figure 4.12: Simplified industry marginal cost curve for the Belgian electricity
sector
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The fixed capital charge fn for nuclear power is estimated using the capex
estimate provided by the European Commission (2008), but with a lower dis-
count rate: 7%, which is in line with the pre-tax weighted average cost of
capital of a large European utility (see e.g. E.ON, 2009), instead of the 10%
discount rate suggested by the European Commission (2008). The result is
fn = 34.7 EUR/MWh. For the variable cost cn of nuclear power, we include
not only the marginal cost of 14.1 EUR/MWh, as shown in Figure 4.12 but
also the FOM of 6.0 EUR/MWh, bringing the total to cn = 20.1 EUR/MWh.
Indeed, although the industry marginal cost curve – as used for pricing – does
not include the FOM, the FOM will be relevant for the nuclear firm in deciding
whether or not to withhold some of its nuclear capacity over the timeframe of
a year. Finally, we assume that the fixed capital charge for lifetime extension
is 20% of fn: f
′
n = 6.9 EUR/MWh.
Chapter 5
International Transport of
Captured CO2: Who Can
Gain and How Much?
5.1 Introduction
Fossil fuels are likely to remain the main source for electricity generation in
Europe, at least in the short to medium term, despite the significant ongoing
efforts to promote renewable energy technologies and energy efficiency. CO2
Capture and Storage (CCS) is generally considered as a promising technolog-
ical option for reducing CO2 emissions from the power generation sector, as
well as from other heavy industries. CCS is a process consisting of the separa-
tion of CO2 from industrial and energy-related sources, transport to a storage
location (such as a depleted hydrocarbon field or a saline aquifer) and long-
term isolation from the atmosphere (see e.g. IPCC, 2005). CCS may offer a
bridge between the fossil fuels dependent economy and the carbon-free future.
Large-scale deployment of CCS in Europe may require the development
of an international pipeline network to transport the captured CO2 from its
sources (e.g. power plants) to the appropriate CO2 storage sites. This paper
estimates the magnitude of the benefits associated with international cooper-
ation in the development of the pipeline network, compared to a situation in
which countries take individual action. More importantly, this paper uses co-
operative game theory to describe how the gains from such cooperation could
be distributed among participating countries. Equivalently, the paper answers
the question how the costs of an international CO2 network would be allocated
to the participating countries. In particular, we study how the allocation de-
pends on EU legislation for CO2 pipelines, by considering two possible policy
scenarios: national pipeline monopolies on the one hand, and full liberalisation
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on the other hand.
CCS figures quite prominently in EU energy and climate policies. The EU’s
Energy Roadmap 2050 (European Commission, 2011) contains 7 scenarios up
to 2050, and on average these scenarios project 133 GW of installed CCS power
generation capacity by 2050. Such a power plant fleet would correspond to
around 1 Gt/y of CO2 being transported from sources (power plants) to sinks,
which would require a network of the extent described in this paper. Despite
the prominence of CCS in EU energy system projections, the acceptance of
CCS is still low in many countries, hence large-scale cooperation still seems
challenging. The policy relevance of this paper is first of all that it points
out which monetary transfers may be needed in order to achieve cooperation.
Secondly, the paper assesses the effect of EU CO2 pipeline regulation options
on the cooperation game between European countries.
The paper is centered on a case in which there is a need for a large-scale
international CO2 pipeline network. In this context, it needs to be mentioned
that there are different views on how the CO2 transport infrastructure might
evolve in Europe. On the one hand, there is often a perception that CCS
plants will be built very close to potential storage sites in order to minimise
transport costs. On the other hand, proposals for CCS projects that have
become public tend to show that their location is dictated by other factors,
such as safety and public acceptance concerns that may require that CO2 is
initially stored offshore; or the presence of old power plants that are suitable
for retrofitting or refurbishing with CO2 capture technologies. Furthermore,
the large-scale deployment of CO2 capture facilities in Europe, which would be
needed to achieve the decarbonisation of the European energy system by 2050,1
combined with the fact that CO2 storage sites and capacities are not uniformly
distributed across Europe, will quickly exhaust local storage opportunities and
necessitate the construction of an extended transport infrastructure, which will
span across national borders when countries do not have adequate domestic
CO2 storage capacity.
The evolution of the CO2 transport network in Europe will be dictated by
the level of CCS deployment and the degree of coordination for its develop-
ment. The simplest approach for the development of the CO2 transport infras-
tructure would be the construction of numerous pipelines linking individual
CO2 sources with sinks, sized to meet the transport needs of individual capture
facilities. This implies that pipelines will be constructed in the context of indi-
vidual CCS projects and their planning and construction will be synchronous
to the development of the CO2 capture facilities. This approach is however
likely to impede the large-scale deployment of CCS as it will not allow for the
expansion and sharing of the infrastructure with other CO2 sources, which in
1For instance, a scenario such as Power Choices (Eurelectric, 2010), which is in line with
the EU’s 80% to 95% greenhouse gas emissions reductions targets (as repeated in the recent
communication by the European Commission, 2010a), projects more than 1 Gt/y of CO2
captured in the EU by 2050.
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turn will be required to develop their own pipelines, resulting in deployment
delays due to permitting procedures, and additional costs, since pipeline costs
do not scale proportionally with transport capacities. Apparently, this situa-
tion would be most detrimental for CO2 sources that are either of small size
or located away from suitable storage sites. Alternatively, the development
of integrated pipeline networks, planned and constructed initially at regional
or national level and oversized to meet the transport needs of multiple CO2
sources would take advantage of economies of scale and enable the connection
of additional CO2 sources with sinks in the course of the pipeline lifetime.
For example the Pre-Front End Engineering Design Study of a CCS network
for Yorkshire and Humber (CO2Sense, 2010) showed that initial investment in
spare pipeline capacity would be cost-effective even if subsequent developments
were not to join the network for up to 11 years. The study also confirmed ex-
perience from other sectors i.e. that investing in integrated networks would
catalyse the large scale deployment of CCS technologies by consolidating per-
mitting procedures, reducing the cost of connecting CO2 sources with sinks
and ensuring that captured CO2 can be stored as soon as the capture facil-
ity becomes operational. In the longer run, such integrated networks could
be expanded and interlinked to reach CO2 sources across Europe and distant
storage sites, leading to the development of a true trans-European network,
similar to the existing ones for electricity and gas. A recent communication
from the European Commission (2010b) points out that the realisation of such
CO2 transport infrastructure would require a timely start of coordinated in-
frastructure planning and development at European level.
Recent research has produced a number of models that are capable of de-
termining the optimal (i.e. cost-minimising) CO2 transport network that can
transport CO2 from sources to sinks, such as Middleton and Bielicki (2009),
Broek et al. (2010a,b), Mendelevitch et al. (2010) and Morbee et al. (2010).
These studies, however, do not describe how the necessary coordination to
achieve such optimal infrastructure would be realised. The case studies in-
vestigated by e.g. Middleton and Bielicki (2009) and Broek et al. (2010a) are
focused on single countries or states, where coordination may be relatively fea-
sible. However, the trans-European networks described by e.g. Mendelevitch
et al. (2010) and Morbee et al. (2010) require coordination and joint pipeline
infrastructure investment by a large number of countries. The question we
study in this paper is how such international cooperation could be structured
in order to achieve the benefits of joint infrastructure optimisation.
In particular, our paper aims to study how the gains from coordination
can be allocated between countries in order to ensure participation in the joint
coordination. We analyse the allocation by means of the Shapley value con-
cept from cooperative game theory. Game theory has already been applied to
energy networks by e.g. Hobbs and Kelly (1992), who apply cooperative mod-
els to short-run electricity transmission games and a dynamic non-cooperative
Stackelberg game to long-run electricity transmission capacity decision games.
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Our model, by contrast, applies cooperative game theory to the capacity deci-
sion. Kleindorfer et al. (2001) provide an overview of strategic gaming in power
markets, but do not focus on transmission infrastructure. Csercsik and Koczy
(2011) study transmission networks – including expansion games – using coop-
erative game theory in a load flow model of the electricity system, and apply
it to a stylised 5-node network. Our analysis is less detailed on the technical
side (CO2 transmission is treated here as a simple transport model) but the
methodology is applied to an extensive European case study. As mentioned
before, the focus of our study is on allocation of the benefits of cooperation, or
equivalently, allocation of the network investment cost. Again for the case of
electricity, cost allocation has been studied by e.g. Contreras and Wu (2000)
and Evans et al. (2003), who use a Kernel approach from cooperative game
theory. Gately (1974) provides a game-theoretic analysis of the distribution
of the benefits of cooperation in electrical power investments between three
regions in the Southern Electricity Region of India. The study considers 5
possible partitions of players, comprising 7 possible coalitions, and compares
several game-theoretic methods for distributing the gains from cooperation,
with Shapley value and Kernel as some of the possible options. Our model,
by contrast, needs to consider a more complex game with 18 players, hence
262143 possible coalitions and 682 billion possible partitions. As a result, our
analysis of the strategic game is less extensive, and considers only the Shapley
value as a possible allocation.
As is well-known, the Shapley value is an approach for ‘fair’ allocation of
gains from cooperation among participating actors. It has been applied to
natural gas by e.g. Hubert and Ikonnikova (2009) and Ikonnikova and Zwart
(2010), and to CO2 emissions by e.g. Albrecht et al. (2002). In the context
of CO2 pipeline networks, the Shapley value determines the bargaining power
of individual countries in the international negotiation on CO2 infrastructure
investment, and hence the allocation of the cost burden. The bargaining power
of each country depends on how easily the country can be circumvented. As
can be intuitively expected, we will find that countries with large storage
potential are likely to receive net benefits from the negotiation, while countries
with large excess CO2 quantities (i.e. CO2 captured which cannot be stored
domestically) make a net contribution. Furthermore, the Shapley value shows
that countries with a strategic transit location are able to extract some (but
limited) rent from their position. In an alternative scenario, in which CO2
pipeline construction is liberalised and not subject to national monopolies,
such transit rents disappear and the bargaining power of countries with excess
storage potential increases further.
The paper is structured as follows. First, Section 5.2 describes the poten-
tial structure of a trans-European CO2 transport network, and the potential
benefits obtained from international coordination. Section 5.3 describes our
game theoretic solution concept. Section 5.4 apply this solution concept to
CO2 infrastructure negotiations, under two scenarios: one scenario with na-
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tional CO2 transport monopolies, and one scenario with liberalised pipeline
construction. Section 5.5 summarises our conclusions.
5.2 International coordination of CO2 pipeline
networks
The starting point of our investigation is a projection of the optimal CO2
pipeline network in Europe in 2050. We assume that the European power
system evolves according to the Power Choices scenario (Eurelectric, 2010).2
The Power Choices scenario, which is based on the PRIMES model, is chosen
for this purpose because it is in line with the EU’s 80% to 95% greenhouse gas
emissions reductions targets by 2050 (implying near-complete decarbonisation
of the power sector), and hence provides a view on large-scale pan-European
deployment of CCS in the power sector. The scenario implies a reduction of
CO2 emissions from the power sector to 150 Mt/y by 2050, compared to 1423
Mt/y in 2005. This is achieved through more than 40% electricity production
from renewable energy sources (RES), close to 30% of nuclear power, and the
remaining 30% from fossil fuels. The latter entails the construction of 63 GW
of CCS-equipped power stations by 2030 and an additional 128 GW between
2030 and 2050.
Since the Power Choices report by Eurelectric (2010) provides the amount
of CCS only at aggregate European level, we need to make an assumption on
how this breaks down to individual countries. First, we assume that CO2 cap-
ture deployment is limited to the 18 countries in which CCS takes places in the
EU’s Baseline 2009 scenario (Capros et al., 2010). Second, we assume that
the aggregate European level of CCS (as obtained from the Power Choices
scenarios) is distributed between countries in proportion to current CO2 emis-
sions from the power sector, as obtained from E-PRTR (2010). Third, within
each country, the amount of CCS is distributed between various industrial
‘clusters’. Further details about the clustering approach can be found in Mor-
bee et al. (2012). Size and location of potential CO2 storage sites (depleted
hydrocarbon fields and saline aquifers) is obtained from the EU GeoCapacity
project (Vangkilde-Pedersen et al., 2009). Due to technical uncertainty and
public acceptance issues, onshore saline aquifers are excluded as potential CO2
storage sites. Details about the assumptions can be found in Morbee et al.
(2012). Table 5.1 provides an overview of the assumed annual amounts of CO2
2Ideally, the amount of CCS-based electricity production per country should be deter-
mined simultaneously with the optimisation of the CO2 network, as in the least cost theory
of industrial location (see e.g. Weber, 1909). In such a model the location of CCS-based
power plants would depend on the spatial distribution of electricity demand, coal transport
costs, and the CO2 pipeline network construction costs. This, however, would lead to severe
computational challenges. As discussed later in Section 5.4 the problem is already very chal-
lenging from a computational complexity point of view, even when an exogenous scenario
for CCS deployment is taken.
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captured in each of the countries, as well as the annual CO2 storage capacity.
CCS activities in Finland have been left out of this picture: since they are
geographically far away from the CO2 network in the rest of Europe, they
do not contribute to the negotiation game described in the remainder of the
paper. Leaving out Finland from the start reduces computational complexity
of the Shapley value approach by an order of magnitude.
Table 5.1: CO2 capture rates and storage potential assumed in this study
Country Annual CO2 Annual CO2
captured storage potential
Mt/y (2050) Mt/y (2050)
Austria 8
Belgium 30
Bulgaria 25
Czech Republic 62
Denmark 15 14
France 27 17
Germany 337 111
Hungary 17 9
Italy 89 61
Netherlands 52 40
Norway 636
Poland 147 17
Portugal 17
Romania 43 88
Slovakia 16
Slovenia 6
Spain 80 108
United Kingdom 173 315
Total 1145 1416
We use the InfraCCS model to compute the optimal CO2 pipeline network
in 2050 for the given configuration of sources and sinks. InfraCCS is a cost-
minimising mixed-integer linear programming model, which takes into account
the scale effects of pipelines (see Morbee et al., 2012 for more details). The re-
sulting optimal network is shown in Figure 5.1. The network consists of 11001
km of pipelines, which transport 1145 Mt/y of captured CO2 from sources
to sinks. The total investment required is 28.0 billion euro. The network in
Figure 5.1 assumes joint international optimisation. If, by contrast, countries
develop networks individually, the resulting pipeline construction would be as
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Figure 5.1: CO2 pipeline network in 2050, assuming joint international opti-
misation. Total amount of CO2 captured and stored: 1145 Mt/y.
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in Figure 5.2. Since not all countries have sufficient storage potential, not all
captured CO2 projected in the Power Choices scenario can be stored. In total,
in the network in Figure 5.2, only 565 Mt/y of CO2 is transported and stored,
i.e. less than half of the amount stored under joint international optimisation
(Figure 5.1). Non-stored CO2 can be recognised in the figure as red circles
that are not connected with any pipeline. The network in Figure 5.2 is 5097
km in length and costs 6.4 billion euro.
Thus, the benefits of international cooperation are that an additional 580
Mt/y of CO2 can be captured and stored compared to individual country ac-
tion, albeit at the cost of a more expensive network. In order to translate the
benefits of international cooperation into a single total quantity, we need to
make an assumption about the cost of the outside option for the 580 Mt/y
of CO2 that cannot be stored in the non-cooperative case. Clearly, this cost
should be lower than the assumed CO2 emissions allowance price in the EU
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), since the fact that the CO2 cannot be
stored also saves the cost of capturing it in the first place. The description of
the PRIMES model in Eurelectric (2010) states that the assumed CO2 trans-
port and storage cost ranges from 6 to 25 euro per tonne of CO2. Assuming
that (i) the lower bound of the range refers to a situation with only storage
costs and no transport costs (i.e. storage very close to the capture site) and
(ii) CO2 storage costs are constant and geographically uniform, we infer that
the transport cost in the Power Choices scenario ranges from 0 to 19 euro per
tonne of CO2. Hence, if transport costs exceed 19 euros per tonne of CO2, the
PRIMES model will switch technologies and the required emissions reduction
will be realised through other means (e.g. wind energy). We therefore assume
in our analysis the availability of an ‘outside option’ that costs 19 euros per
tonne of CO2.
3
For the sake of simplicity we apply this value uniformly across all countries.
Assuming a 7.5% discount rate4 and a 10-year horizon, the cost of not being
able to capture and store 580 Mt/y is 75.7 billion euro. Combined with the
investment of 6.4 billion euro, the total cost of the non-cooperative case is
therefore 82.1 billion euro, compared with 28.0 billion euro in the cooperative
case. In this setting, the benefits of international cooperation are therefore
54.1 billion euro.
The question addressed in this paper is how these benefits can be allocated
between participating countries in order to ensure cooperation. Equivalently,
the question is how to allocate the cost burden of the 28.0 billion euro invest-
3Note that this value is lower than the full CO2 emissions allowance price, which is
projected to be 103.2 euro per tonne by 2050 in the scenario under consideration (Eurelectric,
2010). Indeed, if a country decides to pursue the outside option (hence no CCS) it does not
need to pay for any other CCS-related costs, such as the CO2 capture costs, or the residual
allowances for non-captured CO2. These cost savings, together with the 19 euros, pay for
the outside option of 103.2 euro per tonne.
4This value is midway between a typical social discount rate (5%) and a typical industrial
discount rate for this type of investments (10%).
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Figure 5.2: CO2 pipeline network in 2050, assuming individual optimisation
per country, without international cooperation. Total amount of CO2 captured
and stored: 565 Mt/y.
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ment.
5.3 Bargaining power in multilateral coopera-
tion: the Shapley value
The allocation of benefits between participating countries depends on each
country’s bargaining power. In the context of this analysis, bargaining power
is mainly associated with two types of rents:
Storage rent. Countries with excess CO2 storage (i.e. more storage capacity
than what is required to store the amounts of CO2 captured within the
country) can offer this capacity to other countries who are short of CO2
storage capacity. Since the availability of additional storage capacity
reduces the need for recurrence to the outside option (i.e. switching to
an alternative technology at a cost of 19 euro per tonne), it brings about a
cost reduction for the coalition partners of a country with excess storage.
This increases the bargaining power of countries with excess storage, and
allows them to obtain a ‘storage rent’.
Transit rent. Some countries have a strategic location, which allows for short-
cuts between CO2 sources and storage sites. For example, in Figure 5.1,
the participation of Denmark allows for a near-straight pipeline from
Poland to Norway. Non-participation of Denmark would require a de-
tour of the pipeline and hence a higher construction cost. This translates
into bargaining power for transit countries, allowing them to obtain a
‘transit rent’. This is in fact the reverse of the well-known Jepma-effect
in international transport networks.The Jepma-effect, first described by
Jepma (2001) in the context of liberalisation of the Dutch natural gas
transport network, is the observation that gas transport tariff differences
between neighbouring countries may incentivise gas shippers to reroute
gas flows in order to take advantage of a cheaper neighbouring network,
even if the new route is inefficient from a technical perspective. The CO2
pipeline transit rent described in this paper is essentially the same effect
but in the opposite direction: a country with an advantageous transit
location may be incentivised to increase CO2 transport tariffs because
it would be even more costly for foreign CO2 shippers to reroute CO2
flows in order to circumvent the country.
To assess these rents in an integrated way, we apply the Shapley value
approach, introduced by Shapley (1953). The Shapley value defines a ‘fair’
allocation of the benefits of cooperation, taking into account the contributions
of each of the players (in this case in particular the storage and transit rents
described above). It defines the only allocation that satisfies a set of desirable
properties (individual fairness, efficiency, symmetry, additivity and zero-player
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property). Starting from a setN of n players (in this case: countries), we define
the function v : P(N) → R, such that, for every subset S of N , v(S) is the
pay-off of a cooperation among the countries in S. According to the Shapley
value, the amount of benefit received by player i ∈ N is:
φi =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)) (5.1)
The sum is computed over all possible coalitions of players. For each coalition,
equation (5.1) computes the difference (v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)) between the pay-
off of the coalition with and without player i. The Shapley value φi is then
a weighted average of those values. Intuitively, the formula computes the
contribution added by player i to the ‘grand coalition’ (the coalition of all
players) averaged over all possible sequences in which this grand coalition can
be formed. As an example, we compute (v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)) for the subset
S that includes all countries except Denmark. i is Denmark. For this case
we have S ∪ {i} = N , hence the pay-off v(S ∪ {i}) is the cost of the fully
cooperative CO2 network from Figure 5.1, i.e. 28.0 billion euro. The pay-off
v(S) can be determined by running the InfraCCS tool without Denmark. This
is shown in Figure 5.3. The cost of this network is 32.1 billion euro. Hence, by
including Denmark in the coalition, there is a cost saving of 4.1 billion euro,
because the participation Denmark permits more efficient routing of pipelines
from central Europe to Norway. Furthermore, the inclusion of Denmark in
the coalition offers cost savings in Denmark as well because by participating,
Denmark does not have to build its own small network, which would cost 0.6
billion euro. In addition, the inclusion of Denmark offers a solution for the
1.6 Mt/y that Denmark would not be able to store domestically (which would
cost 0.2 billion euro in order to pay for the NPV of the outside option of 19
euros per tonne). In total, the contribution (v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)) of Denmark
to the coalition S is therefore 4.9 billion euro. This computation is done for
all possible subsets S of N and all players i. Equation (5.1) requires a total of
262143 runs of the above-mentioned InfraCCS model.
5.4 Simulations
In this section, we apply the Shapley value to the issue of European multilateral
CO2 pipeline infrastructure negotiations. The realisation of the network of
Figure 5.1 requires cooperation among n = 18 countries: 17 source countries
within the EU5, plus Norway. When applying equation (5.1), we distinguish
two cases:
Case 1: National CO2 pipeline monopolies. In this case, we assume that
every country has a monopoly on CO2 pipeline construction within its
5As mentioned before, Finland has been omitted from the set of 18 countries active in
CCS according to the simulations by Capros et al. (2010)
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Figure 5.3: CO2 pipeline network in 2050, assuming joint international opti-
misation without participation of Denmark
27
19
47
17
25
90
20 15
312
64
250
54
206
9
15
14
33
99
119
80
47
18
29 15
10
16
26
76
150
165
47
9
414
432
306
114
4
4
208
9
9
YEAR 2050 - 10992km network - 32.1 billion EUR cumulative investment
-2500 -2000 -1500 -1000 -500 0 500 1000
4500
5000
5500
6000
6500
7000
7500
8000
5.4. SIMULATIONS 121
territory. As a result, a pipeline through a given country cannot be built
by a coalition that does not include this country.
Case 2: Liberalised CO2 pipeline construction. In this case, any coun-
try is free to build pipelines in the entire EU and Norway. This does not
mean however, that the land on which these pipelines are constructed is
free: a cost to cover the right-of-way is included in the pipeline costing
approach embedded in the InfraCCS model.
Note that in both cases, CO2 cannot be stored in a given country by a coalition
that does not include that country.
We compute the Shapley value for both cases, which, as mentioned above,
requires the computation of the pay-offs of 262143 coalitions in each case. This
is a computational challenge, because each pipeline optimisation problem is a
mixed-integer problem (MIP), which is NP-hard to solve, i.e. no efficient
algorithms for such problems exist today. In Case 1, due to national pipeline
monopolies, many coalitions can be broken down into independent contiguous
subsets. As a result, Case 1 requires the computation of the pay-offs of only
26922 contiguous coalitions, which can then be combined to obtain the results
for all 262143 coalitions. Hence, in Case 1 the number of runs of the InfraCCS
model can be reduced by a factor 10. In Case 2 however, all coalitions need
to be run with the InfraCCS model.6
Table 5.2 shows the resulting Shapley values in both cases. The Shapley
value is shown both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the total. These
Shapley values show how the 54.1 billion euro benefit from international coop-
eration can be allocated between countries. In Case 1, large rents are allocated
to Norway and the UK, which are the main net storage providers in this anal-
ysis (see Table 5.1). In total, the net storage providers capture 38% of the
benefits. A large rent is also allocated to Denmark, which plays a crucial role
as transit country in Figure 5.1. The large Shapley value for Germany is re-
lated to the fact that it contributes the most CO2, which allows for avoiding
a large ‘outside option’ cost.
In Case 2, the rents shift more towards the largest storage provider, i.e.
Norway. In total, net storage providers capture 45% of the benefits in this
case. Due to the liberalisation of pipeline construction, Denmark loses most
of its Shapley value, which demonstrates indeed that its bargaining power in
Case 1 can be attributed to its transit position. Likewise, one notes that
Germany’s bargaining power decreases between Case 1 and Case 2, which
points to the fact that a portion of its bargaining power in Case 1 is due to its
central location in Europe, which allows it to serve as a hub for CO2 transport.
Finally, note that Poland gains significantly in the transition from Case 1 to
Case 2: indeed, since Poland is at the end of the pipeline network, it does
6For that reason, the MIP computation time is deliberately capped at 3 minutes per
coalition in Case 1, and 3 seconds in Case 2. In total, the computation takes about a week
on a standard computer.
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Table 5.2: Shapley value allocation for the coalitional game described in Sec-
tion 5.2
Country Shapley value
Case 1 Case 2 Difference
Case 2
– Case 1
Bn EUR Percent Bn EUR Percent Bn EUR
Austria 0.4 1 0.4 1 0.0
Belgium 1.8 3 1.7 3 -0.1
Bulgaria 1.0 2 1.1 2 0.1
Czech Republic 1.8 3 3.3 6 1.5
Denmark 4.5 8 0.3 1 -4.2
France 1.4 3 0.6 1 -0.8
Germany 14.1 26 11.9 22 -2.2
Hungary 1.0 2 0.5 1 -0.6
Italy 0.9 2 1.0 2 0.1
Netherlands 1.4 3 0.7 1 -0.7
Norway 11.7 22 16.6 31 4.9
Poland 3.5 7 6.5 12 3.0
Portugal 0.6 1 0.7 1 0.1
Romania 2.2 4 2.4 4 0.2
Slovakia 0.6 1 0.8 2 0.2
Slovenia 0.5 1 0.2 0 -0.2
Spain 1.2 2 1.2 2 0.0
United Kingdom 5.4 10 4.0 7 -1.4
Total 54.1 100 54.1 100
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not have an advantageous transit position and therefore stands to gain from
pipeline liberalisation.
Table 5.3 translates the Shapley values from Table 5.2 into the allocation
of the cost burden of the network. As mentioned in Section 5.2, the total
required investment in the CO2 pipeline network is 28.0 billion euro. Table 5.3
shows how this cost of 28.0 billion euro is shared between individual countries.
Note that some countries make a net payment, while others are net recipients
Table 5.3: Investment cost burden sharing for the CO2 pipeline network shown
in Figure 5.1
Country Contribution to investment
Case 1 Case 2 Difference
Case 2
– Case 1
Bn EUR Percent Bn EUR Percent Bn EUR
Austria 0.6 2 0.6 2 0.0
Belgium 2.1 8 2.2 8 0.1
Bulgaria 2.2 8 2.1 7 -0.1
Czech Republic 6.3 22 4.8 17 -1.5
Denmark -3.7 -13 0.5 2 4.2
France 0.5 2 1.3 5 0.8
Germany 16.3 58 18.5 66 2.2
Hungary 0.2 1 0.8 3 0.6
Italy 3.3 12 3.2 12 -0.1
Netherlands 0.5 2 1.2 4 0.7
Norway -11.7 -42 -16.6 -59 -4.9
Poland 13.8 49 10.8 38 -3.0
Portugal 1.6 6 1.5 6 -0.1
Romania -1.9 -7 -2.1 -8 -0.2
Slovakia 1.5 5 1.3 5 -0.2
Slovenia 0.3 1 0.5 2 0.2
Spain -0.1 0 -0.1 0 0.0
United Kingdom -3.8 -14 -2.4 -9 1.4
Total 28.0 100 28.0 100
from the cooperation. A large share of the cost is borne by countries with
large volumes of excess CO2, such as Germany and Poland. Due to reasons
mentioned before, Germany contributes more in Case 2 than in Case 1, while
Poland contributes less. Note that Denmark is a net recipient in Case 1, while
it is a net contributor in Case 2.
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Finally it is possible to translate the Shapley values into prices expressed
per tonne of CO2 stored. For this purpose, we first compute – for each country
– the additional investment made when going from the non-cooperative case
(Figure 5.2) to the cooperative case (Figure 5.1), i.e. the value from Table
5.3 minus the domestic pipeline investments made to realise the network of
Figure 5.2. Secondly, we divide this number by the additional amount of
CO2 captured in this country in the cooperative case compared to the non-
cooperative case.7 Obviously, this computation is meaningful only for net
CO2 exporters. The results of the countries with the highest cost per tonne
of CO2 exported are shown in Table 5.4. One immediately observes that the
Table 5.4: Costs per tonne of CO2 exported (in EUR per tonne of CO2)
Case 1 Case 2
Country Cost Country Cost
Poland 15.0 Italy 13.9
Czech Republic 14.7 Portugal 13.1
Italy 14.3 Slovenia 12.8
Portugal 13.7 Bulgaria 12.3
Slovakia 13.5 Poland 11.7
Bulgaria 13.1 Austria 11.6
Austria 11.3 Hungary 11.6
Belgium 10.2 Slovakia 11.6
Germany 9.9 Germany 11.3
Slovenia 7.4 Czech Republic 11.2
Hungary 2.3 France 11.0
Netherlands 1.1 Belgium 10.7
France -0.3 Netherlands 9.4
spread of costs is much smaller in Case 2 than in Case 1. Indeed, in Case
1 there is much more heterogeneity between countries, depending on their
transit position. In Case 2, differentiation between counties is mostly due to
their distance from the main storage sites. The range of costs is reduced from
over 15 euro per tonne in Case 1, to less than 5 euro per tonne in Case 2.
Note that e.g. Slovenia, although located far away from the North Sea, pays a
rather low price in Case 1, due to its role as a transit country for Italy. In Case
2 however, this advantage disappears and it ranks as one of the higher-cost
countries.
A similar analysis can be done for countries that are net importers of CO2.
As above, we divide the difference in cashflow (when going from the non-
7As before, discounting at 7.5% is performed and a 10-year time horizon is assumed.
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cooperative case to the cooperative case) by the amount of CO2 imported,
with discounting as above. The results are in Table 5.5. We observe that in
Table 5.5: Revenue per tonne of CO2 imported and stored (in EUR per tonne
of CO2)
Case 1 Case 2
Country Revenue Country Revenue
Spain 10.0 Spain 10.1
United Kingdom 8.5 Romania 8.6
Romania 7.9 United Kingdom 6.3
Norway 3.9 Norway 5.6
Weighted average 5.1 Weighted average 6.0
Case 1, the revenue per tonne of CO2 imported and stored ranges from 3.9 to
10.0 euro per tonne of CO2, with a weighted average of 5.1 euro per tonne. In
Case 2, with liberalised pipeline construction, the average revenue increases to
6.0 euro per tonne, although the impact differs per country. While countries
with strategically located onshore storage do gain revenues when going from
Case 1 to Case 2 (e.g. Spain, Romania), we observe that the revenues of the
United Kingdom decrease, due to its remoteness.
As a side-effect of the results of Table 5.5, we can compute an estimate
of the resource rent associated with a depleted hydrocarbon field that is to
be used for CO2 storage. As a very approximative rule of thumb, a depleted
oil field can store roughly 1 tonne of CO2 per tonne original recoverable oil
reserves. The resource rent of 5-6 euro per tonne of CO2 stored therefore
corresponds to approximately $1 per barrel of original recoverable oil reserves.
This is clearly far below the resource rent that was originally obtained from
the oil extraction. For gas fields, the results are more favourable. As a very
approximative rule of thumb, a depleted gas field can store roughly 2 tonnes of
CO2 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) of gas in its original recoverable reserves.
The resource rent of 5-6 euro per tonne of CO2 stored therefore corresponds
to approximately 1 euro per MWh of gas. This is roughly 5% of the wholesale
price of natural gas: e.g. the average German import border price was 20
euro per MWh in 2010 according to BAFA (2011). Overall, therefore, it seems
that the rent is relatively small from the perspective of petroleum economics.
However, it is relatively large from the perspective of CCS economics. Indeed,
typical storage costs are estimated to be 1 to 20 euro per tonne of CO2 stored
depending on such factors as the type of storage site (hydrocarbon field or
aquifer), the location (onshore/offshore) and the presence of re-usable legacy
wells (see e.g. ZEP, 2011). The rent of 5-6 euros per tonne of CO2 needs to be
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added to this number, and represents an increase of 25 to 600% of the costs.
5.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analysed bargaining power in the multilateral nego-
tiation process that would be required to develop a cost-minimising trans-
European CO2 transport infrastructure if CO2 capture and storage (CCS) is
deployed on a large scale by 2050. We apply the Shapley value to the coali-
tional game between 18 European countries, in two different cases: one case
with national pipeline monopolies and one case with liberalised pipeline con-
struction. Using the InfraCCS pipeline optimisation model, we perform a
numerical simulation, which computes each country’s contribution to a 28.0
billion euro trans-European CO2 pipeline network. We find that countries
with more storage capacity than capture activity obtain 38% to 45% of the
benefits, with the higher number corresponding to the case with liberalised
pipeline construction. Countries with a strategic transit location capture sig-
nificant rent in the case of national pipeline monopolies, e.g. Denmark obtains
a net benefit of over 4 billion euro in case of national pipeline monopolies,
but loses almost all of this if pipeline construction is liberalised. Finally, the
liberalisation of pipeline construction reduces by two-thirds the differences be-
tween countries in terms of cost per tonne of CO2 exported. As a side result
of the analysis, we find that the resource rent of a depleted hydrocarbon field
(when used for CO2 storage) is roughly $1 per barrel of original recoverable oil
reserves, or 1 euro per MWh of original recoverable gas reserves. This is small
from the perspective of petroleum economics, but corresponds to 5-6 euro per
tonne of CO2 stored, which may increase CO2 storage costs by 25 to 600%.
The analysis is strongly dependent on the assumptions underlying the
Shapley value. Other approaches exist, and the allocation shown in this paper
is not necessarily the only possible allocation. Even more importantly, the
cooperative game theory framework from which the Shapley value arises, as-
sumes that the grand coalition is eventually formed. This is in stark contract
with current developments in Europe: unlike the US, there is no CO2 pipeline
network in Europe yet, and many countries would oppose such developments,
which would impede the construction of any trans-European pipeline network.
As a further caveat, it should be mentioned that the rent computed here is
only the rent arising from market power in CO2 transport. In addition there
may be a Hotelling (1931) rent for storage sites if storage becomes scarce.
Furthermore, supranational regulation and enforcement may be required in
order to avoid renegotiation once the network is in place. More generally,
there is a question about which market organisation would be suited for the
operation of such a jointly optimal network. Finally, an important area for
future work is a more thorough understanding of the ‘outside option’ through
better integration with the economic equilibrium models that generate the
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Chapter 6
Market Completeness:
How Options Affect
Hedging and Investments
in the Electricity Sector
This chapter has been published in Energy Economics.
6.1 Introduction
The specific characteristics of electrical energy create a need for hedging. Elec-
tricity cannot be stored economically, and therefore the price for electricity is
determined by the supply and demand conditions at each given hour. As de-
mand for electrical energy is very inelastic and of a stochastic nature and as
generators face production capacity constraints, spot prices are very volatile.
Liberalized electricity markets are therefore typically organized around re-
gional spot markets for energy, which determine hourly spot prices, comple-
mented with markets for long-term contracts, which help coordinate the ac-
tions of the players and allow for hedging of volume and price risks. The extent
to which a firm can hedge its exposure, depends on the availability of mar-
kets, their liquidity (determined by such parameters as trading volume and
bid-ask spread), and the presence of speculators who can absorb part of the
risk. These factors change as markets evolve from pure OTC to sophisticated
spot and futures markets, and to more complete markets in which there is a
liquid trade of a broad set of derivatives.1
1Note that vertical integration of electricity production and retail is an alternative way
of creating a ‘complete’ set of hedging instruments between production and retail.
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Recognizing that electricity markets are typically very incomplete, the ob-
jective of this paper is to analyze the effect of increasing market completeness
on welfare and on investment incentives in the electricity sector. In our paper,
market completeness is measured as the number of electricity options avail-
able to producers and retailers, in addition to a forward contract. Indeed, as
more options with different strike prices become available, firms have more
instruments to trade risks and markets become more complete.2
This paper develops an equilibrium model of the electricity market, which
includes the production process, spot market trades and trade of derivatives.
For illustrative purposes, the model is calibrated on the German electricity
market, although an exact analysis of the German market is not the objective
of this paper. First, the results show that adding option markets is welfare-
enhancing, but that most of the benefits are obtained with one to three options.
In particular, if firms have strong aversion of negative shocks (shocks that
would cause firm bankruptcy), then no equilibrium can be found unless option
contracts are available in order to protect retailers against bankruptcy under
all conditions. Second, we analyze how investment decisions by small firms are
affected when an increasing number of derivatives are traded. We show that
market incompleteness typically leads to underinvestment. The effects are,
however, different for base load plants and peak load plants: the presence of
forward contracts only (i.e., no options) is sufficient for investment in base load
plants to reach the same level as in case of market completeness, but there will
be underinvestment in peak load plants until there is a sufficient number of
option contracts (which allow the investor to hedge market risk associated with
the investment). Increasing the number of derivatives may, however, also lead
to ‘crowding-out’ of certain investments in power plants: if the investor can
trade a financial contract that is highly correlated with the profit of a potential
investment and the financial contract provides a more attractive risk-return
ratio, then the investor will only invest in the financial market, as its risk-
taking capabilities are limited. The amount of information contained in the
equilibrium market prices, increases with the number of financial products
being traded: it is shown that the quality of power plant investment decisions
that are based on risk-free probabilities inferred from market prices, improves
with the number of contracts being traded. If markets are not sufficiently
complete, players basing their investment decisions on risk-free probabilities
may significantly overinvest.
The model proposed in this paper is complementary to the traditional fi-
nancial models for derivatives pricing, which are based on the no-arbitrage
approach. In fact, it has been observed that it is difficult to apply the tradi-
tional no-arbitrage approach to the case of electricity derivatives, because the
2The paper assumes that demand shocks are the only source of risk. In such a setting,
the market is complete if options at every strike price can be traded. However, if there are
also firm-specific shocks, then additional derivatives should be added for the market to be
complete.
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non-storability of electricity means that the well-known cost-of-carry relation-
ship and delta-hedging strategy cannot be implemented, and hence pricing of
electricity forwards and options cannot be done in the usual manner.3 For that
reason, Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) adopt an equilibrium approach and
explicitly model the economic determinants of market clearing forward prices.
Bessembinder and Lemmon’s (2002) model was only focused on forward con-
tracts, and in our paper we extend their model to include an increasing number
of options in addition to a forward contract. We then use the model to study
the effects of increasing market completeness on welfare and on investment
incentives.
The paper is organized as follows. First, Section 6.2 provides an overview
of relevant research on incomplete markets, including the applicability to elec-
tricity markets. Next, Section 6.3 describes the electricity market model that
is used to obtain the results of this paper, while Section 6.4 describes the
model data. Section 6.5 verifies the welfare effects of an increasing number
of markets. Sections 6.6 and 6.7 analyze the effect on investment incentives,
based on welfare considerations (Section 6.6) and on risk-free probabilities,
i.e. the ‘finance approach’ (Section 6.7). Finally, Section 6.8 summarizes our
conclusions.
6.2 Literature review
The topic of this paper is closely related to the literature on incomplete markets
and financial innovation, as well as to the literature on hedging in electricity
markets. In this section we first introduce the concept of incomplete markets.
Next, we discuss the main results of the literature. Finally, we highlight the
relevance for electricity markets and discuss related work on hedging in elec-
tricity markets. We base our discussion on market completeness mainly on
Staum (2008) and Duffie and Rahi (1995).
6.2.1 Incomplete markets
Markets are incomplete when perfect risk transfer between the agents is im-
possible. There might be several reasons why this would be the case. First,
the marketed set of assets may be insufficient to hedge the class of risk one
wishes to hedge. This type of incompleteness deals with the spanning role of
securities (see also Allen and Gale, 1994). Second, markets might be imper-
fect due to the existence of transaction costs and/or trading constraints. For
instance, firms might not be able to take a short position in a traded security.
These costs and/or constraints make it effectively impossible to transfer risk
3Eydeland and Geman (1998) present a pricing model for power options that relies on
assumptions regarding the evolution of forward power prices. They show that the approach
is adequate to manage monthly and yearly power options, but that it does not offer a safe
solution for daily options.
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perfectly. In our paper we focus on the first type of market incompleteness:
the missing markets problem.
In practice, markets are never complete, as not all risk factors are traded on
a market. Hence, when might market incompleteness be relevant for hedging
or pricing decisions? We mention two situations in which this might be the
case. The first situation is when some of the variables one would like to hedge
are derived from non-market prices, as is the case for weather derivatives. The
second typical situation of market incompleteness occurs when the price of an
asset does not follow a standard random walk process – where prices changes
are ‘infinitesimally small’ – but contains ‘large’ price jumps. The problem with
price jumps is that a hedging strategy which dynamically adjusts a portfolio
containing the underlying asset and a risk-free bond, is no longer possible, as
the payout is non-linear in the size of the shock. In order to complete the
market one would need to add a forward market and a set of option markets
with different strike prices.
6.2.2 Research results on incompleteness
The first main result of the literature on welfare effects and pricing of additional
assets is that welfare in an incomplete market is lower than in a complete
market because not all risk is perfectly allocated in the market.4 This is a
rather intuitive result: as in an incomplete market not all potential gains from
trade are exhausted, total welfare can be improved by a sufficient number of
additional markets until the market is complete. This simple intuition does,
however, not carry over to situations where only one additional market is
added to the economy, without completing the market. Hart (1975) shows
that adding a financial product might make every one in the economy worse
off. Extending this result, Elul (1995) and Cass and Citanna (1998) show that
in an economy with many consumption goods one can always find an asset that
makes everyone worse off, or an asset that makes everyone better off, or an
asset that makes any combination of individuals better or worse off.5 Note that
introducing all financial assets (completing the market) does not necessarily
make everyone better off. Complete markets are Pareto efficient, but not
necessarily Pareto dominant with all possible incomplete market allocations.
Willen (2005) studies the impact of market innovation in more detail and shows
that, when agents have exponential utility and risk is normally distributed, the
4In this paper we assume that a Walrasian equilibrium exists, even when markets are
incomplete. In a general equilibrium setting with multiple goods, (where securities can con-
tain different bundles of goods), this is not guaranteed. However, when we restrict ourselves
to economies where financial claims only have a pay-off in terms of a single numeraire good,
existence is guaranteed. On existence of equilibria in a general equilibrium setting, see Duffie
and Shafer (1985) and Duffie and Shafer (1986).
5Similar results were obtained earlier by Milne and Shefrin (1987) in a specific model
set-up. Note that the results are not applicable here because our model assumes only one
relevant good: money.
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effect of a financial innovation can be split up in a portfolio effect and a price
effect. Elul (1999) studies the welfare effects of a financial innovation in a
single-good market.
Boyle and Wang (2001) study the pricing of a new derivative in an incom-
plete market. They show that one should not use the standard arbitrage as-
sumptions typically used in the financial (engineering) literature, as the prices
of existing assets may change once a new asset is added to the economy.6 In-
stead, they recommend to make explicit assumptions on the preferences of the
agents in the economy and to use an equilibrium model to derive the prices
of the different assets. Staum (2008) and Carr et al. (2001) argue however
that results of equilibrium models depend very much on the choice of the util-
ity function, the initial endowment of the firms, and the parameters of the
probability measure, and are therefore not useful for trading decisions.
6.2.3 Incompleteness and hedging in electricity markets
The electricity market is an interesting example of a very incomplete market.
Since electricity cannot be stored economically and electricity prices are very
volatile, it is difficult to hedge even the most basic forward contracts and op-
tions, when they are not traded directly in the market.7 Our paper focuses on
the electricity market and builds further upon existing studies on contracting
and hedging in this market.8
First of all, Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) develop a partial equilib-
rium model of the spot market and one forward market. They derive analytical
solutions for forward and spot prices in a setting in which firms are risk averse,
production cost are convex, retail prices are fixed and demand is stochastic.
Their theoretical predictions on risk premia are verified empirically: the model
correctly predicts when markets should be in backwardation or in contango.
Siddiqui (2003) completes the Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) model by
introducing a forward market for ancillary services (reserve capacity) and de-
riving analytical results that link the forward prices of electricity and ancillary
services with the statistical properties of the spot price. Our paper also extends
the framework of Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) and allows for multiple
financial products to be traded – not just one forward contract.9 Furthermore,
6They also show that the condition of arbitrage-free pricing does not determine a unique
price for the newly created asset.
7If it were possible to store electricity economically, then the forward contract could be
hedged through a combination of stored electricity and a loan. If, in addition, electricity
prices did not have spikes, then electricity options could be hedged through a dynamically
adjusted portfolio of stored electricity and a loan (i.e., delta-hedging).
8In the review we limit ourselves – with the exception of Oum et al. (2007) – to studies
that rely on equilibrium models of the electricity market. The alternative to equilibrium
models is the study of one firm’s contracting and production decisions for an exogenously
given stochastic spot price process and forward price.
9With a forward contract this paper refers to a contract for future delivery of a fixed
quantity of a good at a fixed price. We will not explicitly specify whether these contracts
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our paper analyzes the effects of speculators trading in a number of derivatives
markets and studies an alternative, more realistic formulation of risk aversion.
In addition, the effect on investments is analyzed.
The usefulness of financial instruments other than forwards to hedge risks
in electricity markets is discussed by Oum et al. (2007). They show that
a regulated retail firm can use a combination of forwards, call options and
put options to hedge its volumetric risk, and draw attention to the regulated
firm’s difficulty to hedge when regulators forbid trade in derivatives that look
speculative, such as weather derivatives, and rebuff contracting positions that
require the firm to pay a sum ex-ante. The optimal hedging strategy is found by
optimizing the firm’s utility, subjective to the financing constraint. The results
are derived for the CARA and the mean-variance utility functions, with an
endogenously given price and quantity distribution function. In our paper we
develop an equilibrium model of the market and show that option contracts are
important instrument to transfer volumetric risks from generators to retailers,
even more so when firms might face liquidity constraints.10 We also show the
importance of options for investment decisions.
Baldursson and von der Fehr (2007) study vertical integration, forward
contracting and hedging in an equilibrium electricity market model. They
show that vertical integration might increase the equilibrium risk premia in
the market and lower overall welfare, compared with forward contracting. The
reason why this happens in their model is that they assume that a vertically
integrated firm has a ‘smaller capacity’ to take up risk than two separate enti-
ties combined. Even though our model does not represent vertical integration
explicitly, the case of vertical integration in our model corresponds to the case
in which perfect risk-transfer between producer and retailer is possible, i.e.,
the case of market completeness. In such a setting, the implicit assumption is
that the vertically integrated firm has the ‘same capacity’ to take up risk as
the two separate firms combined. In our opinion, this is a more realistic as-
sumption. We see the difference between vertical integration and contracting
by means of a forward contract, as follows: within the vertically integrated
firm, risk sharing between generation and retail is perfect, while risk sharing
by trading forward contracts is imperfect, leaving part of the risk untraded.11
are traded over the counter (OTC), or whether they are traded as ‘futures’ on a centralized
power exchange.
10The notion liquidity constraints in this context refers to the constraints faced by an
individual firm in the financing of its activities. We model these through a CRRA utility
function, as described further in the paper. Separately, there is the entirely different issue
of limited market liquidity, which refers to the fact that in general, markets for energy
derivatives are relatively thin. As mentioned in the introduction, market liquidity is one
of the elements of market completeness. In our paper, limited market liquidity is therefore
modeled by assuming that not all possible contracts are traded. An alternative way of
modeling limited market liquidity is by assuming a large bid-ask spread. Our paper, however,
does not consider transaction costs, hence we do not study market liquidity in this way.
11An additional difference between vertical integration and trading derivatives is that in
a derivatives market, financial investors can reduce the risk premia in the market.
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Also Aid et al. (2006) study vertical integration, forward contracting, hedg-
ing, and retail competition. They develop an equilibrium model in which firms
have a mean-variance utility function and show that both vertical integration
and forward contracting allows for a better risk sharing between retailers and
generators and leads to lower retail prices, increased market share for small
generators, and a reduction of the profits of retailers. Compared with long-
term contracts, vertical integration leads to perfect risk sharing between gen-
erators and retailers. Additionally, forward markets might not develop under
some parameters of the game in which case no risk is shared between upstream
and downstream firms. The results of Aid et al. (2006) on the comparison
of vertical integration and forward contracting are driven by the change of
the utility function (and the implied capacity of firms to take up risks) and
the quality of risk transfer between upstream and downstream firms (market
completeness). In our paper we single out the effect of market completeness.
We do not, however, study retail competition. Our paper assumes a perfectly
competitive market and neglects strategic issues associated with long-term
contracting that have been reported in the literature.
Allaz and Vila (1993) study the role of forward contracts, not as a tool to
hedge risks, but as an instrument used by oligopolists to strategically affect
market outcomes. It is shown that in a Cournot setting, generation firms sell
forward contracts in order to commit to compete more aggressively in the spot
market. Hence forward contracts make markets more competitive. Willems
(2006) shows that a similar mechanism is at work with financial call options:
the market equilibrium is even more competitive than with future contracts.
Green (2003) studies the combined hedging and strategic roles of forward
contracts while at the same time examining different types of competition in
the retail market. He shows that retail competition may lower the amount of
forward contracts firms will sign. The current paper does not allow for retail
competition, – consumers cannot switch retail supplier – and assumes, as in
Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002), that retail prices are fixed.
Green (2007) models investment decisions and the technology choice in a
long-term oligopolistic equilibrium model with risk averse firms in which firms
can sign forward contracts. The setting of our paper allows us to analyze the
relation between market completeness and investment decisions of generators.
6.3 Model description
We extend the competitive market equilibrium model of the forward and spot
markets developed by Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002). The main difference
with their model is that we allow for multiple financial products to be traded
on the market. We start with a description of the spot market and continue
with a description of the derivatives markets.
We consider an electricity sector with Ng identical generation firms and Nr
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identical retailers. Each of the Ng generation firms is assumed to have a total
production cost with a fixed and a variable component:
F˜ + a˜
Q˜c
c
(6.1)
where F˜ , a˜ and c are parameters that determine the shape of the cost function,
and Q˜ is the production level of an individual firm. The total production cost
of the industry is given by:
C(Q) = F + a
Qc
c
(6.2)
with F = NgF˜ and a = a˜/N
c−1
g and Q the total production of the industry.
Demand for electricity D is inelastic and stochastic. The spot market is
perfectly competitive, and the wholesale price for electricity P is determined
by market clearing:
P = C ′(D) = aDc−1 (6.3)
Each generation firm produces D/Ng. As demand is a random variable, so is
the spot price.
The combined profit of the generators is equal to spot market revenue
minus production costs:
pig = P ·D − C(D) (6.4)
Retailers buy energy on the spot market and sell it at a fixed retail rate R to
consumers.12 Each retailer supplies a volume D/Nr. The combined profit of
the retailers is equal to:
pir = (R− P )D (6.5)
Both retailers’ and generators’ profits are affected by the stochastic nature of
demand.
In the derivatives market, a derivative i ∈ {1, .., I} is traded at a price Fi.
The derivative promises a payment Ti(P ), which is conditional on the spot
price P . This paper assumes that the only derivatives which are traded are
call options. Hence:
Ti(P ) = max(P − Si, 0) (6.6)
with Si the strike price of option i. A derivative with strike price zero corre-
sponds to the standard forward contract.
The combined profit Πj (j = r, g) that is made by retailers and generators,
respectively, when the retailers/generators buy a total of kji derivatives in the
derivatives market, is equal to:
Πj = pij(P ) +
I∑
i=1
kji · (Ti(P )− Fi) (6.7)
12The fixed rate R is either a regulated rate, or a fixed price contract offered to customers
in a deregulated market. The case of real-time pricing, which would allow retailers to transfer
upward price risk to the consumers, is discussed in Section 6.5.
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The firms’ profit is the sum of the profit they make in the spot market, and
the profit they make on the derivatives they have bought. Both terms are
stochastic as they depend on the realization of the demand level.
We assume that retailers and generators are risk averse, and that the utility
of individual retailers and generators can be described by a mean-variance
utility function with risk aversion parameter NjA (j = r, g). The risk aversion
parameter contains Nj to account for the fact that a larger number of firms
would lead to a smaller average size per firm, and therefore a proportionally
smaller risk-bearing capacity, i.e. a higher absolute risk aversion. When Ng =
Nr, the risk aversion of all firms (both generators and retailers) is the same,
a reasonable assumption. If Ur and Ug represent the utility of retailers and
generators, respectively, then each identical individual firm will maximize its
utility Uj/Nj :
Uj
Nj
= E
(
Πj
Nj
)
− NjA
2
Var
(
Πj
Nj
)
j = r, g (6.8)
Maximizing (6.8) is equivalent to maximizing the following:
Uj = E(Πj)− A
2
Var(Πj) j = r, g (6.9)
which has the intuitively appealing benefit of not containing Nj anymore.
One could say that the risk aversion parameter A measures the risk aversion
of either the generation sector or the retail sector as a whole. We can proceed
with the analysis as if there was only one generator and one retailer. Aggregate
market welfare W is equal to the sum of the utility of retailers and generators:
W = Ur + Ug.
In the contracting stage, firm j maximizes its utility Uj , by choosing the
amount of derivatives kj1, ..., k
j
i , ..., k
j
I it buys or sells. The equilibrium contract
positions are given by:
~kj = Σ−1
E(~T )− ~F
A
− Σ−1Cov{pij , ~T} (6.10)
with ~kj = (kj1, ..., k
j
I), the vector of equilibrium quantities bought by player j,
Σ = Cov{~T , ~T} the I by I covariance matrix of the contracts ~T = (T1, ..., TI),
~F = (F1, ..., FI) the derivative price vector, and Cov{pij , ~T} the 1 by I covari-
ance matrix of contracts and firm j’s profit.
Equation (6.10) shows that the amount of contracts firm j buys is the sum
of two terms. The first term is the pure speculative amount of contracts a firm
would like to buy. If a financial derivative has an expected positive return,
then the firm will buy some of it, as long as it does not increase the variance
of its portfolio too much. The second term is the pure hedging demand by the
firm. A firm j will buy derivatives in order to hedge its profit risk. It will buy
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more of a certain derivative, if it is more correlated with the profit it wants to
hedge, and if the impact on the variance of the portfolio is smaller.
In equilibrium the demand and supply of derivative products should be
equal. Hence, if there are no speculators active in market iwe find:
kri + k
g
i = 0 (6.11)
and using equation (6.10) the equilibrium price of derivative i is given by:
Fi = E(Ti)− A
2
Cov{pig + pir, Ti} (6.12)
Hence, the price of a derivative is equal to the expected pay-off of the derivative
minus a term which reflects the fact that the derivative is used to hedge the
risk of the individual firms. The last term depends on the risk aversion of all
the firms and the covariance of industry profit with financial instrument i. It
is worth noting that the price of the derivative does not depend on the number
of products traded in the market.13
If risk neutral speculators are active in derivatives market i, then the risk
premium becomes zero, and the price of the derivative should be equal to its
expected value:
Fi = E(Ti) (6.13)
6.4 Model data
The model is calibrated on the German electricity market, using technical and
market data recorded in the first two months of 2006. Note that the purpose of
the calibration is to allow us to perform simulations that produce intuitively
relevant results. The numbers thereby serve as an illustration – this paper
does not claim to make exact statements about the impact of option trade on
the German electricity sector.
The marginal production cost curve C ′(Q) is calibrated on the actual Ger-
man marginal production cost curve, as explained in Appendix 6.A. Demand
is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 60 GW (which is the av-
erage of the observed sample) and standard deviation 17 GW. The standard
deviation is chosen in such a way that the standard deviation of the resulting
power price (according to equation (6.3)) corresponds to the standard devi-
ation of the sample of observed prices. Given the assumptions about supply
and demand, we can derive the wholesale price distribution. The distribution
has a mean of 48 EUR/MWh and a standard deviation of 35 EUR/MWh.
Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) show that as the industry marginal cost
function is convex, the price distribution is skewed.
13In standard mean-variance settings, risk pricing is not affected. Specifically, in quadratic
or CARA-normal economies, the price of any risky security relative to the bond is unaffected
by changes in the span. See Oh (1996).
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Retailers and generators have the same risk aversion parameter A = 0.0025,
which has the unit (h/1000 EUR). Furthermore, we assume that the fixed cost
parameter F = 1200 (expressed in 1000 EUR/h), and that retailers sell their
energy at a fixed price of 58 EUR/MWh. Note that prices and quantities are
expressed in (EUR/MWh) and (GW), respectively, and hence profits and total
costs are expressed in (1000 EUR/h).
6.5 Welfare effects
In this section, we use the model to calculate the optimal hedging strategy of
generators and retailers, and analyze the welfare effects of adding additional
derivatives to the market. In the first part of the simulations we assume that no
speculators are active on the market, and hence supply and demand of financial
contracts is only from retailers and generators. We consider four scenarios with
a different number of derivative markets present. In Scenario 1, only a forward
market exists. In Scenarios 2 through 4, the forward market is supplemented
with one, three, and eleven additional option markets, respectively.14
Table 6.1 shows the simulation results for all scenarios. It shows for each
of the twelve derivative contracts the net amount traded by generators and
retailers. Positive numbers represent long positions, negative numbers repre-
sent short positions. The option contracts have strike prices ranging from 0 to
143 EUR / MWh, with the zero strike price (contract 1) corresponding to the
forward contract. The range of option strike prices covers the 95% confidence
interval of price levels.
The results show that if there are only forward contracts, firms overhedge
their positions. Generators sell 68 GW forward, while in expected terms they
will only produce 60 GW. The intuitive explanation for this is that genera-
tors and retailers want to hedge volumetric risk (or quantity risk), in addition
to price risk. If there were only price risk (i.e., the quantity of electricity
demanded would be deterministic), then forward contracts – which are specif-
ically suited for hedging price risk – would be sufficient. The number of for-
ward contracts would exactly correspond to the deterministic demand quantity.
However, in the setting of this paper (and in reality), generators and retailers
are exposed to both volumetric risk and price risk, because both quantities
and prices are stochastic. If no options are traded, then volumetric risk can
be hedged using additional forwards, because price and quantity are positively
related. Another way of explaining this effect is that, because price and quan-
tity are positively related, overall risk exposure is convex in the underlying
state variable (demand) and hence the number of forward contracts exceeds
expected demand. The price of the forward contract is 45.3 EUR/MWh, which
is below the expected spot price of 48 EUR/MWh.
14The numerical model is written as a Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) in GAMS.
See Appendix 6.B.
142 CHAPTER 6. MARKET COMPLETENESS
Table 6.1: Market equilibrium without speculation
 15
1 0 45.3 -68.0 68.0 -52.0 52.0 -32.1 32.1 5.3 -5.3
2 13 33.6 -37.9 37.9
3 26 25.2 -16.2 16.2
4 39 19.1 -37.7 37.7 -11.1 11.1
5 52 14.5 -8.3 8.3
6 65 10.9 -6.9 6.9
7 78 7.9 -45.4 45.4 -15.9 15.9 -5.9 5.9
8 91 5.6 -5.2 5.2
9 104 3.8 -4.3 4.3
10 117 2.4 -14.5 14.5 -6.6 6.6
11 130 1.3 3.7 -3.7
12 143 0.7 -13.1 13.1
Net Contract Position
Welfare 1224
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Forward Forward + 1 Option
768 1322 1337
Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Forward + 3 Options All Contracts
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Table 1: Market equilibrium without speculation 
 
The results show that if there are only forward contracts, firms overhedge their 
positions. Generators sell 68 GW forward, while in expected terms they will only 
produce 60 GW. The intuitive explanation for this is that generators and retailers 
want to hedge volumetric risk (or quantity risk), in addition to price risk. If there 
were only price risk (i.e., the quantity of electricity demanded would be 
deterministic), then forward contracts – which are specifically suited for hedging 
price risk – would be sufficient. The number of forward contracts would exactly 
correspond to the deterministic demand quantity. However, in the setting of this 
paper (and in reality), generators and retailers are exposed to both volumetric risk 
and price risk, because both quantities and prices are stochastic. If no options are 
traded, then volumetric risk can be hedged using additional forwards, because price 
and quantity are positively related. Another way of explaining this effect is that, 
because price and quantity are positively related, overall risk exposure is convex in 
the underlying state variable (demand) and hence the number of forward contracts 
exceeds expected demand. The price of the forward contract is 45.3 EUR/MWh, 
which is below the expected spot price of 48 EUR/MWh. 
In Scenarios 2 to 4, extra financial instruments are added to the market. Table 1 
shows that once more instruments become available, generators reduce the amount 
of standard forward contracts they sell and substitute these contracts with option 
contracts. The generators and the retailers reduce their supply and demand of 
forward contracts. Although both demand and supply functions shift, the price of the 
forward contract remains 45.3 EUR/MWh as shown in derivation (12). As we 
In Scenari s 2 to 4, extra financial instruments are added to the market.
Table 6.1 shows that once more instruments become available, generators re-
duce the amount of standard forward contracts they sell and substitute these
contracts with option contracts. The generators and the retailers reduce their
supply and demand of forward contracts. Although both demand and supply
functions shift, the price of the forward contract remains 45.3 EUR/MWh as
shown in derivation (6.12). As we pointed out in footnote 13, this effect is due
to he use of the mean-variance u ility function.
The last row in Table 6.1 is the aggregate welfare, measured in certainty
equivalents (1000 EUR/h). Increasing the number of contracts traded clearly
increases market efficiency. The introduction of one option contract, when
none existed before, increases welfare by approximately 50 %. Adding extra
markets for option contracts increases welfare further, but to a lesser extent.
For instance, increasing the number of option markets from 3 to 11, increases
welfare by 1.2 %. Hence risk sharing between generation and retail is close to
optimal once one option contract (or a few option contracts) are traded. In
fact, the welfare effects in Scenario 2 (Forward + 1 Option) can be improved
even further, by modifying the strike price of the one available option contract.
The strike prices of the option contracts in the simulations of Table 6.1 are
chosen so that they span the 95% confidence interval of price levels. Scenario 2
assumes that one option is available, with a strike price roughly in the middle
of this price rang . Figure 6.1 shows how welfare would change when a different
strike price is used.
If the strike price of the option is very low, then welfare is equal to wel-
fare obtained with a forward contract only, because the option does not add
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Figure 6.1: Welfare obtained with “Forward + 1 Option”, for different strike
prices (compared with welfare obtained with only a “Forward” and with “All
contracts”)
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pointed out in footnote 15, this effect is due to the use of the mean-variance utility 
function. 
The last row in Table 1 is the aggregate welfare, measured in certainty equivalents 
(1000 EUR/h). Increasing the number of contracts traded clearly increases market 
efficiency. The introduction of one option contract, when none existed before, 
increases welfare by approximately 50 %. Adding extra markets for option contracts 
increases welfare further, but to a lesser extent. For instance, increasing the number 
of option markets from 3 to 11, increases welfare by 1.2 %. Hence risk sharing 
between generation and retail is close to optimal once one option contract (or a few 
option contracts) are traded. In fact, the welfare effects in Scenario 2 (Forward + 1 
Option) can be improved even further, by modifying the strike price of the one 
available option contract. The strike prices of the option contracts in the simulations 
of Table 1 are chosen so that they span the 95% confidence interval of price levels. 
Scenario 2 assumes that one option is available, with a strike price roughly in the 
middle of this price range. Figure 1 shows how welfare would change when a 
different strike price is used. 
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Figure 1: Welfare obtained with "Forward + 1 Option", for different strike prices 
(compared with welfare obtained with only a "Forward" and with "All contracts") 
 
If the strike price of the option is very low, then welfare is equal to welfare obtained 
with a forward contract only, because the option does not add any new hedging 
possibilities. Welfare reaches a plateau optimum of 1280 (expressed in 1000 EUR/h) 
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any new hedging possibilities. Welfare reaches a plateau optimum of 1280
(expressed in 1000 EUR/h) when the strike price is in the 50-55 EUR/MWh
range. However, for all strike prices in the 30-80 EUR/MWh range, adding
the one option contract to the forward contract lifts welfare above 1200 (in
1000 EUR/h), thereby capturing more than 75% of the potential benefits of
market completeness.
Until now, we have assumed that retailers sell at a fixed price R, which can
be either a regulated rate, or a fixed price contract offered to customers in a
deregulated market. Given the continuous development of more sophisticated
metering systems, it is interesting to consider what would happen if real-time
pricing were possible. If all consumer contracts were based on real-time prices,
then this would eliminate all risk for the retailers. However, generators would
still have a desire to hedge. Smart retailers could therefore develop structured
consumer contracts that take away risks from the generators and transfer them
to the consumers who are willing to take on the risks. Such consumers would
be rewarded with a lower expected power price. In its simplest form, such
a structured contract could be similar to a fixed price contract. If options
are available on the wholesale market (in addition to forwards) then more
sophisticated structures would be possible, thereby hedging the generators’
risk better and better, and improving welfare. In practice, in order to preserve
the demand incentives created by real-time pricing, such structured contracts
are still likely to price a consumer’s individual demand based on real-time
prices. However, at the end of each period, consumers could expect a check
that settles the structured part of the consumer contract, i.e. the hedge,
with the amount of the check depending on the overall demand and price
developments in the spot market in the course of the period.15
For the second part of the simulations, we assume that speculators can ac-
tively participate in the market, by taking positions in the electricity derivative
markets and financially closing their position in the spot market. We assume
they trade away the risk premia in the market: the price of the derivatives
becomes equal to the expected value of the derivative. As speculators provide
extra liquidity to the market, the supply of derivatives by generators does no
longer need to exactly balance the demand by retailers. The difference of gen-
erators’ supply and retailers’ demand is the position speculators take in the
market. For the same four scenarios as before, Table 6.2 gives the net position
of generators and retailers. In Scenario 1, only forward contracts exist, and
generators sell 69.1 GW forward, retailers buy 67 GW, and speculators buy 2.1
GW. The results indicate that the more derivatives markets are introduced,
the larger the gap between supply and demand for forward contracts, and the
larger the role played by speculators. In Scenario 4, in which there is one
15Borenstein (2007) discusses retail markets and hedging in more detail. He shows how
retail contracts can be developed that base the marginal price of electricity consumption
on the real time price, but at the same time include a hedge which reduces monthly bill
volatility.
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forward market and eleven option markets, generators sell 34.2 GW, retailers
sell 44.8 GW and speculators buy 79 GW.
The introduction of speculators increases welfare, as the players can share
their risk with players outside the market, the speculators. Hence, the addition
of speculators does not change our previous conclusions. Speculators play an
active role in the electricity market by taking up market risk and by decreasing
the risk premia in the market. As the number of markets increases, the amount
of risk that speculators take away from market participants increases, but the
positive welfare effect of additional markets levels off after a few products.
Table 6.2: Market equilibrium with speculation
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the position speculators take in the market. For the same four scenarios as before, 
Table 2 gives the net position of generators and retailers. In Scenario 1, only forward 
contracts exist, and generators sell 69.1 GW forward, retailers buy 67 GW, and 
speculators buy 2.1 GW. The results indicate that the more derivatives markets are 
introduced, the larger the gap between supply and demand for forward contracts, and 
the larger the role played by speculators. In Scenario 4, in which there is one 
forward market and eleven option markets, generators sell 34.2 GW, retailers sell 
44.8 GW and speculators buy 79 GW. 
The introduction of speculators increases welfare, as the players can share their risk 
with players outside the market, the speculators. Hence, the addition of speculators 
does not change our previous conclusions. Spe ulator  play an active ole in the 
electricity market by taking up market risk and by decreasing the risk premia in the 
market. As the number of markets increases, the amount of risk that speculators take 
away from market participants increases, but the positive welfare effect of additional 
markets levels off after a few products. 
 
1 0 48.4 -69.1 67.0 -58.7 45.3 -48.0 16.2 -34.2 -44.8
2 13 36.0 -13.2 62.6
3 26 25.9 -8.8 23.6
4 39 18.1 -20.5 55.0 -6.6 15.7
5 52 12.4 -5.5 11.2
6 65 8.3 -4.7 9.1
7 78 5.5 -29.3 61.5 -12.2 19.7 -4.2 7.6
8 91 3.5 -3.8 6.6
9 104 2.1 -3.2 5.4
10 117 1.2 -10.5 18.4 -4.9 8.2
11 130 0.7 2.7 -4.7
12 143 0.3 -9.9 16.4
Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Forward + 3 Options All Contracts
Net Contract Position
Welfare 1285
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Forward Forward + 1 Option
772 1403 1423W
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Table 2: Market equilibrium with speculation 
 
Finally, for the third part of the simulations, we repeat the previous simulation but 
we now use a different assumption for firms’ utility functions: instead of the utility 
functions from equation (7), we use the well-known CRRA utility function (i.e., the 
utility function with constant relative risk aversion). As a result of the CRRA 
property, firms become very averse of potential shocks that would lead to very low 
or negative profits. In other words, the CRRA utility function models a world in 
Finally, for the third part of the simulations, we repeat the previous simula-
tio but we now use a different ass mption for firms’ utility funct ons: instead
of the utility functions from equation (6.7), we use the well-known CRRA util-
ity function (i.e., the utility function with constant relative risk aversion). As
a result of the CRRA property, firms become very averse of potential shocks
that would lead to very low or negative profits. In other words, the CRRA
utility function models a world in which firms want to avoid the risk of liquid-
ity problems or bankruptcy. Practically, we choose the coefficient of relative
risk aversion to be 4, which is in the middle of the typical 2-6 range (see
e.g. Palsson, 1996). The simulation results with speculation and CRRA util-
ity functions for producers and retailers are shown in Table 6.3. Generally
speaking, the results are very similar to the results of Table 6.2, although the
retailer seems to have a slightly increased preference for options over forwards
(as compared to Table 6.2).
The most interesting observation is that with the CRRA utility function,
it is not possible to find a sufficiently hedged solution in the case when only
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forwards are present. In other words, if no options are introduced, welfare
remains ‘infinitely low’ for CRRA utility functions. The reason is that forwards
alone do not allow the retailer and the generator to limit their exposure in all
‘states-of-the-world’. The intuition for this effect is the following: since a
negative result in one potential state-of-the-world is strongly penalized by the
CRRA function, the retailer and the generator would like to avoid – at all costs
– any outcomes in which their profit is below a certain threshold, in order to
avoid bankruptcy. The retailer faces a negative shock when demand is high
(it faces a high wholesale price, and has to buy a large volume of power),
and when demand is low (sales volume is too low to cover fixed costs). The
generator faces a negative shock when demand is very low (low price and low
volume). As the retailer wants to avoid bankruptcy at all cost, its demand for
forward contracts is undetermined for any price of forward contracts. With
only the forward contract, the retailer is unable to hedge against both the risk
of having high demand and the risk of having low demand. Based on these
results for a CRRA utility function, it is clear that the introduction of options
is especially welfare-enhancing if there is a strong risk aversion for negative
shocks that could lead to bankruptcy.
A practical implication of this phenomenon would be that a retailer alone
would have difficulty to survive if no liquid option market is available. Anecdo-
tal evidence of this effect is the case of Centrica in the UK. After the demerger
of British Gas (Centrica, 12/2/1997), Centrica was essentially a gas retailer
in the UK. At the end of 1997, Centrica entered the electricity market as a
pure retailer (without any generation assets) and acquired its first electricity
customers (Centrica, 1/12/1997). Rather than staying a stand-alone gas and
electricity retailer, Centrica started to invest in gas-fired power generation in
2001 (Centrica, 29/5/2001 and 24/8/2001). Centrica stated the following rea-
son for the investments in power generation: “As part of its risk management
strategy the company has said it plans to source 20-25 per cent of its future
peak electricity requirements from its own generating capacity. This strategy
offers increased long term stability and protection against electricity price fluc-
tuations and spikes” (Centrica, 24/8/2001). In other words: the investment
in gas-fired power generation is meant primarily to protect the retailer against
electricity price volatility in case of peak demand. From a financial perspective,
an investment in gas-fired power generation (which has relatively low invest-
ment cost and relatively high marginal cost) can be considered as the purchase
of a call option on electricity, with a relatively high strike price16. The absence
of a market for such options forces retailers to invest in the physical equivalent,
because staying unhedged is not a viable alternative.
16Strictly speaking, a gas-fired power plant is an option on a (clean) spark spread, i.e., the
difference between the electricity price and the input prices (gas, carbon emission rights).
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Table 6.3: Market equilibrium with speculation, with CRRA utility functions
 20
Centrica stated the following reason for the investments in power generation: "As 
part of its risk management strategy the company has said it plans to source 20-25 
per cent of its future peak electricity requirements from its own generating capacity. 
This strategy offers increased long term stability and protection against electricity 
price fluctuations and spikes" (Centrica, 24/8/2001). In other words: the investment 
in gas-fired power generation is meant primarily to protect the retailer against 
electricity price volatility in case of peak demand. From a financial perspective, an 
investment in gas-fired power generation (which has relatively low investment cost 
and relatively high marginal cost) can be considered as the purchase of a call option 
on electricity, with a relatively high strike price18. The absence of a market for such 
options forces retailers to invest in the physical equivalent, because staying 
unhedged is not a viable alternative. 
 
1 0 48.4 -58.8 38.7 -48.1 11.3 -33.5 -45.8
2 13 36.0 -13.4 63.6
3 26 25.9 -10.8 23.7
4 39 18.1 -20.5 59.6 0.0 15.7
5 52 12.4 -18.7 11.2
6 65 8.3 6.1 9.1
7 78 5.5 -29.3 63.8 -12.1 20.2 -3.7 7.9
8 91 3.5 -3.8 5.6
9 104 2.1 -9.9 9.4
10 117 1.2 -10.5 18.2 -2.5 -9.6
11 130 0.7 -7.3 49.6
12 143 0.3 10.4 -47.0
Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Forward + 3 Options All Contracts
-314
No solution
Net Contract Position
Welfare -1216
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Forward Forward + 1 Option
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Table 3: Market equilibrium with speculation, with CRRA utility functions 
 
6 Investment decisions by small firms 
Above we have shown that the welfare effect of adding contracts levels off after a 
relatively small number of contracts. However, implicitly we have assumed that all 
production firms have a diversified portfolio of generation plants. Indeed: we 
assume that there are gN  identical production firms, which implies that the 
                                                 
18 Strictly speaking, a gas-fired power plant is an option on a (clean) spark spread, i.e., the difference 
between the electricity price and the input prices (gas, carbon emission rights). 
6.6 Investment decisions by small firms
Above we have shown that the welfare effect of adding contracts levels off
after a relatively small number of contracts. However, implicitly we have
assum d that all producti firms hav a diversified portfolio of g nera ion
plants. Indeed: we assume that there are Ng identical production firms, which
implies that the production cost curve of each firm is just a horizontally scaled
version of the aggregate pro uc ion cost curve of the generation industry. In
other words, the portfolio of each firm contains power plants with relatively
low marginal costs (e.g., nuclear power plants), which will be run in nearly
all demand scenarios, and power plants with relatively high marginal costs
(e.g., gas-fired power plants), which will be run only if demand is high. As a
result, all generation firms are reasonably diversified, and the demand/price
risk is adequately distributed across generation firms. However, if some firms
have only base load power plants and other firms have only peak load power
plants, then some firms’ financial results are much more sensitive to certain
demand/price scenarios. Intuitively, this could make the potential social value
of a comprehensive set of financial contracts (which would allow risk-transfer
under accurately defined demand/price scenarios) significantly higher.
In order to test the impact of market completeness when firms have different
types of portfolios, we analyze how risk trading modifies investment behavior.
Specifically, we determine whether a small, non-diversified firm would invest in
a single power plant with marginal cost c and fixed investment cost F .17 The
17Since such a power plant is in fact (almost) equivalent to an option contract, this essen-
tially means that we analyze the implications of providing one player with one additional
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small firm is assumed to be risk averse, with mean-variance utility function (as
in the first part of our simulations). We assume no speculators in the market.
The firm invests in this production plant if the investment increases its
expected utility. The expected utility without investments is equal to
UNI = max
k1,...,kI
[
E{pi} − A2 Var{pi}
]
with pi =
∑I
i=1 ki · (Ti(P )− Fi)
(6.14)
while the expected utility with investments is equal to
U INV (c, F ) = max
k1,...,kI
[
E{pi} − A2 Var{pi}
]
with pi =
∑I
i=1 ki · (Ti(P )− Fi) + (max{p− c, 0} − F )
(6.15)
The firm invests as long as
UNI > U INV (c, F ) (6.16)
Equation (6.16) defines implicitly the maximum fixed cost for which the firm
is willing to invest in new generation capacity with marginal cost c. Hence
investment occurs as long as
F < F cr(c) (6.17)
Therefore, the function F cr(c) represents the investment behavior of the firm.18
F cr(c) obviously depends on the number and types of financial contracts traded
in the market, and on the risk aversion of the firm. Indeed, generally speaking,
as more contracts are traded, the firm is able to better hedge the output of the
production plant, thereby reducing its risks. This makes it more interesting
for the firm to build a power plant. In certain cases, there is, however, a non-
monotonic relation between market completeness and investments decisions,
as will see below. Let F
cr
(c) denote the case of market completeness, i.e., the
firm’s investment behavior if a full set of option contracts is available.
Figure 6.2 compares the decision behavior of risk averse firms in case of
market incompleteness with the decision behavior in case of market complete-
ness. More specifically, the figure shows the “adjustment factor” κ:
κ =
F cr(c)
F
cr
(c)
(6.18)
When calculated for different levels of market completeness, the factor κ de-
scribes how the firm’s investment decisions change as markets become more
contract.
18If we consider the power plant as an option contract, then F cr(c) is the maximum price
(option premium) the firm would be willing to pay for this option contract.
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complete. Those investments decisions are the profit-maximizing decisions for
the firm (conditional on the available contracts). Note that the firm’s risk
aversion is chosen at a higher level than before, because we analyze a small
firm and the mean-variance utility function does not scale.
If κ < 1, the firm invests less in a particular type of generation than if
markets were complete. If κ > 1, the firm invests more in a particular type of
generation than if markets were complete.
Figure 6.2: Optimal investment decisions
 23
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Figure 2: Optimal investment decisions. 
 
The effect of increasing market completeness is very different for base load plants 
on the one hand, and peak load plants on the other hand. Once the forward contract 
is introduced, a firm with a base load plant ( 0c  ) would be able to hedge its 
position completely. Adding additional derivatives to the market does not change the 
investment decisions for a base load power plant, as the firm already has perfect 
information in evaluating the value of the power plant using the forward contract. 
Speculation and investment decisions are decoupled: a firm wanting to invest in a 
base load power plant can do so without taking any market risk (i.e., it can focus on 
the operational aspects), while a speculator can decide to assume some base load 
market risk without actually having to build a power plant. 
For peak load plants ( c  large), the results are quite different. Once the forward 
contract is introduced (and no options), investment in certain peak load power plants 
with very high marginal cost (higher than 100 EUR/MWh in Figure 2) may actually 
be less than if no contracts are traded. The reason for this is that it may be more 
profitable for the firm to speculate on the forward market (without building a power 
plant), than to build a power plant and use financial contracts to hedge its portfolio. 
Hence, financial investments ‘crowd out’ the investments in physical assets: 
investment and speculation decisions are coupled. As more and more contracts are 
introduced, we see that investment in peak generation increases dramatically, 
because there are better instruments to hedge the risk of the production output of the 
The effect of increasing market completeness is very different for base load
plants on the one hand, and peak load plants on the other hand. Once the
forward contract is introduced, a firm with a base load plant (c ≈ 0) would
be able to hedge its position completely. Adding additional derivatives to the
market does ot ch nge the investment d cisions for a base load power plant,
as the firm already has perfect information in evaluating the value of the
power plant using the forward contract. Speculation and investment decisions
are decoupled: a firm wanting to invest in a base load power plant can do so
without taking any market risk (i.e., it can focus on the operational aspects),
while a speculator can decide to assume some base load market risk without
actually having to build a power plant.
For peak load plants (c large), the results are quite different. Once the
forward contract is introduced (and no options), investment in certain peak
load power plants with very high marginal cost (higher than 100 EUR/MWh in
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Figure 6.2) may actually be less than if no contracts are traded. The reason
for this is that it may be more profitable for the firm to speculate on the
forward market (without building a power plant), than to build a power plant
and use financial contracts to hedge its portfolio. Hence, financial investments
‘crowd out’ the investments in physical assets: investment and speculation
decisions are coupled. As more and more contracts are introduced, we see that
investment in peak generation increases dramatically, because there are better
instruments to hedge the risk of the production output of the firm.19 As a
result, the investment decision and the speculation decision become decoupled
again. The figure also shows that for the technology with marginal production
costs around 78 EUR/MWh, adding additional contract markets on top of
contract number 7 does not change the results. Contract 7 has a strike price
of approximately 78 EUR/MWh, hence the investment valuation of the firm
is perfect, regardless of any additional contracts being added.
Note that in certain cases the adjustment factor κ might be larger than one,
which implies that a firm might invest more when markets are incomplete than
when markets are complete. This may happen when the investment increases
the risk of the existing firms in the sector. In that case it would be cheaper
for the firm to buy a financial option with an equivalent strike price, than
to invest in physical capacity. Such a financial option would be available at
a ‘depressed’ price, i.e. a price below its expected value, because it reduces
risk of the existing firms. Put otherwise, the availability of an extra derivative
market creates additional investments opportunities for the firm. If those
opportunities are very profitable, then the firm uses its capital to speculate
on the derivatives market, instead of investing it in new power plants. In
other words, the opportunity cost of risk-bearing capital has increased with
the availability of new investment opportunities. Similar to what we have
observed for peak load plants when a forward contract is introduced, we see
that financial investments ‘crowd-out’ physical investments.20
19It is important to note the difference with the Centrica case, in which – as mentioned in
Section 6.5 – peak investment was due to a lack of tradable call options. Before the invest-
ment, Centrica was a pure retailer, hence it had a natural short position in peak electricity.
If tradable call options had been available, such a retailer would have closed its position
by taking a long position (i.e. buying) in call options. Since these call options were not
available, Centrica invested in physical peak generation in order to close its position. In
contrast, Section 6.6 studies the incentives of a small generator, who is considering making
an investment in power generation, which would give it a natural long position in peak elec-
tricity. If tradable call options are available, such a firm invests in physical peak generation
and closes its position by taking a short position (i.e. selling) in call options. If tradable call
options are not available, then the only way to keep a closed position is to not invest, which
leads to the underinvestment in peak generation that one can observe in Figure 6.2 for the
case where no contracts or only forward contracts are traded. In summary, the availability
of tradable call options increases investment incentives for generators, who then sell call
options to retailers. A lack of tradable call options leads to underinvestment by generators
and leaves retailers with no other alternative than to become an integrated generator-retailer
themselves.
20Crowding out of physical investments can only happen in incomplete markets. Once a
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The previous discussion assumes that the investor actually has access to
all contracts traded in the market. It is interesting to consider the investment
incentives of a completely new entrant who trades neither physically nor fi-
nancially before investing. Suppose for instance that forward contracts (but
no options) are traded in the market. For power plants with marginal cost
smaller than 100 EUR/MWh, an investor who has no market access would
underinvest, as can be seen from Figure 6.2. Indeed, given that the investor
does not utilize the hedging possibilities offered by the market (i.e., the forward
contract), his risk aversion reduces his investment, especially for plants that
can be hedged very well using the available contracts (in particular: base load
plants). The investor therefore foregoes potential profits by not having market
access. The opposite happens for power plants with marginal cost larger than
100 EUR/MWh: investing in the power plant is in fact a less profitable use
of the investor’s ‘risk budget’ (i.e., his capital) than investing in forward con-
tracts. An investor without market access would overinvest in power plants,
and forego the potential profits of speculation with forwards.
6.7 Information content of derivatives prices:
risk-free probabilities
In the previous section, we studied the effect of financial contracts on the
investment decisions of a firm as a function of the technology parameter c.
In this section we look at the information content contained in the prices
of financial products, and derive optimal investment decisions based upon a
typical financial approach using risk-free probabilities. This approach uses the
price data from the financial market to estimate the risk-free probabilities and
then computes the market value of an asset as its expected value under the
risk-free probability measure. The investment decision is made by comparing
the market value of the asset with the investment costs of the asset. In a sense,
this approach measures the ‘information content’ of the derivatives prices. The
approach assumes that the market is sufficiently complete to create a portfolio
of contracts which replicates the pay-off of the physical asset. In this section
we will test at which point markets are sufficiently complete to use the risk-
free probabilities approach. We will compare the investment decisions based
on the risk-free probabilities approach with the optimal decisions we found in
the previous section.
The market equilibria in Table 6.1 can be represented by means of a risk-
free probability distribution θ, different from the true distribution. Under
the risk-free probability distribution, the contracts’ prices are equal to their
power plant is fully hedged, crowding-out no longer occurs. The investment in the power
plant becomes risk-free, and will therefore no longer put a burden on the risk-bearing ca-
pacities of the firm.
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expected values:
Eθ(~T ) = ~F (6.19)
and the generator and the retailer act as risk neutral agents who optimize
expected profit:
j = r, g Uj = Eθ(Πj) (6.20)
Figure 6.3 shows the risk-free probabilities for different assumptions regard-
ing the number of products being traded.21 When all financial contracts are
traded, the risk-free probability distribution assumes that extreme events, es-
pecially low prices, are more likely to occur than they do in reality. When only
forward contracts are traded, however, the risk-free probabilities calculated on
the basis of forward prices, give extreme events a too small probability. Adding
just one extra financial market brings the distribution relatively close to the
situation in which all 12 financial products are traded, and greatly improves
the information that firms obtain.
In the risk-free probabilities approach, firms invest in a power plant when
the expected net present value, calculated using the risk-free probabilities, is
larger than the fixed investment cost. Hence a firm invests if
F < NPVθ(c) = Eθ{max(p− c, 0)} (6.21)
As in Section 6.6 we compare these critical values with NPV θ(c) = F
cr
(c),
the net present value of a power plant with marginal cost c calculated using
the risk-free probabilities inferred when all contracts are traded. Figure 6.4
shows – for different types of generation plants – the ratio of both numbers.
We use the index RF (risk-free probabilities) to distinguish the result from
the previous section:
κRF =
NPVθ(c)
NPV θ(c)
(6.22)
The results are similar to those obtained in Section 6.6. In order to see
whether the information content of the prices is sufficient, we compare the
decisions of the risk-free probabilities approach with the optimal decisions
described in Section 6.6. Figure 6.5 shows the difference between the two
21As the set of forward and option markets is incomplete, the risk-free probability distri-
bution is not uniquely determined by the observable market prices. We estimate the risk-free
probabilities using a slightly modified version of the approach suggested by Stutzer (1996).
The approach of Stutzer (1996) is essentially a Bayesian framework in which the risk-free
probabilities are estimated using the historical real probabilities as a prior (thereby maxi-
mizing the observed entropy). In our model setting, we use the available real probabilities in-
stead of ‘historical’ real probabilities. Furthermore, we replaced Stutzer’s maximum-entropy
objective function with the minimum-distance objective function suggested by Rubinstein
(1994), in order to reduce computational complexity. Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996) had
already pointed out the computational challenges of the maximum-entropy objective func-
tion and had observed that results with a minimum-distance objective function are very
similar.
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Figure 6.3: Risk-free probabilities without speculators
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Figure 3: Risk-free probabilities without speculators. 
 
In the risk-free probabilities approach, firms invest in a power plant when the 
expected net present value, calculated using the risk-free probabilities, is larger than 
the fixed investment cost. Hence a firm invests if 
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Figure 6.4: Investment decisions using risk-free probabilities
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Figure 4: Investment decisions using risk-free probabilities.  
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Figure 5: Difference of the risk-free probabilities approach and the optimal investments 
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decision rules:
∆κ =
NPVθ(c)− F cr(c)
NPV θ(c)
= κRF − κ (6.23)
Figure 6.5: Difference of the risk-free probabilities approach and the optimal
investments
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Figure 5: Difference of the risk-free probabilities approach and the optimal investments Figure 6.5 shows that if the marginal cost of the power plant is equal to the
strike price of one of the contracts traded in the market, the two approaches
produce identical results. In general, the error in using risk-free probabilities
is smaller when the contracts traded correspond better to the risk profile of
the power plant being built. Hence, the decisions to build base load power
plants are always efficient when there is a forward contract. Similarly, if the
market trades an option with a strike price very close to the marginal cost of a
certain peak power plant, the investment decision for that power plant based
on risk-free probabilities is optimal.
On the other hand, the risk-free probabilities approach leads to overin-
vestment in power plants for which no close financial substitutes are traded
in the market. For example, if only forward contracts are available, the in-
vestment decision for a peak power plant can be seriously distorted. In our
model setting firms may make an error of more than 15% when evaluating this
decision. The addition of one option contract eliminates this error for almost
all types of power plants. In general, as more contracts are being traded, the
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risk-free probabilities approach leads to decisions that are closer to the opti-
mal decisions. When markets are complete, the two approaches yield identical
results.
6.8 Conclusions
The contribution of this paper is that it studies the effects of market complete-
ness on welfare and on investment incentives, in an equilibrium model of the
spot and derivative markets in the electricity sector.
With respect to welfare, the numerical results of the model (calibrated with
German market data) show that welfare is enhanced when options are offered
in the market in addition to forward contracts. However, it turns out that
most of the welfare benefits are achieved with one to three options. The need
for options is especially relevant if firms have a strong aversion of liquidity
problems (bankruptcy risk): with a CRRA utility function, aggregate welfare
is infinitely low when no options are present. Allowing speculators to actively
trade in the market, eliminates the risk premium, and increases aggregate
welfare. The beneficial effect of speculators increases as more contracts are
traded.
With respect to investment incentives, financial contracts are important for
(i) hedging the risk of the entrant, and (ii) signaling to entrants how they could
reduce the overall sector risk. When no financial contracts are traded, risk
averse firms will tend to invest less than if a complete set of financial contracts
is present. When forward contracts are traded, investment in base load power
plants increases (investment and speculation are decoupled), but investment
in certain peak load plants declines because it is more attractive to speculate
with forward contracts instead (investment and speculation are coupled, and
financial investments may ‘crowd-out’ physical investments). When options
are added to the market, investment in peak power plants increases again
dramatically (investment and speculation become more and more decoupled).
We test at which point markets are sufficiently complete so that a firm can
base its investment decisions on a financial approach using risk-free probabili-
ties, in other words, at which point the information content contained in the
prices is sufficient for investment purposes. We show that as long as a per-
fectly matching contract is traded, the risk-free probabilities approach leads
to optimal investment decisions. However, for power plants for which no close
financial proxy is available, the risk-free probabilities approach can lead to sig-
nificant overinvestment, especially for peak load power plants. As more and
more options are added to the markets, the investment error decreases. This
shows that the quality of the information contained in market prices improves
as markets become more complete.
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6.A Annex: Construction of the German
marginal production cost curve
The marginal production cost curve C ′(Q) (see equations (6.2) and (6.3)) is
calibrated on the actual German marginal production cost curve, as shown
in Figure 6.6. The parameters chosen in order to obtain a reasonable fit, are
c = 4, a = 1.852 10−4.
Figure 6.6: Industry marginal cost
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Figure 6: Industry marginal cost 
 
Generation capacities and ownership are obtained from VGE (2006). More than 300 
power plants are considered, totaling 100 GW of generation. Wind, biomass and 
solar capacities are not considered within the firm’s generation portfolios. Plant 
capacities are decreased by seasonal availability factors following Hoster (1996). 
Using a type-specific algorithm based on Schröter (2004) with construction year as 
proxy, we calculate a plant-specific efficiency to derive marginal costs. Fuel prices 
are taken from BAFA (2006) and resemble average monthly cross-border prices for 
gas, oil and coal. We include the price of CO2-emission allowances in the cost 
estimate based on fuel type and plant efficiency. Allowance prices are taken from 
the EEX. 
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The equilibrium model is solved as a Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) in 
GAMS. By writing the problem as a MCP, we can simultaneously determine the 
equilibrium prices and quantities of derivatives.  
 
Generation capacities and ownership are obtained from VGE (2006). More
than 300 power plants are considered, totaling 100 GW of generation. Wind,
biomass and solar capacities are not considered within the firm’s generation
portfolios. Plant capacities are decreased by seasonal availability factors fol-
lowing Hoster (1996). Using a type-specific algorithm based on Schro¨ter (2004)
with construction year as proxy, we calculate a plant-specific efficiency to de-
rive marginal costs. Fuel prices are taken from BAFA (2006) and resemble
average monthly cross-border prices for gas, oil and coal. We include the price
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of CO2-emission allowances in the cost estimate based on fuel type and plant
efficiency. Allowance prices are taken from the EEX.
6.B Annex: Numerical model
The equilibrium model is solved as a Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP)
in GAMS. By writing the problem as a MCP, we can simultaneously determine
the equilibrium prices and quantities of derivatives.
6.B.1 Spot market
The following equations are considered for the spot market:
Cs = F +
a
cD
c
s Ps = aQ
c−1
gs
pigs = Ps ·Ds − Cs pirs = (R− Ps)Ds
(6.24)
with s the state of the world and the indices gand r indicating generator and
retailers.
6.B.2 Call option
The call option i pays Tis in state s, with Tis = max(Ps − Si, 0).
6.B.3 Equilibrium in the derivatives markets
Πgs = pigs +
∑I
i=1 kgi · (Tis − Fi)
Πrs = pirs +
∑I
i=1 kri · (Tis − Fi)
EΠg =
∑S
s=1 ρs Πgs
EΠr =
∑S
s=1 ρs Πrs∑S
s=1 (1−A (Πgs − EΠg)) ρs Tis = Fi∑S
s=1 (1−A (Πrs − EΠr)) ρs Tis = Fi
kri + kgi = 0
(6.25)
6.B.4 Risk-free probabilities
The risk-free probabilities are chosen such that the price of each financial in-
strument equals its expected value under the risk-free probability measure, and
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that the difference between the risk-free probabilities and the true probabilities
is minimized: ∑S
s=1 θs Tis = Fi ⊥ µi∑S
s=1 θs = 1 ⊥ ω
2(θs − ρs)− ω −
∑I
i=1 µiTis = 0 ⊥ θs ≥ 0
(6.26)
Chapter 7
Risk Spillovers and
Hedging: Why Do Firms
Invest Too Much in
Systemic Risk?
7.1 Introduction
This paper studies whether investments by a small competitive firm are so-
cially efficient, when market outcomes are uncertain and financial markets are
incomplete. We show that decisions about real investments, i.e. investments
in productive assets, may be suboptimal, because the presence of those assets
changes the distribution of overall industry risk, which, if financial markets
are incomplete, creates a risk externality for the firms already active in the
market. In particular, private investment decisions will lead to a market in
which the industry as a whole takes too much risk by investing too much in
production activities with highly correlated risk profiles. Firms that could
reduce the overall risk of the industry by offsetting the aggregate risk, do no
enter often enough, and firms that increase the overall industry risk, enter
too often. It is important to note that if the entrant only invests in financial
products and not in real physical assets, then its investment decisions will be
socially optimal, even if the market is incomplete.
To illustrate the point, let us consider an industry in which the production
cost is strongly dependent on an input factor of which the price is uncertain.
As an example, we consider the production of tomatoes in heated greenhouses.
The production costs are strongly dependent on the price ω of the gas that is
used to heat the greenhouses. The gas price ω is determined on international
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markets and is considered an exogenous random variable in this analysis. We
assume that the gas price is the only source of uncertainty: the state-of-the-
world is fully defined by ω. Producer and consumer surplus are a function of ω.
For simplicity, let us assume that the tomato market is perfectly competitive
and that demand is completely inelastic. In this market, a higher gas price
would result in higher costs for the marginal tomato producer, hence higher
tomato prices. Therefore, consumer surplus declines rapidly as a function of
the gas price. On the other hand, producer surplus increases slightly as a
function of the gas price. Indeed, with higher gas price, the surplus of the
marginal producer would not change, since the gas price increase is passed on
to consumers through higher tomato prices. However, inframarginal capacity
consisting of more efficient greenhouses that consume less gas would obtain
higher profits when gas prices are higher, because the tomato price increases
more than the gas cost per tomato. Consumer surplus CS and producer
surplus Π are shown schematically as a function of ω in Figure 7.1. Since they
depend on ω, both CS and Π are random variables.
Now, let us consider an entrant who invests in setting up a transport chain
to import tomatoes from a warmer country. Due to transport costs, such
imported tomatoes are only competitive when tomato prices are high enough.
This is the case when the gas price ω exceeds a given price ωe. Therefore,
the advent of the entrant has an impact on consumer surplus and producer
surplus of existing players in all states-of-the-world for which ω > ωe. The
effect is shown in Figure 7.1: due to the entrant, the producer surplus Π of
existing producers is reduced to Π′ while consumer surplus increases from CS
to CS′. For a very small entrant, the impact dΠ of the entrant on Π is the
exact opposite of the impact dCS of the entrant on CS. Hence, the entrant
does not cause a net change in total surplus of existing players (i.e. the sum of
existing producer and consumer surplus). However, the entrant does cause a
change in the variation in surplus. In this particular example, the variation in
both producer surplus of existing players and consumer surplus is lower when
the entrant is present, as can be observed in Figure 7.1. Hence, the entrant
takes risk out of the market. If the existing producers and consumers are
risk-averse, the entrant therefore has a positive externality on the industry.
The entrant does not get rewarded for this, however. If the investment in the
entrant’s envisaged transport chain is marginally too expensive compared to
the expected profits, the entrant would not invest, while it would be socially
optimal to invest given the positive externality. Entry in the tomato transport
option may be inefficiently low.
Conversely, consider an entrant who invests in a very inefficient old green-
house technology with very high gas consumption but low other operating
costs. Such a greenhouse would only produce if gas prices are low enough.
There would only be an impact on Π and CS for gas prices lower than a given
price level, say ω′e. Above that gas price level, the entrant’s greenhouse would
not be competitive due to high gas costs. Again, the impact of the entrant
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Figure 7.1: Illustration of the effect of an infinitesimal entrant on producer
surplus of existing producers and consumer surplus, as a function of the gas
price ω. The entrant reduces variation in outcomes for existing players.
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Figure 7.2: Illustration of the effect of another infinitesimal entrant on pro-
ducer surplus of existing producers and consumer surplus, as a function of the
gas price ω. The entrant increases variation in outcomes for existing players.
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on Π and CS is symmetric and there is no change in total surplus of existing
players if the entrant is small enough. However, in this case the entrant causes
an increase in variation of producer and consumer surplus of existing players,
as shown in Figure 7.2. Hence, the entrant has a negative externality on the
existing producers and consumers, if they are risk-averse. The entrant does not
‘see’ this external cost when making the investment decision. If the investment
in the entrant’s envisaged greenhouse is marginally lower than the expected
profits, the entrant would invest, while it would be socially optimal not to
invest given the negative externality. Entry in the old greenhouse technology
may be inefficiently high.
The problem is therefore one of incomplete property rights to the risk of
existing producers and consumers. If, as in the traditional Coase (1960) ap-
proach, property rights could be assigned and enforced, the inefficiency would
disappear. In practice this is hard to do. There is however another way to elim-
inate the efficiency, namely by introducing financial markets for risk-sharing.
If there are financial instruments – e.g. a combination of options on the gas
price – that have a pay-off similar to the impact dCS = −dΠ of the entrant,
then producers and consumers can optimally share the risk between them.
Any impact of the entrant could be hedged, and there would be no external-
ity. If markets are complete, then such a combination of financial instruments
exists for all types of entrants. If markets are incomplete, only a limited set of
risk-sharing instruments is available, and the impact of the entrant cannot be
perfectly replicated with the available instruments. With incomplete markets,
part of the impact of the entrant may be hedged, but there is no guarantee
that the inefficiency decreases or disappears.
The results of our discussion are relevant for specific sectors such as elec-
tricity or oil, in which investment costs are significant, financial markets do
not cover all potential contingencies1 and firms can choose between different
technologies or locations with different risk profiles. In such situations, the in-
dustry as a whole becomes too risky. In those cases sector-specific regulation
might be necessary. Sector-specific regulation could take the form of entry-
regulation – if the regulator is capable of adequately measuring the risk – or
incentives for the creation of markets of additional financial instruments.2
The fact that entry decisions might be socially inefficient in an oligopolistic
market structure is well known. The most obvious case is the case of entry de-
terrence by oligopolistic incumbents, a topic that has been studied extensively
1Markets might be incomplete because productive assets have a long lifetime, or because
some sources of risks are non-tradable. For instance, there might not be financial instruments
to hedge regulatory uncertainty.
2One may wonder what prevents industry actors from creating those markets by them-
selves. In many cases, however, it turns out that markets are not sufficiently liquid to
constitute a realistic hedging solution. Even the market for oil futures or forwards becomes
relatively illiquid for delivery dates that are more than a few years out. Industry players
often need to hedge through vertical integration, as in the Centrica example described by
Willems and Morbee (2010).
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in the industrial organization literature, following the seminal work by Bain
(1949), Sylos Labini (1969) and Modigliani (1958). With entry deterrence,
there is too little entry from a welfare standpoint. For example, Spence (1977)
– later extended by Dixit (1980) and Schmalensee (1981) among others – shows
that entry deterrence through prior capacity commitments by the incumbent
may result in larger costs than are necessary for a given output level, and
higher prices. Our paper does not consider the preemptive strategic actions
of incumbents and focuses on the potential entrant’s investment decision. In
such a context, one finds not only cases with too little entry, but also cases
with excessive entry: von Weizsa¨cker (1980) shows that there are plausible
parameter configurations under which welfare would be improved by limiting
entry. Similar to Mankiw and Whinston (1986), we use a two-stage model
with capacity investment decisions by entrant(s) in stage one and actual pro-
duction in stage two. As Mankiw and Whinston (1986) point out, suboptimal
entry is due to the fact that the entrant’s evaluation of the desirability of his
entry is different than the ‘social planner’s’ evaluation – a phenomenon one
could call investment externalities. In the analysis by Mankiw and Whinston
(1986), the externality is due to ‘business-stealing’ from other players: the
entrant will gain some profit by reducing the profit of the existing players.
This leads to a redistribution of industry profits, but not necessarily to an
increase in the total surplus of the industry. Note that the business stealing
effect disappears if the stage-two game is perfectly competitive and the post-
entry market price reflects the marginal cost of firms.3 Our model is quite
different from the industrial organization literature because it has a perfectly
competitive post-entry market. Furthermore, the models by Spence (1977),
Dixit (1980) and Schmalensee (1981) either assume a minimum entry capac-
ity or a fixed set-up cost – independent of entry capacity. In contrast, our
model allows for infinitesimal capacity investment by the entrant. Finally, our
model incorporates uncertainty, a feature which has also been added to the
above-mentioned models, by e.g. Perrakis and Warskett (1983) and Maskin
(1999). Most importantly however, we assume imperfect financial markets.
The investment externality in our model turns out to be a ‘risk externality’:
the real investment changes the risk profile of future shocks.
Investment under uncertainty has been thoroughly studied in the real op-
tion framework (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994): firms should take into account the
option value of an investment opportunity. By delaying the investment the
firm learns more about the likely profitability of the project and might be
able to avoid investments that are likely to be loss-making. Recently, Miao
and Wang (2007) and Hugonnier and Morellec (2007) have extended the real
option framework to the case of incomplete markets, using a utility-based
approach. They study how market incompleteness affects the investment de-
cisions of firms. Miao and Wang (2007) for example, find that – unlike in
3Reaching a sufficient number of entrants in order to satisfy this condition typically
requires the absence of fixed set-up costs that would create barriers to entry.
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standard real options analysis – an increase in project volatility can accelerate
investment if the agent has a sufficiently strong precautionary savings motive.
Although we use a similar utility-based model framework, our point of view
is complementary in that we do not focus on how the entrant should make
investment decisions, but rather study the social welfare implications of those
decisions.
This paper is an extension and generalization of Willems and Morbee
(2010), in which the effect of increasing market completeness on an entrant’s
investment decisions was examined numerically for the case of the electricity
market. In the current paper we develop a general analytical model. In the
next section, we first demonstrate the possibility of suboptimal entry when
risk markets are incomplete. We will start from the traditional determinis-
tic model, where entry is optimal, and subsequently include uncertainty and
risk aversion, which may lead to suboptimal entry. Then, in section 7.3 we
study the effect of increasing market completeness, i.e. increasing availability
of instruments to trade risk between market participants. Section 7.4 summa-
rizes our conclusions and briefly provides policy recommendations and areas
for future research.
7.2 Suboptimal entry with incomplete markets
Building on the industrial organization literature, we first describe a deter-
ministic version of our model, in which entry is always socially optimal, as
there are no risk spillovers. In a second step, we demonstrate the possibility
of suboptimal entry when uncertainty and risk aversion are introduced.
7.2.1 Traditional deterministic model
Following Mankiw and Whinston (1986), we model entry as a two-stage game.
In the first stage, the investment stage, the entrant decides whether to enter
the industry by investing in capacity. In stage two, the production stage, firms
produce and sell a homogeneous product in a perfectly competitive market.
P (Q) denotes the inverse demand function, where Q is aggregate output, and
assume P ′(Q) ≤ 0,∀Q. Before any entry takes place, the industry marginal
cost curve is given by C ′(Q), with C ′′(Q) ≥ 0,∀Q. In the absence of entry, the
competitive market equilibrium is (p∗, Q∗) with p∗ = P (Q∗) = C ′(Q∗). We
consider an entrant who, in the first stage, has the possibility to invest in an
infinitesimal amount of production capacity dq, at an investment cost of k dq.
If the entrant decides to invest, she will have access to a production capacity
dq with marginal production cost c in the second stage.4
4We assume an infinitesimal small entrant as we want to model the behavior of a com-
petitive, price-taking entrant. An infinitesimal investor will affect market outcomes only
marginally, which justifies the price-taking assumption. Note that in contrast with many
entry models we do not assume that investment decisions are lumpy. Spence (1977), Dixit
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Figure 7.3: Effect of entry on stage-two Marshallian aggregate surplus
p*
p
qQ*
c
dq
A
B
C
DE
p*+dp*
Q*+dQ*
P(·)
C'(·)
Figure 7.3 shows how the entry decision in stage one affects the outcome
of the production stage, for the case in which c ≤ p∗. Entry reduces the
equilibrium price to p∗ + dp∗, and increases the equilibrium quantity to Q∗ +
dQ∗. Entry increases stage-two Marshallian aggregate surplus by an amount
corresponding to the shaded area ÂCDE. Since the area ÂBC is only a
second-order effect (it is approximately given by 12dp
∗ · dq), the surface area
of ÂCDE can be approximated by ÂBDE, which corresponds to (p∗ − c)dq.
Taking into account the investment cost k dq incurred by the entrant in stage
one, the net effect of entry on social welfare W is therefore:
dW = (p∗ − c)dq − k dq (7.1)
This amount dW corresponds exactly to the entrant’s profit dpi, hence the en-
trant’s incentives are perfectly aligned with social interest: the entrant invests
if and only if it is socially optimal to do so. This is the well-known textbook
result about the social efficiency of free entry in a perfectly competitive market.
At this point it is useful to take a closer look at equation (7.1). In general,
the change in social welfare caused by entry is given by:
dW = dΠ + dCS + dpi (7.2)
where Π represents aggregate industry profits (producer surplus) of existing
producers, CS represents aggregate consumer surplus and dpi the profit of the
(1980) and Schmalensee (1981) either assume a minimum entry capacity or a fixed set-up
cost – independent of entry capacity. By assuming away lumpiness we eliminate a possible
source of inefficiency in the market, and the results of our model become stronger.
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Figure 7.4: Effect of entry on producer surplus of existing firms and on con-
sumer surplus
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infinitesimal entrant. Since we concluded above that dW = dpi, we must have:
dΠ = −dCS (7.3)
Equation (7.3) is illustrated in figure 7.4. The investment in capacity dq causes
a (negative) price change dp∗ = dp
∗
dq dq. As a result, CS increases by the
area ĤACG, which in first order corresponds to −Q∗dp∗. The effect on Π is
similar, but slightly more complicated to compute. In the absence of entry,
the producer surplus Π of existing firms is given by ĤAF . In the event of
entry, the producer surplus of existing firms changes to ĜIEF + ĴCD =
ĜKF . Hence, dΠ = −ĤAKG, which in first order corresponds to Q∗dp∗ =
−dCS.5 Again, this result stems from ÂCK = ÂBC = 12dp∗ · dq being a
second-order effect, which should be ignored in infinitesimal analysis. The
fact that there is no net effect of entry on Π + CS is due to the perfectly
competitive nature of the production stage. In a non-competitive setting, entry
would have an additional negative externality, due to ‘business-stealing’ from
existing inframarginal capacity. In a perfectly competitive setting, existing
firms produce up to the point where price equals marginal cost, hence the only
existing capacity that is being displaced by business-stealing is the capacity
at the margin, which does not have any net social value.
5Note that dΠ = Q∗dp∗ is in fact nothing but Hotelling’s lemma for the case of a one-
good economy, while dCS = −Q∗dp∗ is Roy’s identity for the case of a quasilinear utility
function (as is implicitly assumed in our partial equilibrium setting).
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The above reasoning is for the case in which c ≤ p∗. The alternative case
c > p∗ is trivial: since neither Π nor CS is affected by the entrant’s investment,
we obviously have dW = dpi and dΠ = −dCS = 0 in this case.
7.2.2 Model including uncertainty and risk aversion
We will extend the deterministic model from section 7.2.1 to include the effects
of uncertainty and risk aversion. Uncertainty is included by making the second
stage stochastic: stage two takes place in a random state-of-the-world denoted
ω, chosen stochastically among a range of possible states Ω. As a result, the
variables Π, CS and dpi, as well as all equilibrium prices and quantities, become
random variables, which will be denoted using boldface.6 The randomness may
be caused by uncertainty in demand (as in Willems and Morbee, 2010), but
may also be due to other factors, such as e.g. uncertainty in the prices of
input factors, possible unforeseen outages of some of the production capacity,
or regulatory uncertainty. Our reasoning is not limited to any of these sources
of uncertainty.
The random nature of stage two requires additional assumptions about the
social welfare function. As before we use a utilitarian social welfare function,
i.e. the sum of the individual utilities of existing firms, consumers and entrant.
As for the individual utility functions, we incorporate risk aversion, i.e. a
preference for more certain outcomes over more uncertain outcomes for a given
expected value of the outcome. For the sake of analytical convenience, we
assume that the aggregate utility Up of the existing producers is given by the
well-known mean-variance utility function:
Up = E[Π]− Ap
2
Var[Π] (7.4)
and, likewise, that the aggregate utility Uc of consumers is given by:
Uc = E[CS]− Ac
2
Var[CS] (7.5)
with the risk aversion parameters for producers and consumers Ap, Ac ≥ 0.
The expected-value and variance operators E[·] and Var[·] in equations (7.4)
and (7.5) are computed on the sample space Ω. Social welfare is assumed to
be given by:
W = Up + Uc + Ue (7.6)
in which Ue represents the utility of the entrant, for which we do not make
functional-form assumptions.
Proposition 7.1. When social welfare is given by equations (7.4), (7.5) and
(7.6), the effect of an infinitesimal entrant with capacity dq, on social welfare,
is given by:
dW = dUe + Cov[ApΠ−AcCS,x]dq (7.7)
6Later we will interpret random variables as vectors in #Ω-dimensional space.
168 CHAPTER 7. RISK SPILLOVERS AND HEDGING
where:
x = −Q∗ dp
∗
dq
(7.8)
Proof. If the entrant decides to invest in capacity dq in stage one, this will
have an effect on Π and CS in stage two. The effect may be different in each
state-of-the-world ω. However, equation (7.3) will hold for each ω. Therefore,
we can write the effect of entry on Π and CS as:
dΠ = −dCS = −xdq (7.9)
with x as in equation (7.8). The effect on Up is obtained by differentiation of
equation (7.4):
dUp = d(E[Π]− Ap
2
Var[Π])
= E[dΠ]− Ap
2
(Var[Π + dΠ]−Var[Π])
= E[−xdq]− Ap
2
(Var[Π− xdq]−Var[Π])
= −E[x]dq +ApCov[Π,x]dq (7.10)
where we have used the fact that Var[xdq] = Var[x](dq)2 can be ignored as a
second-order term. Using an analogous reasoning, we obtain
dUc = E[x]dq −AcCov[CS,x]dq (7.11)
Putting equations (7.6), (7.10) and (7.11) together, we find equation (7.7).
The first term dUe in equation (7.7) is the effect of entry on the utility of
the entrant himself. The second term in equation (7.7) is an externality : unlike
dUe, this effect of entry on social welfare is not fully internalized by the entrant,
and hence is not included in his investment decision. Of particular interest are
the cases in which the entrant would like to enter, dUe > 0 but it would not
be socially optimal, dW < 0, or vice versa. Such cases exist when dUe and
Cov[ApΠ−AcCS,x] have different signs and Ap and/or Ac are large enough.
In such circumstances, a decision to enter (or refrain from entering) may be
privately optimal, but socially detrimental. The externality is due to the fact
that the investment in new capacity leads to a shift in market outcomes, which
affects risk-sharing between existing producers and consumers. Hence, despite
the perfectly competitive nature of stage two, the combination of uncertainty
and risk-averse agents may lead to suboptimal entry. We will illustrate the
potential inefficiency of free entry in the following example.
Example 7.2. Let us consider a sector with linear inverse demand P (Q) = α−
βQ with α, β > 0. The industry marginal cost curve is given by C ′(Q) = c¯Q,
with c¯ a constant. For analytical convenience we assume c¯ = β. In the absence
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Figure 7.5: Graphical illustration of Example 7.2
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of any intervention, the competitive equilibrium will be (p∗1, Q
∗
1) = (
α
2 ,
α
2β ),
shown as point A in Figure 7.5. We introduce uncertainty into this market
by assuming that with probability ψ, government will intervene and forbid
the lowest-value applications of the product.7 The result of this intervention
would be that demand becomes flat as soon as it reaches a certain level D.
The part of the inverse demand curve to the right of Q = D is clipped and
becomes a vertical line at Q = D. Hence, with probability ψ the equilibrium is
(p∗2, Q
∗
2) = (α− βD,D), which is shown as point B in Figure 7.5. Conversely,
with probability 1−ψ there is no government intervention and the equilibrium
is at point A. No other source of uncertainty is assumed. Furthermore, we
assume that Q∗2 < Q
∗
1, i.e. D <
α
2β . Social welfare is assumed to be given by
equations (7.4), (7.5) and (7.6), with Ap = 0 and Ac > 0. Hence, producers
are risk-neutral while consumers are risk-averse.
Let us now consider an entrant who has access to two technologies: a
‘peak’ technology with marginal cost cP such that p
∗
2 < cP < p
∗
1, and a
‘base’ technology with marginal cost cB such that 0 < cB < p
∗
2. The unit
investment cost of the two technologies is kP and kB , respectively. Hence, the
‘peak’ technology will be activated only if there is no government intervention
(probability 1 − ψ), while the ‘base’ technology will be activated both in the
case of government intervention and in the case of no government intervention.
Obviously, a necessary condition for the ‘peak’ technology to be attractive,
is that kP < kB . More than that, we will assume that both technologies
7Environmental concerns would be a typical reason for this kind of interventions. One
could think, for example, of a ban on using tap water for filling up swimming pools, or – as
it exists in some European countries – a fine for installing electrical heating in new houses.
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yield equal, zero NPV for the investor. Assuming the entrant is risk-neutral
like the other producers (in fact, the entrant could be one of the existing
producers), we would then have dUe = 0, which would make the entrant
indifferent between investing and not investing in either technology. To make
matters more interesting, we shall assume that kB is infinitesimally smaller
and kP is infinitesimally larger, so that the entrant would have a marginal
preference for investing in the ‘base’ technology and not investing in the ‘peak’
technology.
Since dUe = 0, the social welfare impact of the investment is only the
‘investment externality’: dW = dUp + dUc. Using Proposition 7.1, or by
directly computing Up and Uc, one can demonstrate that the social welfare
impact of an infinitesimal investment dqB in the ‘base’ technology, for the case
ψ = 12 , is given by:
dW
dqB
= −3Aβ
2
8
(
α
2β
−D
)(
D − α
6β
)(
D − α
4β
)
(7.12)
while the welfare impact of an infinitesimal investment dqP in the ‘peak’ tech-
nology, for the case ψ = 12 , is given by:
dW
dqP
=
3Aβ2
8
(
α
2β
−D
)(
D − α
6β
)
α
4β
(7.13)
Assuming that D > α4β , we find that dW/dqB < 0 while dW/dqP > 0. Hence,
from a social welfare point of view, the entrant would overinvest in the ‘base’
technology, and underinvest in the ‘peak’ technology. The underlying cause is
that the ‘peak’ technology takes costly risk out of the market, but the entrant
is not rewarded for this. In this example, we have assumed that the uncertainty
is due to unhedgeable political factors. In the next section, we will examine
the case in which risk-sharing instruments are available.
7.3 Effects of increasing market completeness
As mentioned before, the demonstration of suboptimal entry in section 7.2.2
is related to imperfect risk-sharing between market participants. Indeed, the
setting described above does not offer any instruments that would allow market
participants to trade risk between them: markets are incomplete. In this
section we will examine the case of increasingly complete markets.
7.3.1 Increasing market completeness without entry
Let us consider a case with n tradable financial instruments, such as forwards
and options. Such instruments are fully represented by prices Fi, i = 1, . . . , n
and their pay-offs Ti, i = 1, . . . , n, the latter being random variables because
they depend on the state-of-the-world ω ∈ Ω in stage two. Buying (selling)
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an instrument i means paying (receiving) a fixed price Fi in stage one, and
receiving (paying) an uncertain pay-off Ti in stage two. Without loss of gener-
ality, we can assume that E[Ti] = 0,∀i. To study the impact of the availability
of these financial instruments on the behavior of producers and consumers, it
is convenient to consider random variables as ‘vectors’. Indeed, the space of
zero-mean random variables (i.e. all functions X : Ω→ R with E[X] = 0) can
be augmented with an inner product 〈X,Y〉 = E[XY] = Cov[X,Y], to form
a Hilbert space. The instrument pay-offs Ti, i = 1, . . . , n span a subspace of
this Hilbert space. Through orthogonal projection of the two zero-mean ran-
dom variables Π−E[Π] and CS−E[CS] onto this subspace, we can uniquely
rewrite Π and CS as:8
Π = E[Π] + ~λTp T˜ + εp (7.14)
CS = E[CS] + ~λTc T˜ + εc (7.15)
with E[εp] = E[εc] = 0 and Cov[Ti, εp] = Cov[Ti, εc] = 0,∀i. The arrow ~·
denotes an n-dimensional column matrix, and ·T denotes matrix transposition.
Furthermore, we write ~T = [T1 . . . Tn]
T and ~F = [F1 . . . Fn]
T . Finally, note
that εp and εp are stochastic, while ~λp and ~λc are deterministic.
The trade of financial instruments modifies producers’ profits and consumer
surplus. The resulting quantities are:
Π˜ = Π + ~kTp (
~T− ~F ) (7.16)
C˜S = CS + ~kTc (
~T− ~F ) (7.17)
with the column matrices ~kp and ~kc denoting the amount of each of the
n instruments bought by producers and consumers, respectively. Negative
amounts represent ‘selling’. The resulting utility levels U˜p and U˜c are related
to Π˜ and C˜S in the same way as in equations (7.4) and (7.5).
Lemma 7.3. In the absence of other players on the financial markets, the
equilibrium quantities and prices of financial instruments bought and sold by
producers and consumers are given by:
~kp = −~kc = Ac
~λc −Ap~λp
Ac +Ap
(7.18)
and
~F = − AcAp
Ac +Ap
Σ(~λc + ~λp) (7.19)
with Σ the n× n-dimensional covariance matrix of ~T.
8Uniqueness requires that the Ti, i = 1, . . . , n not be linearly dependent. We assume
here that this condition is fulfilled.
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Proof. From equations (7.4), (7.14) and (7.16), we find that:
U˜p = E[Π]− ~kTp ~F −
Ap
2
((~λp + ~kp)
TΣ(~λp + ~kp) + Var[εp]) (7.20)
using the fact that Cov[Ti, εp] = 0,∀i. The gradient in ~kp, assuming price-
taking behavior on the financial market, is easily derived as:
~∇kpU˜p = −~F −ApΣ(~λp + ~kp) (7.21)
from which the first-order equilibrium condition for ~kp can be determined:
~kp = −
(
1
Ap
Σ−1 ~F + ~λp
)
(7.22)
A completely analogous condition can be derived for ~kc. In the absence of other
players on the financial markets, we must have ~kp+~kc = ~0, from which we can
derive equation (7.19). Substituting (7.19) into (7.22), we obtain (7.18).
Equation (7.18) represents the optimal risk-sharing between producers and
consumers, for the given set of available financial instruments.
Example 7.4. Assume the market is complete (εp = εc = 0) and Ap = Ac = A.
Then ~kp =
~λp−~λc
2 , hence Π˜ = E[Π] − ~kTp ~F +
(
~λp+~λc
2
)
~T, so that Π˜ becomes
identical to Π+CS2 , except for a non-stochastic component. The same holds for
CS, hence risk is perfectly distributed between producers and consumers: the
only remaining risk is the sector risk Π+CS, which is shared equally between
producers and consumers. The transition from an incomplete market (as in
Section 7.2.2) to a complete market as in this example, increases social welfare
from E[Π + CS]− A2 (Var[Π] + Var[CS]) to E[Π + CS]− A4 (Var[Π + CS]) .9
7.3.2 Production entry in an increasingly complete mar-
ket
Let us now study the effect of an infinitesimal entrant in the case of an increas-
ingly complete financial market. Analogous to equations (7.14) and (7.15), we
can write x (defined as in Section 7.2.2) as:
x = E[x] + ~λTx
~T + εx (7.23)
Lemma 7.5. In first order, an entrant who only invests in physical capacity
and does not enter the financial markets, does not change the prices of tradable
9Note that market completion does not increase social welfare when the stochastic vari-
ations in Π and CS are identical. In that case, social welfare remains the same before and
after the introduction of a complete market, because there are no gains to be made from
trading risk.
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financial instruments (d~F = 0), while the quantities of financial instruments
traded change by an amount corresponding to the hedgeable part of the impact
of the entrant (d~kp = −d~kc = ~λxdq).
Proof. From equations (7.9), (7.14), (7.15), (7.23) and the uniqueness of or-
thogonal projection, one can infer that the effect on ~λp and ~λc, of an infinites-
imal entrant with capacity dq, is d~λp = −d~λc = −~λxdq. Lemma 7.5 then
follows directly from Lemma 7.3.
Proposition 7.6. Assume the same conditions as in Proposition 7.1. When
tradable financial instruments ~T are available, the effect of an infinitesimal
entrant with capacity dq, on social welfare, is given by:
dW˜ = dUe + Cov[Apεp −Acεc, εx]dq (7.24)
with εp, εc and εx defined as in equations (7.14), (7.15) and (7.23).
Proof. Using reasoning analogous to the proof of Proposition 7.1, we find
dU˜p = d
(
E[Π]− ~kTp ~F −
Ap
2
((~λp + ~kp)
TΣ(~λp + ~kp) + Var[εp])
)
= E[dΠ]− ~λTx ~Fdq −Ap(~λp + ~kp)TΣd(~λp + ~kp)
−Ap
2
(Var[εp − εxdq]−Var[εp])
= −E[x]dq − ~λTx ~Fdq −Ap(~λp + ~kp)TΣ(−~λxdq + ~λxdq)
−Ap
2
(−2Cov[εp, εxdq])
= −E[x]dq − ~λTx ~Fdq +ApCov[εp, εx]dq
and analogous for dU˜c. Putting both expressions together, we find equation
(7.24).
As before, the second term in equation (7.24) is an externality that may
lead to over- or underinvestment. Proposition 7.6 clearly demonstrates the
impact of increasing market completeness. As markets become more complete,
the subspace spanned by the instruments ~T approaches the complete space of
random variables. As a result, Var[εp] = ‖εp‖2 → 0, and likewise for εc, so
that, in a complete market, the externality disappears and the entry decision
is socially optimal.
Example 7.7. Let us consider a sector in which consumers have fixed inelastic
demand D, with reservation price α. We assume that the industry marginal
cost curve takes one of the following three forms: C ′1(Q) =
1
2βQ, C
′
2(Q) = βQ,
or C ′3(Q) = 2βQ. In words: costs can take a reference value, or double the
reference value, or half the reference value. As an example, the uncertainty in
industry costs may be due to uncertainty in prices of input products, such as
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Figure 7.6: Graphical illustration of Example 7.7
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oil. To focus our thoughts, let us assume indeed that the industry is strongly
dependent on oil and that all the above-described uncertainty in production
costs is due to uncertainty about the oil price. The choice between the three
cost curves is stochastic. We assume that the three states-of-the-world are
equally likely. The sector assumptions are illustrated in Figure 7.6. Note that
we assume α > 2βD. The competitive equilibrium price in the absence of entry
is p∗1 =
1
2βD (point A), p
∗
2 = βD (point B), or p
∗
3 = 2βD (point C), each with
probability 13 . The top part of Table 7.1 summarizes the pay-offs Π and CS
in each of the states-of-the-world. Social welfare is assumed to be given by
equations (7.4), (7.5) and (7.6), with Ap = Ac ≡ A. Hence, consumers and
producers are equally risk-averse.
Let us now consider an entrant who has access to three technologies: a
‘peak’ technology with marginal cost cP such that p
∗
2 < cP < p
∗
3, a ‘base’
technology with marginal cost cB such that 0 < cB < p
∗
1, and a ‘medium’
technology with marginal cost cM such that p
∗
1 < cM < p
∗
2. We assume that
the costs cP , cB and cB do not exhibit any uncertainty. In the story of our
example: they are independent of the oil price. The unit investment cost of
the three technologies is kP , kB and kM , respectively. The ‘peak’ technology
will be activated only in state ω3, the ‘medium’ technology will be activated
only in states ω2 and ω3, while the ‘base’ technology will be activated in all
three states. As in Example 7.2, we assume that all three technologies yield
equal, zero NPV for the investor. Again assuming the entrant is risk-neutral,
we would then have dUe = 0 for all technologies, which would make the entrant
indifferent between investing and not investing in any of the technologies. We
will assume that in this case the entrant does not invest. The bottom part of
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Table 7.1: Example 7.7: Profits of existing producers and consumer surplus in
the three states-of-the-world (top part of the table), and impact of the entrant
(bottom part of the table)
State-of-the-world ω = ω1 ω2 ω3
C ′(Q) = 12βQ βQ 2βQ
Π = 14βD
2 1
2βD
2 βD2
CS = (α− 12βD)D (α− βD)D (α− 2βD)D
dCS
dqB
= − dΠdqB = xB = 12βD βD 2βD
dCS
dqM
= − dΠdqM = xM = 0 βD 2βD
dCS
dqP
= − dΠdqP = xP = 0 0 2βD
Table 7.2: Example 7.7: Pay-offs of the tradable financial instruments
State-of-the-world ω = ω1 ω2 ω3
T1 = −1 0 1
T2 = −1 −1 2
T3 = 4 −5 1
Table 7.1 shows the impact (on profits of existing producers and on consumer
surplus) of an entrant investing in an infinitesimal amount of ‘base’ capacity
(dqB), ‘medium’ capacity (dqM ), or ‘peak’ capacity (dqP ), respectively. Since
dUe = 0, the social welfare impact of the investment is only the ‘investment
externality’: dW˜ = dU˜p + dU˜c. Looking at Table 7.1 and considering Proposi-
tion 7.1, it is easy to see that dW˜ > 0 for all three technologies, because they
reduce the variability of profits of existing producers and consumer surplus.
However, since the entrant does not invest, we have a case of underinvestment
(insufficient entry) compared to the social optimum.
Now let us introduce tradable financial instruments. Since there are three
states-of-the-world, the Hilbert space of zero-mean random variables is two-
dimensional. Hence, two linearly independent instruments T1 and T2 are
sufficient to make the market complete. Let us define the pay-offs of T1 and
T2 as in Table 7.2. T1 could be considered as a ‘future’ contract on the oil
price, while T2 could be considered as a ‘call option’ contract. The table also
mentions T3, which will be considered later on. The availability of tradable
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Table 7.3: Example 7.7: Social welfare impact of the entrant (for each of the
three technologies) as a function of the available tradable instruments
No instruments Only T1 Only T2 Both T1 and T2
dW˜
dqB
= 712
1
48
1
16 0
dW˜
dqM
= 34 0
1
8 0
dW˜
dqP
= 56
1
12 0 0
Note: all values in this table need to be multiplied by Aβ2D3.
financial instruments alters the risk-sharing between existing producers and
consumers. As a result, the risk-reducing external benefits of an investment
by the entrant may be less important. Using Proposition 7.6, we can compute
the impact of an infinitesimal investment on social welfare, when an increasing
number of tradable instruments are available. Table 7.3 provides an overview
of the results, for each of the three technologies. The presence of either T1
or T2 reduces the positive externalities of entry. When both instruments are
present, the market is complete, hence risk-sharing between producers and
consumers is perfect and entry (or, in this example, lack thereof) is socially
optimal. Finally, it is interesting to note that the externalities for some types
of entry may become 0 even when the market is not yet fully complete. This
is the case when an instrument is available with exactly the same risk profile
as the impact of the entrant. For example, the presence of only T1 already
makes the externality of the ‘medium’ technology disappear. The same holds
for T2 and the ‘peak’ technology.
The observation in Table 7.3 that the investment externality goes down for
each tradable instrument added, is however not general:
Corollary 7.8. Adding a tradable instrument does not necessarily decrease
the investment externality computed in Propositions 7.1 or 7.6.
To see this, let us consider a market in which the instruments Ti, i =
1, . . . , n are available. The investment externality per unit of investment dq
according to Proposition 7.6 is given by:
Cov[Apεp −Acεc, εx] = 〈εpc, εx〉 (7.25)
with εpc = Apεp−Acεc. Consider the addition of a new instrument Tn+1. Let
T′n+1 denote the component of Tn+1 that is orthogonal to Ti, i = 1, . . . , n. We
can now write εpc = ε
′
pc+apcT
′
n+1 and εx = ε
′
x+axT
′
n+1 , with
〈
ε′pc,T
′
n+1
〉
=〈
ε′x,T
′
n+1
〉
= 0. The new value of the investment externality is now given by
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〈
ε′pc, ε
′
x
〉
. We find:
〈εpc, εx〉 =
〈
ε′pc + apcT
′
n+1, ε
′
x + axT
′
n+1
〉
(7.26)
=
〈
ε′pc, ε
′
x
〉
+ ax
〈
ε′pc,T
′
n+1
〉
+ apc
〈
T′n+1, ε
′
x
〉
+ (7.27)
+apcax
〈
T′n+1,T
′
n+1
〉
(7.28)
hence: 〈
ε′pc, ε
′
x
〉
= 〈εpc, εx〉 − apcax
∥∥T′n+1∥∥2 (7.29)
Clearly, when apcax < 0 (i.e. when sgn
〈
εpc,T
′
n+1
〉 6= sgn 〈εx,T′n+1〉), the
investment externality increases. If in addition, 〈εpc, εx〉 > 0, then the invest-
ment externality increases also in absolute terms. By analogy, the same holds
when no instruments are available yet and the instrument added is the first
(i.e. n = 0). As mentioned before, however, when sufficiently many instru-
ments are added so that the market becomes complete, the externality always
tends to 0.
Example 7.9. (Continuation of Example 7.7) Consider the same set-up as in
Example 7.7. Suppose that we do not introduce T1 and T2, but instead we
introduce T3 (and only T3 ), an instrument with pay-offs shown in Table
7.2. In the story of the example, T3 can be considered as an asymmetric
long straddle option on the oil price. The investment externality after in-
troduction of T3 is shown in Table 7.4. The introduction of T3 increases
the investment externality of entry in ‘peak’ technology. Hence, if only the
‘peak’ technology is available, the introduction of T3 increases the inefficiency
in entry. To illustrate this point, suppose that instead of dUe = 0, we have
dUe = − 7184Aβ2D3dqP . Clearly, the entrant would not invest. When no trad-
able instruments are available, this would also be the socially optimal behavior,
since dW = (− 7184 + 56 )Aβ2D3dqP < 0. Now suppose that the instrument T3 is
available. The entrant obviously still would not invest. But in this case, this
would not be socially optimal, since dW˜ = (− 7184 + 67 )Aβ2D3dqP > 0.
7.3.3 Entry in financial markets
Until now, we have assumed that the entrant invests only in physical capacity
and does not trade on the financial markets. Let us now consider an en-
trant on the financial markets. As before, the available financial instruments
are Ti, i = 1, . . . , n. The pre-entry equilibrium on the financial markets is
described by Lemma 7.3. Entry here means that the entrant invests in an in-
finitesimal amount of financial instruments d~ke in stage one, thereby causing
a change d~F in the prices ~F of financial instruments, and a change d~kp and
d~kc, respectively, in the quantities ~kp and ~kc of financial instruments bought
by existing producers and consumers, respectively. In the absence of other
players on the financial markets, we must have d~ke + d~kp + d~kc = 0.
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Table 7.4: Example 7.7 – continued: Social welfare impact of the entrant
(for each of the three technologies) as a function of the available tradable
instruments
No instruments Only T3
dW˜
dqB
= 712 = 0.583
4
7 = 0.571
dW˜
dqM
= 34 = 0.750
5
7 = 0.714
dW˜
dqP
= 56 = 0.833
6
7 = 0.857
Note: all values in this table need to be multiplied by Aβ2D3.
Lemma 7.10. In response to a change d~F in the price of financial instruments
– caused by infinitesimal entry on the financial markets – the existing producers
and consumers change their quantities of financial instruments bought, by:
d~kj = − 1
Aj
Σ−1d~F j = p, c (7.30)
Proof. The proof follows directly from differentiation of equation (7.22).
Proposition 7.11. Entry on the financial markets without production entry,
does not have an externality on the existing producers and consumers:
d(U˜p + U˜c) = 0 (7.31)
Proof. Differentiation of equation (7.20) yields:
dU˜p = −d~kpT ~F − ~kTp d~F −Ap(~λp + ~kp)TΣd~kp (7.32)
Using Lemma 7.10, we obtain:
dU˜p =
(
1
Ap
Σ−1d~F
)T
~F − ~kTp d~F
−Ap(~λp + ~kp)TΣ
(
− 1
Ap
)
Σ−1d~F (7.33)
=
1
Ap
d~FTΣ−1 ~F + ~λTp d~F (7.34)
and a completely analogous expression for dU˜c. Putting both together, we
find:
d(U˜p + U˜c) =
(
1
Ap
+
1
Ac
)
d~FTΣ−1 ~F + d~FT (~λp + ~λc) (7.35)
Substituting ~F from Lemma 7.3 into the last factor of the first term, we find
that the first term and the second term cancel out, hence equation (7.31).
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Proposition 7.11 is equivalent to saying dW˜ = dU˜e. The entrant on the
financial markets therefore ‘sees’ the full societal impact of its entry. Entry
decisions in the financial market are therefore always optimal from a societal
perspective.
7.4 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a model of investment in a perfectly compet-
itive industry. We have shown that a combination of risk aversion of existing
players and incomplete financial markets, leads to a situation in which entrants’
investment decisions in productive assets may be inefficient. In particular, we
have demonstrated that there are situations in which new entrants overinvest
in one technology and underinvest in another technology, compared to the
socially optimal investment decisions. The underlying cause is that presence
of the new productive assets changes the distribution of overall industry risk,
which, if financial markets are incomplete, creates a risk externality for the
firms already active in the market. The availability of an additional tradable
financial instrument (without making the market complete) does not necessar-
ily reduce the externality. When financial markets become complete however,
the externality disappears. If the entrant invests in the financial market in-
stead of in productive assets, there are no externalities, hence entry decisions
in the financial market are always optimal from a societal perspective.
The result of the above is that the industry as a whole takes too much
risk by investing too much in production activities with highly correlated risk
profiles. Firms that could reduce the overall industry risk, do no enter often
enough, while firms that increase overall industry risk, enter too often. Govern-
ments could attempt to reduce these inefficiencies by stimulating the creation
of financial markets. More than that, in the absence of financial markets, the
results could provide a ground for sector-specific regulation of investment de-
cisions. Indeed, one could imagine a regulatory setting in which all project
proposals need to be screened in advance by the regulator in order to assess
the impact of the proposed investment on systemic risk. Approval would be
given when project benefits weigh up against a possible negative risk spillover.
A major obstacle to this approach, however, is that it may be very difficult
for the regulator to adequately measure the risk. Finally, from the perspective
of competition policy, the analysis of this paper shows that, in the absence of
complete financial markets, an efficiency defense based on optimal risk-sharing
may be a valid argument in vertical mergers.
Our model takes the number and types of tradable financial instruments
as an exogenous input. Future work could endogenize the degree of market
completeness, in order to study e.g. whether incumbent firms might have
strategies to create market incompleteness as an entry barrier. Furthermore,
the model assumes mean-variance utility, which allows for simple closed-form
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expressions of welfare impacts of entrants. Using numerical methods, one
could study the effect of assuming a different structure for the utility func-
tions. Finally, our model makes no assumptions about the risk behavior of the
entrant. By making such assumptions, one could make an integrated study of
the effect of market completeness on both the risk externality and the entrant’s
decision-making under (hedgeable) uncertainty.
Possibilities for Further
Research
Chapter 2. The results of this paper are obtained using a partial equilibrium
model of the market for long-term gas import contracts, with differen-
tiated competition between one potentially unreliable ‘dominant firm’
(Russia) and a reliable ‘competitive fringe’ of other non-European im-
port suppliers. Future research could examine the impact of the other
suppliers becoming unreliable as well. Another possible extension is to
turn our model into a repeated game. In such a game, δ could become
endogenous as part of a mixed Russian strategy. Finally, the topic of
this paper could be placed in a broader comparison of policy measures
(import taxes, rationing, interruptible consumer contracts, etc.) that
can be used to address gas import challenges.
Chapter 3. The model of this paper can be further improved by modelling
the behavior of citizens in a more detailed way, thereby endogenizing
the election probability or non-revolution probability. Furthermore, an
extension to more than two periods or to continuous time would enable
a more refined modelling of the complex trade-off between current and
future earnings. Finally, the use of longer time series of resource taxation
data would allow for more conclusive panel data estimates.
Chapter 4. Our stylized representation of the electricity market of a country
with nuclear power could be further refined. In particular, it would be
useful to enhance the integration of international imports in our model,
as these may be quite important in the event of large underinvestment.
Furthermore, since our analysis shows that multi-party negotiation of
lifetime extension agreements and auctioning of new nuclear licenses
seem to be the most attractive policies, further research on the details
of such auctioning processes would be beneficial.
Chapter 5. The analysis is strongly dependent on the assumptions underly-
ing the Shapley value. The allocation shown in this paper is therefore
not necessarily the only possible allocation. Furthermore, supranational
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regulation and enforcement may be required in order to avoid renegoti-
ation once the network is in place. An important area for future work
is a more thorough understanding of the ‘outside option’ through bet-
ter integration with the economic equilibrium models that generate the
scenarios of CO2 capture rates.
Chapter 6. The results of this paper are obtained in a numerical simulation
for the electricity sector. The phenomenon can be generalized beyond
the electricity sector and studied in an analytical model. This extension
is pursued in Chapter 7.
Chapter 7. Our model takes the number and types of tradable financial in-
struments as an exogenous input. Future work could endogenize the
degree of market completeness, in order to study e.g. whether incum-
bent firms might have strategies to create market incompleteness as an
entry barrier. Furthermore, the model assumes mean-variance utility,
which allows for simple closed-form expressions of welfare impacts of
entrants. Using numerical methods, one could study the effect of as-
suming a different structure for the utility functions. Finally, our model
makes no assumptions about the risk behavior of the entrant. By mak-
ing such assumptions, one could make an integrated study of the effect
of market completeness on both the risk externality and the entrant’s
decision-making under (hedgeable) uncertainty.
Bibliography
Acemoglu, D., 2005. Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on
Persson and Tabellini’s the Economic Effects of Constitutions. Journal of Economic
Literature 43(4): 1025-1048.
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J. Robinson, 2001. The colonial origins of comparative
development: An empirical investigation. American Economic Review 91(5): 1360-
1401.
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J., 2006. Economic origins of dictatorship and democ-
racy. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Aguilera, R., Eggert, R., Lagos, G. and Tilton, J., 2009. Depletion and the Future
Availability of Petroleum Resources. The Energy Journal 30(1):141-174.
Aid R., Porchet, A., and N. Touzi, 2006. Vertical Integration and Risk Management in
Competitive Markets of Non-Storable Goods. Centre de Mathmatiques Appliques
– Ecole Polytechnique (29 September 2006).
Albrecht, J, Francois D, Schoors K, 2002. A Shapley decomposition of carbon emis-
sions without residuals. Energ Policy 30(9): 727-736
Allaz, B. and J.L. Vila, 1993. “Cournot competition, forward markets and efficiency”.
Journal of Economic Theory 59: 1-16.
Allen, F. and D. Gale, 1994. Financial Innovation and Risk Sharing. Cambridge:
MIT press.
Angevine, G., Brown, M. and Cervantes, M., 2009. Fraser Institute Global Petroleum
Survey 2010. The Fraser Institute, Vancouver, BC.
Angevine, G. and Cameron, B., 2007. Fraser Institute Global Petroleum Survey 2007.
The Fraser Institute, Vancouver, BC.
Angevine, G. and Cervantes, M., 2010. Fraser Institute Global Petroleum Survey
2010. The Fraser Institute, Vancouver, BC.
Angevine, G. and Cervantes, M., 2011. Fraser Institute Global Petroleum Survey
2011. The Fraser Institute, Vancouver, BC.
183
184 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Angevine, G. and Thomson, G., 2008. Fraser Institute Global Petroleum Survey 2008.
The Fraser Institute, Vancouver, BC.
Auty, R. M., 1993. Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource
Curse Thesis, London/New York:
Auty, R. M., 2001. Resource Abundance and Economic Development. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Auty, R. M. and A. H. Gelb, 2001. Political Economy of Resource-Abundant States.
In: Auty (2001). Routledge.
BAFA, 2006. http://www.bafa.de/1/de/aufgaben/energie/. Retrieved 21.08.06.
BAFA, 2009. Monatliche Erdgasbilanz und Entwicklung der
Grenzu¨bergangspreise, ausgewa¨hlte Statistiken zur Entwicklung des
deutschen Gasmarktes, Bundesministerium fu¨r Wirtschaft und
Technologie – Bundesamt fu¨r Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle,
http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Navigation/Energie/Energiestatistiken/
gasstatistiken.html, last consulted in June 2009.
BAFA, 2011. Monatliche Erdgasbilanz und Entwicklung der Grenzu¨bergangspreise,
ausgewa¨hlte Statistiken zur Entwicklung des deutschen Gasmarktes. Bun-
desministerium fu¨r Wirtschaft und Technologie Bundesamt fu¨r Wirtschaft
und Ausfuhrkontrolle, http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Navigation/ En-
ergie/Energiestatistiken/gasstatistiken.html, last consulted in February 2011
Bain, J., 1949. A Note on Pricingin Monopoly and Oligopoly. American Economic
Review 39(2):448-464.
Baldursson, F. and N.-H. von der Fehr, 2007. Vertical Integration and Long-Term
Contracts in Risky Markets. Conference on “The Economics of Energy Markets”,
Toulouse (January 15-16, 2007).
Besley, T., 2006. Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bessembinder, H. and M.L. Lemmon, 2002. Equilibrium Pricing and Optimal Hedg-
ing in Electricity Forward Markets. The Journal of Finance 57(3): 1347-1382.
Boots, M., F. Rijkers and B. Hobbs, 2004. Trading in the Downstream European Gas
Market: A Successive Oligopoly Approach. The Energy Journal 25(3): 73-102.
Borenstein S., 2007. Customer risk from real-time retail electricity pricing: Bill
volatility and hedgability. The Energy Journal 28(2): 111-129.
Borenstein S., Bushnell J., Knittel C.R., 1999. Market power in electricity markets:
beyond concentration measures. The Energy Journal 20(4): 65-88.
Boucher, J., T. Hefting and Y. Smeers, 1987. Economic Analysis of Natural Gas
Contracts, in Golombek et al. (1987).
BIBLIOGRAPHY 185
Boyle, P. and T. Wang, 2001. Pricing of new securities in an incomplete market: The
catch 22 of no-arbitrage pricing. Mathematical Finance 11: 267-284.
BP, 2006/2007/2008. Statistical Review of World Energy June 2006/2007/2008, Lon-
don, BP p.l.c.
BP, 2011. Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011, London, BP p.l.c.
Broek, M vd, Ramirez A, Groenenberg H, Neele F, Viebahn P, Turkenburg W, Faaij
A, 2010a. Feasibility of storing CO2 in the Utsira formation as part of a long term
Dutch CCS strategy: An evaluation based on a GIS/MARKAL toolbox. Int J
Greenh Gas Con 4: 351-366
Broek, M vd, Brederode E, Ramirez A, Kramers L, van der Kuip M, Wildenborg T,
Turkenburg W, Faaij A, 2010b. Designing a cost-effective CO2 storage infrastruc-
ture using a GIS based linear optimization energy model. Environ Modell Softw
25(12): 1754-1768
Browning E., 1976. The Marginal Cost of Public Funds. The Journal of Political
Economy 84(2): 283-298.
Burness, S., 1976. On the Taxation of Nonreplenishable Resources. Journal of Envi-
ronmental Economics and Management 3:289-311.
Bushnell J., Mansur E.T., Saravia C., 2005. Market Structure and Competition: a
cross-market analysis of U.S. electricity deregulation. CSEM WP 126, University
of California Energy Institute.
Campbell, H. F. and Lindner, R. K., 1985. A Model of Mineral Exploration and
Resource Taxation. The Economic Journal 95(377): 146-160.
Capros P, Mantzos L, Tasios N, De Vita A, Kouvaritakis N (2010) EU energy trends
to 2030 - Update 2009. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg
Cardell J. B., Hitt C.C., Hogan W. W., 1997. Market power and strategic interaction
in electricity networks. Resource and Energy Economics 19: 109-137.
Carlton, D., and J. Perloff, 2000. Modern Industrial Organization, Third Edition,
Reading, Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley.
Carr, P., H. Geman, and D.B. Madan, 2001. Pricing and hedging in incomplete
markets. Journal of Financial Economics 62: 131-167.
Cass, D. and A. Citanna, 1998. Pareto improving financial innovation in incomplete
markets. Economic Theory 11: 467-494.
Centrica, 1997-2001. Press releases: “Extraordinary General Meeting: British
Gas Shareholders Approve Demerger” (12/2/1997), “British Gas signs up its
first electricity customers” (1/12/1997), “Centrica delivers generation for grow-
ing electricity customer base” (29/5/2001), “Centrica acquires further electricity
generation” (24/8/2001). Centrica Media Relations, Centrica corporate website
(http://www.centrica.co.uk).
186 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Coase, R., 1960. The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3(1):
1-44.
CO2Sense, 2010. A Carbon Capture and Storage network for Yorkshire and the Hum-
ber, Pre-Front End Engineering Study – Executive summary. CO2Sense Yorkshire,
www.co2sense.org.uk, last consulted on 26 November 2010
Conrad, R. and Hool, B., 1981. Resource Taxation with Heterogeneous Quality and
Endogenous Reserves. Journal of Public Economics 16:17-33.
Contreras, J. and Wu, F. (2000). A Kernel-Oriented Algorithm for Transmission
Expansion Planning. IEEE Transactions On Power Systems 15(4): 1434-1440.
CREG – Commissie voor de Regulering van de Elektriciteit en het Gas / Commission
de Re´gulation de l’Electricite´ et du Gaz, 2010a. Studie over de kostenstructuur van
de elektriciteitsproductie door de nucleaire centrales in Belgie¨. Studie (F)20100506-
CDC-968. CREG, Brussels.
CREG – Commissie voor de Regulering van de Elektriciteit en het Gas / Commission
de Re´gulation de l’Electricite´ et du Gaz, 2010b. Studie over het nucleair akkoord in
Duitsland en de toepassing ervan op Belgie¨. Studie (F)101014-CDC-999. CREG,
Brussels.
CREG – Commissie voor de Regulering van de Elektriciteit en het Gas / Commission
de Re´gulation de l’Electricite´ et du Gaz, 2011. Rente nuclaire : la CREG analyse
les explications dElectrabel et confirme sa position. Press release, March 1 2011.
CREG, Brussels.
Csercsik, D. and Koczy, L. (2011). Externalities in the games over electrical power
transmission networks. IEHAS Discussion Papers.
Dahl, C., 1993. A Survey of Energy Demand Elasticities in Support of the Devel-
opment of the NEMS, Paper prepared for United States Department of Energy,
Contract De-AP01-93EI23499.
Dasgupta, P. and Heal, G., 1979. Economic Theory and Exhaustible Resources.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Dasgupta, P., Heal, G. and Stiglitz, J., 1980. The Taxation of Exhaustible Resources.
NBER Working Paper No. 436, January 1980.
Davis, G., 1995. Learning to Love the Dutch Disease: Evidence from the Mineral
Economies. World Development 23(10): 1765-1779.
Demsetz, H., 1968. Why regulate utilities? The Journal Of Law And Economics 11:
55-66.
De Tijd. Uitgeversbedrijf Tijd NV, Brussels.
Deneckere, R., and D. Kovenock, 1992. Price Leadership. The Review of Economic
Studies 59: 143-162.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 187
Dixit, A., 1980. The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence. The Economic Journal
90(357):95-106.
Dixit, A. and R. Pindyck, 1994. Investment Under Uncertainty, Princeton: Prince-
tonUniversity Press.
Downs, A., 1957. An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. Journal
of Political Economy 65(2): 135-150.
Duffie, D. and R. Rahi, 1995. Financial Market Innovation and Security Design - an
Introduction. Journal of Economic Theory 65: 1-42.
Duffie, D. and W. Shafer, 1985. Equilibruim in incomplete markets I: Basic model
of generic existence. Journal of Mathematical Economics 65: 1-42.
Duffie, D. and W. Shafer, 1986. Equilibrium in incomplete markets II: Generic exis-
tence in stochastic economies. Journal of Mathematical Economics 15: 199-216.
E.ON, 2009. Financial Report 2009. E.ON AG, Du¨sseldorf.
Easterly, W., 2001. Global Development Network Growth Database. The World Bank,
Washington D.C.
Elia, 2011. Corporate website www.elia.be. Elia System Operator NV, Brussels. Last
consulted on July 12th 2011.
Elul, R., 1995. Welfare Effects of Financial Innovation in Incomplete Markets
Economies With Several Consumption Goods. Journal of Economic Theory 65:
43-78.
Elul, R., 1999. Welfare-improving financial innovation with a single good. Economic
Theory 13: 113-131.
E-PRTR (European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register), 2010. Database avail-
able from the European Environment Agency, Copenhagen, www.eea.europa.eu,
update of 8 June 2010
EURELECTRIC – Union of the Electricity Industry, 2010. Power Choices, Pathways
to Carbon-Neutral Electricity in Europe by 2050. Eurelectric, Brussels
European Commission, 2007. An Energy Policy for Europe, Communication to the
European Council and the European Parliament.
European Commission, 2008. Energy Sources, Production Costs and Performance
of Technologies for Power Generation, Heating and Transport. Commission Staff
Working Document accompanying the Second Strategic Energy Review, An EU
Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan. SEC(2008) 2872. Brussels.
European Commission, 2010a. Energy 2020 - A strategy for competitive, sustain-
able and secure energy. Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions. COM(2010) 639 final, Brussels 10.11.2010
188 BIBLIOGRAPHY
European Commission, 2010b. Energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond -
A Blueprint for an integrated European energy network. Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. COM(2010) 677 final,
Brussels, 17.11.2010
European Commission, 2011. Energy Roadmap 2050, Communication from the Com-
mission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. COM(2011) 885/2 final,
Brussels, 19.12.2011.
Eurostat, 2011. Statistics downloaded from epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.
Evans, F., Zolezzi, J. and Rudnick, H., 2003. Cost assignment model for electrical
transmission system expansion: an approach through the Kernel theory. IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems 18: 625-632.
Eydeland, A. and H. Geman, 1998. Pricing power derivatives. Risk Magazine October
1998, 71-73.
Fabrizio, K., Rose, N. and Wolfram, C., 2007. Do Markets Reduce Costs? Assessing
the Impact of Regulatory Restructuring on US Electric Generation Efficiency.
American Economic Review 97(4): 1250-1277.
Financial Times. The Financial Times Ltd, London.
Freedom House, 2011. Freedom in the World 2011. Freedom House, Washington DC.
Fridolfsson, S. and Tangers, T., 2011. Nuclear Capacity Auctions. IFN Working
Paper No. 892.
Gately, D. (1974). Sharing the Gains from Regional Cooperation: A Game Theoretic
Application to Planning Investment in Electric Power. International Economic
Review 15: 195-208.
Gaudet, G. and M. Moreaux, 1990. Price versus Quantity Rules in Dynamic Com-
petition: The Case of Nonrenewable Natural Resources. International Economic
Review 31(3): 639-650.
Golombek, R., M. Hoel and J. Vislie (eds.), 1987. Natural Gas Markets and Contracts,
North Holland, Elsevier Science Publishers.
Golombek, R. and E. Gjelsvik, 1995. Effects of Liberalizing the Natural Gas Markets
in Western Europe. The Energy Journal 16(1).
Golombek, R., E. Gjelsvik and K. Rosendahl, 1998. Increased Competition on the
Supply Side of the Western European Natural Gas Market. The Energy Journal
19(3): 1-18.
Grais, W. and K. Zheng, 1996. Strategic Interdependence in European East-West Gas
Trade: A Hierarchical Stackelberg Game Approach. The Energy Journal 17(3):
61-84.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 189
Green, R., 2003. Electricity contracts and retail competition. University of Hull (De-
cember 2003).
Green, R., 2007. Carbon Tax or Carbon Permits: The Impact on Generators’ Risks.
Conference on “The Economics of Energy Markets”, Toulouse (January 15-16,
2007).
Hall, R. and Jones, C., 1999. Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More
Output Per Worker Than Others? Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 83-116.
Hart, O., 1975. On the optimality of equilibruim when the market structure is in-
complete. Journal of Economic Theory 11: 418-835.
Hartley, P. and K. Medlock III, 2009. Potential Futures for Russian Natural Gas
Exports. The Energy Journal 30(Special Issue): 73-95.
Heaps, T., 1985. The Taxation of Nonreplenishable Natural Resources Revisited.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 12:14-27.
Heston, A., Summers, R. and Aten, B., 2011. Penn World Table Version 7.0, Center
for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University
of Pennsylvania, May 2011.
Himona, I., 2005. Oil & Gas: Nigerian Oil & Gas: Vital Statistics, Morgan Stanley
Report 10718962.
von Hirschhausen, C., B. Meinhart and F. Pavel, 2005. Transporting Russian Gas to
Western Europe – A Simulation Analysis. The Energy Journal 26(2): 49-68.
Hobbs, B. and Kelly, K. (1992): Using game theory to analyze electric transmission
pricing policies in the United States. European Journal of Operational Research
56: 154-171.
Hobbs B.F., Pang J.S., 2007. Nash-Cournot equilibria in electric power markets
with piecewise linear demand functions and joint constraints. Operations Research
55(1): 113-127.
Holz F., C. von Hirschhausen and C. Kemfert, 2008. A strategic model of European
gas supply (GASMOD). Energy Economics 30: 766-788.
Hoster, F., 1996. Auswirkungen des europischen Binnenmarktes fr Energie auf die
deutsche Elektrizittswirtschaft. Munich: Oldenbourg.
Hotelling, H., 1929. Stability in Competition. The Economic Journal 39(153): 41-57.
Hotelling, H., 1931. The Economics of Exhaustible Resources. The Journal of Polit-
ical Economy 39(2): 137-175.
Hubert, F. and S. Ikonnikova, 2004. Holdup, Multilateral Bargaining, and Strate-
gic Investment: The Eurasian Supply Chain for Natural Gas, Discussion paper
Humboldt University Berlin.
190 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hubert, F, Ikonnikova S, 2009. Investment Options and Bargaining Power the
Eurasian Supply Chain for Natural Gas. MPRA Paper No. 17854, September
2009.
Hugonnier, J. andE. Morellec, 2007. Corporate control and real investment inincom-
plete markets. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31: 1781–1800.
International Energy Agency, 2008. World Energy Outlook 2008, Paris, OECD/IEA.
Ikonnikova, S. and G. Zwart, 2009. Strengthening buyer power on the EU gas mar-
ket: Import caps and supply diversification. Presentation at KULeuven Energy
Institute Seminar, May 2009.
Ikonnikova, S. and G. Zwart, 2010. Reinforcing Buyer Power: Trade Quotas and
Supply Diversification in the EU Natural Gas Market. TILEC Discussion Paper
No. 2010-018.
IPCC, 2005. Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage. Prepared by
Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Metz,
B., O. Davidson, H.C. de Coninck, M. Loos, and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge
Jackwerth, J. and M. Rubinstein, 1996. Recovering probability distributions from
option prices. Journal of Finance 51(5): 1611-1632.
Janeba E., 2000. Tax Competition When Governments Lack Commitment: Ex-
cess Capacity as a Countervailing Threat. The American Economic Review 90(5):
1508-1519.
Jepma, C.J., 2001. Gaslevering onder druk: invloed van de Richtlijnen van de DTe
op de Nederlandse gasstromen. April 2001. Groningen/Paterswolde, Stichting JIN.
Johnson N, Ogden J, 2010. Detailed spatial modeling of carbon capture and storage
(CCS) infrastructure deployment in the southwestern United States. Proceedings
of the 10th International Conference on Greenhouse Gas Control Technologies
(GHGT-10), 19-23 September 2010, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Energy Pro-
cedia, forthcoming
Johnston, D., 1994. Global petroleum systems compared by contractor take. Oil &
Gas Journal Dec 12 1994: 47-50.
Johnston, D., 1999. Maturing planet, tougher terms change upstream landscape. Oil
& Gas Journal Dec 13 1999: 16-20.
Johnston, D., 2003. International Exploration Economics, Risk, and Contracts Anal-
ysis. PennWell Books, Tulsa, Oklahoma.
Karl, T. L., 1997. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States, Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M., 2010. Governance Matters IX: Ag-
gregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2009, Washington, D.C.: The
World Bank.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 191
Kleindorfer, P., Wu, D.-J. and Fernando, C. (2001). Strategic gaming in electric
power markets. European Journal of Operational Research 130:156-168.
Krugman, P., 1987. The narrow moving band, the Dutch disease, and the competitive
consequences of Mrs. Thatcher: notes on trade in the presence of dynamic scale
economies. Journal of Development Economics 27: 41-55.
Lal, D., 1995. Why growth rates differ. The political economy of social capability in
21 developing countries. In: B. Koo and D. Perkins (eds.), Social Capability and
Long-Run Economic Growth, Basingstoke: Macmillan: 288-309.
Lise W., B. Hobbs and F. van Oostvoorn, 2008. Natural gas corridors between the
EU and its main suppliers: Simulation results with the dynamic GASTALE model.
Energy Policy 36: 1890-1906.
Mankiw, G. and M. Whinston, 1986. Free Entry and Social Inefficiency. The RAND
Journal of Economics 17(1): 48-58.
Marshall, M. and Jaggers, K., 2010. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Character-
istics and Transitions, 1800-2010, Maryland: Center for Systemic Peace (CSP).
Maskin, E., 1999. Uncertaintyand entry deterrence. Economic Theory 14: 429-437.
Mathiesen, L., K. Roland and K. Thonstad, 1987. The European natural gas market:
degrees of market power on the selling side, in Golombek et al. (1987).
Matthes F.C., 2010. Auswertungsaktualisierung des am 5. September 2010 ausge-
handelten Modells fu¨r die Laufzeitverla¨ngerung der deutschen Kernkraftwerke.
O¨ko-Institut e.V., Berlin.
Mendelevitch R, Herold J, Oei P-Y, Tissen A, 2010. CO2 Highways for Europe -
Modeling a Carbon Capture, Transport and Storage Infrastructure for Europe.
DIW Discussion Paper 1052, September 2010. Deutsches Institut fu¨r Wirtschafts-
forschung, Berlin
Miaoa, J. and N. Wang, 2007.Investment, consumption, and hedging under incom-
plete markets. Journal of Financial Economics 86: 608-642.
Middleton R., Bielicki J., 2009. A scalable infrastructure model for carbon capture
and storage: SimCCS. Energ Policy 37: 1052-1060
Milne, F. and H. M. Shefrin, 1987. Information and securities: A note on Pareto
dominance and second best. Journal of Economic Theory 43: 314-328.
Modigliani, F., 1958. New Developments on the Oligopoly Front, The Journal of
Political Economy 66(3): 215-232.
Morbee, J., Serpa J., Tzimas E., 2010. The Evolution of the Extent and the Invest-
ment Requirements of a Trans-European CO2 Transport Network. JRC Scientific
and Technical Report Series, EUR 24565 EN. Publications Office of the European
Union, Luxembourg
192 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Morbee, J., Serpa, J. and Tzimas, E., 2012. Optimised Deployment of a European
CO2 Transport Network. International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control 7: 48-
61.
Mulder, M. and G. Zwart, 2006. Government involvement in liberalised gas markets,
CPB document No 110, Centraal Planbureau, Netherlands.
Mulligan, C., Gil, R. and Sala-i-Martin, X., 2004. Do Democracies Have Differ-
ent Public Policies than Nondemocracies? The Journal of Economic Perspectives
18(1): 51-74.
Neuhoff, K. and C. von Hirschhausen, 2005. Long-term contracts vs. short-term trade
of natural gas – A European perspective, Working paper University of Cambridge.
Newberry D.M., European Deregulation: Problems of liberalising the electricity in-
dustry, 2002, European Economic Review, 46, pp 919-927.
Niskanen, W., 1997. Autocratic, Democratic, and Optimal Government. Economic
Inquiry 35:464-479.
Nordhaus, W., 1974. The 1974 Report of the President’s Council of Economic Advis-
ers: Energy in the Economic Report. American Economic Review 64(4): 558-565.
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2011. The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate’s
FactPages. http://factpages.npd.no/factpages/. Last consulted on August
22nd 2011.
Oh, G., 1996. Some results in the CAPM with nontraded endowments. Management
Science 42: 286-293.
OME – Observatoire Me´diterrane´en de l’Energie, 2002. Assessment of internal and
external gas supply options for the EU, evaluation of the supply costs of new natural
gas supply projects to the EU and an investigation of related financial requirements
and tools, Study for the European Commission.
Oum, Y., Oren, S., and Deng, S., 2006. Hedging Quantity Risks with Standard Power
Options in a Competitive Wholesale Electricity Market. March 24, 2006, Eleventh
Annual POWER Research Conference on Electricity Regulation and Restructur-
ing, UCEI, Berkeley.
Palsson, A.-M., 1996. Does the degree of relative risk aversion vary with household
characteristics? Journal of Economic Psychology 17: 771-787.
Peltzman, S., 1976. Toward a more general theory of regulation. Journal of Law and
Economics, 19:211-240.
Perrakis, S. and G.Warskett, 1983. Capacity and Entry Under Demand Uncertainty.
The Review of Economic Studies 50(3): 495-511.
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G., 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Pol-
icy. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 193
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G., 2003. The Economic Effects of Constitutions: What
do the data say? MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Peterson, F., 1978. A Model of Mining and Exploring for Exhaustible Resources.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 5: 236-251.
Pindyck, R., 1978. The Optimal Exploration and Production of Nonrenewable Re-
sources. Journal of Political Economy 86(5):841-861.
Platts, 2010. PowerVision database, version 2010. Platts (The McGraw-Hill Compa-
nies), New York.
Various specialized and general press sources, 2006. Several articles from January to
August 2006, and January 2009 from International Herald Tribune (Paris, The
New York Times Company), De Tijd (Brussels, Uitgeversbedrijf Tijd NV).
Riordan, M., 1984. On Delegating Price Authority to a Regulated Firm. The RAND
Journal of Economics 15(1): 108-115.
Robinson, J. A., Torvik, R. and Verdier, T., 2006. Political foundations of the re-
source curse. Journal of Development Economics 79(2): 447-468.
Rubinstein, M., 1994. Implied binomial trees. Journal of Finance 49: 771-818.
Sachs, J. and Warner, A., 1995. Natural resource abundance and economic growth,
NBER Working Paper 5398.
Salanie´ B., 2003. The Economics of Taxation. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts.
Schmalensee, R., 1981. Economiesof Scale and Barriers to Entry. The Journal of
Political Economy: 89(6): 1228-1238.
Schmoker, J. and Klett, T., 2000. U.S. Geological Survey Assessment Model for
Undiscovered Conventional Oil, Gas, and NGL Resources – The Seventh Approx-
imation. In USGS (2000).
Schro¨ter, J., 2004. Auswirkungen des europa¨ischen Emissionshandelssystems auf den
Kraftwerkseinsatz in Deutschland, Diploma Thesis, Berlin University of Technol-
ogy, Institute of Power Engineering.
Shapley, LS, 1953. A Value for n-person Games. In Contributions to the Theory of
Games, volume II, by H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker, editors. Annals of Mathe-
matical Studies 28: 307-317.
Siddiqui, A. S., 2003. Managing electricity reliability risk through the forward mar-
kets. Networks and Spatial Economics 3: 225-263
Singh, N. and X. Vives, 1984. Price and quantity competition in a differentiated
duopoly. RAND Journal of Economics 15(4): 546-554.
Solow, R. and Wan, F., 1976. Extraction Costs in the Theory of Exhaustible Re-
sources. The Bell Journal of Economics 7(2): 359-370.
194 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Spence, M., 1977. Entry, capacity,investment and oligopolistic pricing. The Bell Jour-
nal of Economics 8(2): 534-544.
Staum, J., 2008. Incomplete Markets. In: Birge, J.R. and V. Linetsky, eds., Hand-
books in Operations Research and Management Science 15: 511-563.
Stigler, G., 1971. The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and
Management Science 2:3-21.
Stiglitz, J., 1976. Monopoly and the Rate of Extraction of Exhaustible Resources.
The American Economic Review 66(4): 655-661.
Stock, J., Wright, J. and Yogo, M., 2002. A survey of weak instruments and weak
identification in generalized method of moments. Journal of Business & Economic
Statistics 20:518-529.
Stutzer, M., 1996. A simple nonparametric approach to derivative security valuation.
Journal of Finance 51: 1633-1652.
Sylos Labini, P., 1969. Oligopoly and Technical Progress, Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
The Economist. The Economist Newspaper Limited, London.
Tordo, S., 2006. Fiscal Systems for Hydrocarbons: Design Issues, World Bank Work-
ing Paper No. 123.
Torvik, R., 2002. Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare. Journal of Development
Economics 67: 455-470.
Train, K., 1991. Optimal Regulation: The Economic Theory of Natural Monopoly
Kenneth Train. Cambridge, The MIT Press.
Ulph, A. and G. Folie, 1980. Economic Implications of Stackelberg and Nash-Cournot
Equilibria. Journal of Economics 40(3-4): 343-354.
USGS World Energy Assessment Team, 2000. U.S. Geological Survey World
Petroleum Assessment 2000 – Description and Results. U.S. Geological Survey
Digital Data Series - DDS-60. USGS Information Services, Denver, CO.
van der Ploeg, F., 2008. Why do many resource-rich countries have negative genuine
saving? Anticipation of better times, or rapacious rent-seeking, CEPR Discussion
Paper No. 7021.
van der Ploeg, F., 2011. Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing? Journal of Economic
Literature 49(2): 366-420.
Van Meurs, A.P. and Seck, A., 1997. Government takes decline as nations diversify
terms to attract investment. Oil & Gas Journal May 26 1997: 35-40.
van Wijnbergen, S., 1984. The ‘Dutch disease’: A Disease After All? The Economic
Journal 94(373): 41-55.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 195
Vangkilde-Pedersen, T, Kirk K, Smith N, Maurand N, Wojcicki A, Neele F, Hendriks
C, LeNindre Y-M, Antonsen KL, 2009. D42 GeoCapacity Final Report. EU Geo-
Capacity project - Assessing European Capacity for Geological Storage of Carbon
Dioxide. Available from www.geology.cz/geocapacity.
Ventosa M., Baillo A., Ramos A., Rivier M., 2005. Electricity market modeling
trends. Energy Policy 33: 897-913.
VGE, 2006. Jahrbuch der europa¨ischen Energie- und Rohstoffwirtschaft 2006. Essen:
Verlag Glckauf GmbH.
von Weizsa¨cker, C., 1980.A Welfare Analysis of Barriers to Entry. The Bell Journal
of Economics 11(2): 399-420.
Weber A., 1909. U¨ber den Standort der Industrie.
Wei J.Y., Smeers Y., 1999. Spatial oligopolistic electricity models with cournot gen-
erators and regulated transmission prices. Operations Research 47(1): 102-112.
Willems, B., 2006. Virtual divestitures, will they make a difference? Cournot compe-
tition, option markets and efficiency. CSEM Working Papers, May 2006, Berkeley.
Willems, B. and J. Morbee, 2010. Market completeness: How options affect hedging
and investmentsin the electricity sector. Energy Economics 32: 786–795.
Willems B., Rumiantseva I., Weigt H., 2009. Cournot versus supply functions: what
does the data tell us? Energy Economics 31: 38-47.
Willen, P., 2005. New financial markets: Who gains and who loses. Economic Theory
26: 141-166.
Wolfram, C., 1999. Measuring duopoly power in the British electricity spot market.
American Economic Review 89: 805-826.
The World Bank, 2011. World Development Indicators & Global Development Fi-
nance. May 2011, The World Bank, Washington D.C.
Zero Emissions Platform (ZEP), 2011. The Costs of CO2 Storage. Brussels, European
Technology Platform for Zero Emission Fossil Fuel Power Plants.
196 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Propositions
1. Electrabel will charge and should charge the price of freely obtained CO2
emission allowances to its customers.
2. There is no shortage of engineers and scientists.
3. Belgium’s very high (75%) marginal tax rate on labor (including VAT)
may improve happiness.
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